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Abstract
In this dissertation, I examine questions concerning space, perception, everyday creativity,
and the social ordering of the senses, and go on to describe a class of creative urban practices
that I name the arts of the street. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, street
performance (busking), street art in the usual sense (graffiti, murals, postering, etc.), punk,
hip hop culture, and skateboarding (street skating). As disparate as they may seem, all of
these practices share certain key characteristics: they are forms of everyday creativity that
claim space according to their own intentions, in opposition to the dominant socio-political
order. They are forms of minor resistance that suggest other ways of understanding,
experiencing, and (re)producing the shared spaces of everyday life. Although concerned with
concrete everyday practices and forms of knowledge, this work is primarily a theoretical
investigation; as such, I construct a basis for my claims by putting the phenomenology of
Maurice Merleau-Ponty in conversation with Henri Lefebvre’s critical analyses of space and
everyday life in the context of late-stage capitalism. Additionally, I engage with a wide range
of anthropological, sociological, and philosophical literature to argue that these diverse arts,
which are directly tied to the concept of ‘the street’—itself a transitory and undetermined
space of possibility—offer opportunities to enact other spaces of encounter and exchange,
and that they exemplify a fundamental creative capacity that exceeds the managerial logic of
capitalism. I show that these everyday arts represent the minor practices of bricolage, of the
amateur, and of a collective sense of creativity that is fundamental to our perceptual
experience but that never assumes formal properties, never acquires an identity. The arts of
the street draw upon the common human abilities of curiosity, do-it-yourself
experimentation, and of ordinary speech, and can draw our attention to a pre-reflexive
corporeal presence that binds us to the world and each other. They thus demonstrate that it is
possible to perceive, conceive, and live (in) urban space in different, possibly more equitable,
ways.
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Summary for Lay Audience
In this dissertation, I examine theoretical questions concerning social space, sense perception,
everyday creativity, and how the senses are conceived of according to changing social and
historical conditions. I look to a range of philosophical, anthropological, sociological and
other literature to show that there is a certain collective sense of being that generally escapes
our conscious attention in our everyday lives, but that we can still have access to. I go on to
describe a class of creative urban practices that I name the arts of the street. These include,
but are not necessarily limited to, street performance (busking), street art in the usual sense
(graffiti, murals, postering, stenciling, etc.), punk, hip hop culture, and skateboarding (street
skating). As different as they may seem from each other, they share certain essential
characteristics: they all engage with public space in ways that it was not designed for; and,
they are tied directly to the concept of ‘the street,’ as a transitory space of possibility. They
thus act as forms of creative resistance by demonstrating other ways of conceiving of and
using shared urban spaces. Moreover, these ‘arts’ express a collective sense of being that is
tied to the common human abilities of curiosity, do-it-yourself experimentation, and of
ordinary speech. In this way, they draw our attention to a pre-reflexive (or pre-conscious)
bodily self-awareness that binds us to the world and to each other. The arts of the street thus
demonstrate that it is possible to perceive, conceive, and live (in) urban space in different,
possibly more equitable, ways.
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Introduction
0 General Introduction
This dissertation works towards an understanding of a loose grouping of creative urban
practices that, tied directly to the spatial and socio-sensorial realities of modern urban
life, act as forms of resistance that can enable different ways of understanding and using
urban public space. By extension, these practices can challenge the routinized and largely
unrecognized (in our daily lives) socio-corporeal norms and habits that help support the
political and economic order of late-stage capitalism. I call this class of practices the arts
of the street, although they do not all necessarily conform to what is often considered
‘art’ in the usual vernacular sense. Rather, as will be seen, they constitute arts in a wider
sense of being creative techne—that is: cohesions of material technologies and associated
mental-corporeal dispositions and operations—that can instill in both practitioner and
casual witness (the passerby in the street) an awareness of the potential for difference and
the new that inhere in the world and in our everyday intercorporeal relations.
The research that informs this text began as an investigation into how certain forms of
popular (as pertains to a general sense of ‘the people’) artistic practices that are
specifically linked to the concepts of the street and the life of the streets might affect the
ways in which public and semi-public urban spaces are produced and experienced in a
broad socio-corporeal sense—how they are perceived, conceived, and lived, in the
terminology of the French Marxian philosopher and sociological thinker Henri Lefebvre.1
Busking (street performance of any kind) first suggested itself to me as an art of the
street—by which I mean a loose set of creative practices that can initiate improvised
moments of encounter and exchange outside of, or alongside, the planned use of public
space. As I demonstrated in my previous research with buskers in the Montreal metro
system, busking does not conform to the idea of a profession, however unorthodox, but
appears instead as general way of practicing an art that resists simple categorization and
offers an entry-point into a different way of experiencing space, for both practitioner and
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passerby.2 From this, three general questions subsequently emerged—questions that
initiated and have driven this present work. The first of these asks: are there other types
of creative practices that share key characteristics with busking, as an art of the street;
and if so, what are they? A second line of questioning, even broader in scope, considers:
what key characteristics link such practices, insofar as they are associated with the life of
the streets (and are, as such, both marginal and resistant) and can instigate different
ways of understanding and engaging with our everyday environments? And, following on
this, a further question: What is the deeper theoretical significance of how these arts
operate, and what do they suggest, in terms of perception, everyday creativity, and the
possibilities for other ways of experiencing—and sharing in—the world?
In these pages, I discuss a collection of practices that have assembled themselves under
the umbrella term of the arts of the street. These are, in addition to busking: street art, in
the more common sense of the word (graffiti art, stenciling, postering, etc.), punk, hip
hop culture, and skateboarding (specifically: street skating). This list is not meant to be
exhaustive or definitive. I explore these examples as they all involve various forms of
creativity that play with the possible in urban space and everyday life while exceeding the
logic of capitalist planning. As disparate as they may seem from each other, these
practices share certain essential characteristics revolving around the body and how we
interact with the built environment on a quotidian basis—an environment that is, for the
most part, designed and constructed in the interests of efficiency, productivity, and
rational management. By fomenting transitory counter-spaces within the common
everydayness of urban public space, the arts of the street challenge notions of private
property and the hierarchized politics of the sensible of global capitalism. But if these
‘arts’ propose a form of politics, it is not one that delineates a formal program or defines
itself within the context of existing political institutions. Rather, the arts of the street are
political insofar as they propose other ways of understanding and experiencing our bodies
and our interactions with space and with each other such that we may reorient our
perceptual trajectories, thus opening ourselves up to other ways of sensing and of being—
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ways that do not answer, perhaps, to the demands of formal planning and private
property.
The arts of the streets are by their very nature never fixed; they never achieve cohesive
closure but exist only as activities-in-the-doing, as transient projects that claim a space,
propose an altered common experience, and move on without establishing defined
properties of their own. However, as lofty as these considerations may seem, in keeping
with my basic contention that all interrogation always begins within particular conditions,
I must first account for the conditions within which this text was produced—conditions
that both completely derailed what seemed like a sound research plan and confirmed my
underlying claim that thinking—and thus, research itself—derives from, and is ultimately
inseparable from, our embodied presence in the world.

0.1 Research Approaches and Reorientations
It is my basic contention that any form of research—indeed the very act of mental
interrogation—is always already firmly grounded in the perceptual world. That is: we
cannot fully separate the question from the conditions of its formulation, no matter how
general the question may be. As such, my primary approach can be characterized as
phenomenological insofar as I take the body and sense perception as both object and
method of study. Moreover, I would characterize this as a critical phenomenology, as I
likewise understand both subjective experience and social practice as being situated
within historical and material forces that invariably help shape the approach taken in any
form of research. Sometime those forces seem to take the lead, in the actual
implementation of a research project.
I had planned to follow up on my previous research with metro buskers by carrying out
ethnographic fieldwork with other street performers as well as street artists, providing a
broader context within which to explore the questions I had raised. My intention was to
build up some amount of empirical evidence as I explored my core research questions.
This would supplement the larger theoretical considerations I laid out (in which I would
also briefly touch on punk, hip hop, and street skating), all the while keeping in mind that
how and what we think is closely tied to where we are—to the spatial, sensorial and
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affective possibilities present in our environment. And so it was that, in the late winter of
2020, the environment in which my research was unfolding was suddenly and
dramatically altered with the global spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Street performers
disappeared from the street, as did nearly everyone else. Travel possibilities were
severely restricted. Fieldwork came to halt, and finally, given multiple other external
constraints, had to be completely abandoned as designed. Where I thought I would be
engaging in a more active and participatory sense of public space, I, along with countless
others all over the world, retreated inward—physically, staying home and avoiding
interactions with others, and mentally, left with little to do but immerse myself further in
the texts that helped shape this present work. I muddled my way through, improvising
solutions as I went, in a way that—as I came to see—expresses one of the central points
elucidated in these pages. That is, I relied on a basic ability to ‘feel my way,’ to (re)orient
myself—and my research—without having a defined strategy in place: a basic ability that
is immanent in our everyday lives and that, as I will argue, link us all to a common
ground of perceptual experience.
However, while the accent of this dissertation shifted as a result of the changed urban
landscape, becoming a more purely theoretical text, my focus on sensation and
embodiment—including my own corporeality—has informed this work through to the
end. In addition to considering my own perceptual experience here and there, I include, in
the final chapter, some more detailed passages derived from notes taken during field
observations, as a point of entry into a more critical analysis. These observations took
place in late February to early March, 2020, and then intermittently from late June
through September, of that same year. The few (and very limited) conversations I had
with street performers took place prior to August 30, 2020.3 In the end, this work is
almost purely theoretical, yet the decision to pursue this course was made less for
theoretical reasons than out of practical necessity. Indeed, as I argue in these pages—

In October 2019 I received approval from Western University’s Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board (NMREB) to proceed with my original ethnographic fieldwork (NMREB project ID
114245).
3
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whether we think this in terms of everyday life or of academic research— it is the body
that leads way.

0.2 Overview of Significant Literature
This dissertation draws on a wide range of literature, from multiple disciplines and,
especially, work that moves across disciplinary boundaries. In terms of fundamental
assumptions and positions, I begin by putting two major figures of 20th century French
thought in conversation with each other: Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Henri Lefebvre.
Merleau-Ponty’s detailed analysis of perceptual experience and the body, particularly in
the Phenomenology of Perception, provides a basic framework from which I develop my
arguments concerning creativity, everyday perception, and intersubjective awareness. I
look to some of his other texts, especially sections of The Visible and the Invisible, in
further considering our sensorial embroilment in the world and with each other.
Importantly, for Merleau-Ponty the body can only be understood as situated, as tied to the
wider world just as consciousness is tied to the body. The body, a body, is always a body
in-and-of space. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty writes that “our body is not primarily in space
but is rather of space.”4 Merleau-Ponty’s influence can also be felt in much of the other
theoretical and more anthropological and sociological literature that I draw upon—in
terms of the latter’s description of embodiment and of perception as a gestalt experience
by which we integrate (or attempt to integrate) ourselves into our environment.
For Henri Lefebvre, body and space are also mutually productive; but, unlike MerleauPonty, Lefebvre develops his analysis from within an explicitly Marxist and post-Marxist
perspective, linking the sense of fragmentation and alienation experienced in everyday
life to the conditions of global capitalism and to its historical development. I draw
heavily on Lefebvre’s critical treatment of space and everyday life, with reference in
particular to The Production of Space and the three volume Critique of Everyday Life, as
well as his not-fully worked out theory of rhythmanalysis.5 By tying our everyday
experiences to the wider social, political, and economic forces at work, and by showing

4
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that the material-historical conditions that give rise to the crises of modernity are not
inevitable, not determined in advance, this Lefebvrean analysis shows that another world
is possible, that things can be other than as they are. For here is another underlying
assumption of this dissertation: there are multiple socio-economic inequities in the world,
to which we may all be exposed in one way or another in our everyday lives; and, much
of the material basis of such inequities can be linked directly to the mode of social and
material reproduction that we call capitalism. I employ, in the coming chapters, the term
‘late-stage capitalism’—sometimes with the prefix ‘global’ or ‘globalized.’ Although I
hesitate to speak of late capitalism as it may be premature to think that we are
transitioning into some completely different arrangement of socio-economic relations of
production, it seems clear that we have seen significant enough changes in these relations
to acknowledge a transition away from industrial capitalism. Late-stage capitalism, or
“post-Fordist capitalism” for autonomist and post-autonomist theorists,6 is characterized
by the distribution of productive activity into all realms of life, both globally (the
mobility of capital and the forced mobility of labour) and individually (subjective
experience turned into product and productive activity, deracinated commodity and
perpetual labour). But, while the logic of capital seems to infiltrate every crevice of our
lives, the unstable and processual nature of space and everyday experience is such that, as
Lefebvre argues, there remain moments of possibility in the everyday.7
In addition to his important philosophical and sociological output, Lefebvre is one of the
most influential thinkers in the realms of urban geography and urban studies. I cite a
range of such authors who have been influenced by Lefebvre’s work, including Tim
Edensor (movement, the body, and everyday spatial experience), Paul Simpson (street
performance), and Iain Borden (skateboarding). Michel de Certeau is another important
French thinker whose ideas appear scattered throughout these pages. His discussions of
everyday practices, of strategies and tactics, of the “ordinary practitioners of the city,” of
the productivity of speech, and of the creative murmurings of the crowd,8 all provide key

See Lazzarato, “Immaterial Labour”; Virno, “General Intellect”, Grammar of the Multitude.
See in particular Lefebvre’s “theory of moments,” Critique II, 340 ff.
8
Practice of Everyday Life, Culture in the Plural.
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elements in linking up various threads pursued in this dissertation. De Certeau’s work, in
many respects, complements that of Lefebvre and of Merleau-Ponty, but does so by
adding particular nuances and imparting a helpful vocabulary. This is also the case in
terms of other authors that I refer to, who adopt what can be can be characterized as an
ecological perspective of perception. This perspective is represented in particular by the
American psychologist James G. Gibson and the British anthropologist Tim Ingold (who
is himself indebted to Gibson),9 who argue for an model of perception that is situational
and relational, in which the individual (or ‘organism’) seeks out what is afforded to it
within its environment. Much like Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, this ecological
anthropology understands the senses as an integral system that is nonetheless subject to
changing conditions. Claude Lévi-Strauss, a major figure in anthropological theory, also
provides a concept that is of particular importance for my purposes: the idea of the
bricoleur,10 which is also important for other theorists that I draw on (notably de
Certeau).
Other thinkers of note whose work has some bearing on the formulation of, and the
conclusions reached by, this dissertation include Alfred Schütz for his more
sociologically applied phenomenology, Marcel Mauss for his foundational analysis of the
“techniques of the body”11 and Georg Simmel, for his descriptions of the sensory
fragmentation and social and affective estrangement that are the result of the rationalizing
logic of the money economy. I also draw on some of the work of Jacques Rancière,
invoking two concepts that prove useful for my purposes: his description of the
“distribution of the sensible” and his analysis of critical art, all of which will be
elucidated in due course. Throughout this entire dissertation, I invoke multiple sources to
explore questions and substantiate the arguments put forward: these are too many and too
varied to mention here, but I will note that, although making only a few appearances in
these pages, the 17th century philosopher Baruch Spinoza nonetheless makes himself felt
in terms of certain key ideas concerning the body, knowledge, and the emotions.

9
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0.3 Outline of Subsequent Chapters
Chapter 1 delves into questions of perception, space, and everyday experience by
working though some of the key ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Henri Lefebvre.
Although there are important differences between these two thinkers, what interests me
here are the areas where their perspectives on space and the body are largely
complementary. From this, I begin to develop an understanding of the everyday as
simultaneously mundane and unreflexive and as opening onto moments of creative
possibility. In this chapter I also introduce some concepts and considerations from
Gibson, Ingold, and de Certeau amongst others, that will reappear in later chapters. I
begin the chapter with an exploration of the co-constitution of body and space and the
“perceptual faith” that, according to Merleau-Ponty, guides us and allows us to negotiate
the apparent contradictions in our perceptions and in the world around us. From there, I
move through some of Lefebvre’s work on space and everyday life, discussing the
relationship between capitalism, everyday experience and the (re)production of space, to
show that the everyday simultaneously suggests stultifying repetition—the workaday
habits and routines that fill much of our days—and speaks of possibility and difference
and of a common ground of experience. I show that there is a fundamental element of
creativity at play in the everyday and argue that this creative potential can also act as a
form of resistance insofar as it represents an opportunity to produce something outside of
the planned use of space. This is important to my overall project, as it establishes the
ideas of everyday creativity and a common ground of experience that may (potentially)
be accessible to all. I introduce the concept of bricolage, taken from Lévi-Strauss, and
connect this to the modern notion of doing-it-yourself, or DIY, which will become
important latter in my discussion of the arts of the street (punk, in particular). I also
emphasize that the everyday creativity of bricolage, as outlined herein, is not a call for
something that might be—as a proscription for a program of social transformation—but is
a description of a basic capacity that inheres in our very being because it is already
present in the world, from the moment that we are in the world. I introduce the related
concepts of resonance and rhythm in this chapter, as they are relevant to both acoustic
phenomena and as descriptors in discussing the spatial and affective relations that help
structure our daily lives. These two related concepts reappear, independently and

9

together, in subsequent pages. I close the chapter by elaborating on the ideas of
affordances, orientations, and of projects (in the world), primarily as general concepts
but with some discussion of how these apply specifically to my research project. In doing
so, I also introduce and integrate some concepts from Spinoza that are relevant to my
discussion. Chapter 1 emphasizes the idea that our very being might be understood as
movement and activity—activities whereby we are projected into the world, as we
engage in projects in the world within which we find ourselves. This is significant for my
argument concerning interrogation and critique as rooted in and emerging from practical
activity.
Chapter 2 covers some of the same ground as the previous chapter but from a different
angle—one that is grounded in more practical considerations and that positions my
approach within a more anthropological and sociological framework. Throughout a
substantial portion of this chapter, I work through Marcel Mauss’ essay “Techniques of
the Body” in conversation with other work, drawing on and critiquing some of these
sources as well as the original text. I thus outline my own understanding of the
simultaneously social and material qualities of the senses and of everyday experience—
specifically within the context of late-stage urban capitalism. I then move to a discussion
of the ‘life of the emotions’ as pertains to perception and social experience, introducing
ideas from Georg Simmel in conversation with some more recent literature on the senses,
affect, and emotion. I go on to outline what Jacques Rancière terms the “distribution of
the sensible”—a way of describing and analyzing the relationship between the sensible
and the political12—as part of a discussion of the emotions in both collective and
subjective experience. I discuss the ways in which “the politics of the sensible,” in
François Laplantine’s terminology,13 have been and continue to often be regimented
within an ocularcentric hierarchy of the senses. I touch on the role played by architecture
in everyday experience, within a broader discussion of technology and the technological
affordances of modernity—in terms of how these help shape our perceptual experiences,
both constraining the possible and simultaneously offering new tools for creativity and

12
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action. I close the chapter by questioning some common assumptions about vision and
our perception of the world, and explore how these relate to certain aspects of modernity
and of European intellectual history. The primary goal of this chapter is to demonstrate
both the constructed and productive nature of the everyday sensorium, and to link the
perceptual affordances of everyday life to the operations of global late-stage capitalism—
to the rationalizing logic of the money economy and the material and affective
estrangement of modernity described by Simmel. Yet, as will be seen, this does not lead
to a total closure and the elimination of creativity, critique, and action. This chapter
largely completes the theoretical groundwork, begun in the previous chapter, for what
follows: a detailed description and exploration of the arts of the street.
Chapter 3 arrives at the heart of this dissertation. In this chapter I delineate precisely what
the arts of the street are and how they function—and why this matters. I begin the
chapter with a discussion of Rancière’s conception of critical art, and explore the
relationship between aesthetics and politics—where the first of these terms refers to
socio-corporeally organized sense experience, while the second is concerned with the
basic questions of how we, as a collectivity, are to live together. While not being
uncritical of Rancière myself, I find his account of critical art to be compelling on certain
levels, and I show that some of the key characteristics that Rancière identifies are also
expressed in the arts of the street. But, there is a fundamental distinction here. While
Rancière’s critical art ultimately finds its home—its proper place—in the institution of
the gallery, the arts of the street are precisely always of the street and as such they
possess an exuberant excess that cannot be fully be recuperated by the forces of
productivity and value creation. The street, as I will detail, is to be understood in a broad
sense—not simply actual roadways, though these too, but sidewalks and public squares,
back alleys and vacant lots, the fringes of shopping malls and city parks. But it is more
than just a physical location: it also represents a realm of social encounter, of habituated
daily practices and routinized dispositions (in a mental and a corporeal sense of the
word). The street, as I will argue, is a liminal space: the fragmented, unstable realm in
between public and private. Under the spatio-economic regime of late capitalism, the
street is today all be completely absorbed into, on the one hand, the functionalism of
‘progressive’ urban planning, and on the other, an unending spectacle of growth and
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consumption—a grand parade of packaged desires. Yet, by its very nature, the street
retains an indeterminacy, an ambiguity and excess that opens upon a sense of possibility
and the common creativity that inheres in the everyday. I thus tie this concept of the
street to our perceptual presence in the world and the improvisational skills of bricolage
already discussed.
The arts of the street organize themselves around practical concerns. Consequently, I
construct my argument with multiple concrete examples that illustrate specific points
concerning these varied sets of practices. I discuss examples of street performance and, to
a lesser degree, street art, punk, hip hop culture, and street skateboarding. These practices
are all ‘arts’ in a conceptual sense of techne, which I discuss as a combination of diverse
material technologies and sets of related practices and dispositions. And, while these sets
of practices may become habituated such that they alter one’s usual everyday ways of
doing and being, they never assume formal properties but remain ‘minor arts’ that claim a
space of their own and reappropriate a remainder from capitalist planning before moving
on. Busking provides my primary source in supporting my argument, but I treat each of
these arts singly and together, with some extra emphasis on punk and street skating. I
identify four essential characteristics that tie these different creative urban practices to the
transformative potential that Rancière attributes to critical art. Firstly, the arts of the street
express a plurality of motives, practices, and self-conceptions. They are concerned less
with accepted categories, media, or technical procedures of art than with the resulting
effects—the social and corporeal relations that are put into play. Secondly, they employ
themes and materials from everyday life, working in the style of the bricoleur with
whatever debitage and detritus is afforded. This is most obviously true of punk which is
explicitly characterized by do-it-yourself aesthetics, but all of the arts of the street rely on
a sense of improvisational play that draws inspiration from the everyday and the common
creativity of bricolage. Thirdly, the arts of the street distinguish themselves from their
quotidian surroundings while simultaneously threatening to eliminate themselves as ‘arts’
by being subsumed in the endless circulation of commodities. They are always subject to
capitalist recuperation—commodification—yet they also always posit an excess, a
uselessness that escapes the logic of value and measure. Finally, they may open up spaces
of encounter and exchange that suggest a reconfiguration of existing spatial and sensorial
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relations, if only temporarily. In this way, the arts of the street show themselves to have a
creative potential that acts as a form of critique: they demonstrate that it is possible to
have a different politics of the sensible by expressing other ways of relating to and
engaging with the everyday urban environment and with each other.
The arts of the street are, then, political in the sense that they manifest different ways of
perceiving, conceiving, and living everyday urban space. It is this point that I argue in the
final chapter of this dissertation. There, I bring together and elaborate upon the central
arguments put forward in the previous chapters. It is also in this final chapter that I
include a more self-reflexive subjective element, drawing on some of my field
observations. In this way, I ground my overarching argument in the pragmatic concerns
of everyday practices, as captured in phenomenological ethnographic research designs,
while also contextualizing both my own project and the questions behind it within wider
social and historical forces. This includes a brief discussion of the effects on public space
caused by the SARS-CoV-2 global pandemic. In this chapter, I draw on the postautonomist Marxist theorist Paolo Virno to introduce the concepts of the General
Intellect and an everyday virtuosity that speaks of a common creative capacity: a capacity
that binds us all to a pre-subjective perceptual sense of the body. I explore the idea of the
crowd—of the public, or publics, of the mass and the many—and link the concept of the
multitude, in Virno’s thought, to the common creativity of bricolage, largely by way of
Michel de Certeau. Finally, I show that while the colonizing logic of rational calculation
and private property has a seemingly endless capacity for reinvention (of its own terms)
and appropriation (of all it encounters), there is nonetheless a counter-logic of excess—of
the useless, of the negative—in the amateur virtuosity of the arts of the street that resists
the logic of capital. These arts—as distillations of the creativity that resides in everyday
space and in the shared spaces of modern urban life—demonstrate that this capacity (i.e.
the general do-it-yourself logic of bricolage) is a common trait that we all share with each
other.
I end this dissertation with a short conclusion where, after summarizing the main points
raised throughout, I consider some of the broader implications of my principal
argument—in particular, the sense of possibility in the notion of amateur virtuosity, and
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in the productive play of everyday bricolage that is encapsulated in the arts of the street.
Finally, I argue that despite capitalism’s seemingly endless recuperative capacities, there
is an excess in the world that always presupposes another, possible, world. The arts of the
street demonstrate this excess.

14

Chapter 1
1 Perception, Space and Everyday Life
This chapter works through the larger theoretical concepts that inform this project. I aim,
here, for a general description of the processes and practices that allow us to carry on in
our everyday lives without giving much thought to how we actually negotiate the
innumerable quotidian micro-decisions that our environment demands of us. I explore
how, in our experience of ourselves and others in the world, we maintain a cohesive
sense of self despite the ambiguity of our perceptions, as we attempt to ‘fit’ into the
world around us—as though ‘self’ and ‘world’ are autonomous, independently definable
terms. In a very broad sense the question is: how it is that, for the most part, ‘things hold
together’? That is: we generally expect the everyday world to function more-or-less
predictably, and we navigate the more-or-less familiar terrain of our daily lives without
giving it much thought. Yet, as we will see, upon closer examination the familiar world
may become strange to us as we become disoriented in our environment. Most of the
time, however, the familiar holds: habitual routine prevails over novelty, risk, innovation.
Not only how it is that we get to work, take care of children, procure nourishment, and
attend to the myriad mundane, and intermittently unfamiliar or surprising tasks and
occasions that make up the quotidian, but that we do all these things in complexly
coordinated relations with a multiplicity of other agents—human or otherwise—rests
upon an implicit and generally unexamined corporeal faith that integrates our activities
into the world while simultaneously obscuring the contradictions both within our
perceptions and in society at large. In the natural attitude I tend to assume, at least at a
pre-reflexive level, that my own perceptions are essentially correct and that there is a
stable continuity in my everyday experience of the world; and, I surmise that this is so for
others, as well. I go about my day with the assumption that the world will continue to
function today as it did yesterday: the buses will run more or less on time, there will be
food on the grocery store shelves, and the other people I encounter will behave in ways
that conform to my general expectations. All this seems to happen seamlessly,
naturally—unless some event radically disrupts my perceptions of myself and the world
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around me. In such an event, I may find myself disoriented, unable to find my perceptual
bearings. As disturbing or at times as debilitating as such crises can be, they may also in
some circumstances offer new possibilities in terms of our perceptual capacities and,
following from this, our relationship with others and with our environment. However,
this is a potential that can just as easily collapse back into the habitual maintenance of the
existing relations of social and material reproduction that underlie the everyday.
In the subsequent chapters of this work, I delve into more concrete detail to discuss my
central concern: the creative and critical capacities contained in our everyday activities;
how these capacities are formulated within public urban space in the context of late-stage
capitalism; and, how the arts of the street, which encapsulate these capacities, may
initiate the transformative potential that inheres in the everyday but may, equally, simply
normalize and reproduce the social-sensorial relations that underpin the politics of the
sensible of late global capitalism. In those later pages, I move from a primarily
conceptual description of the questions explored herein to a more applied perspective,
using concrete examples that illustrate my argument and ground it more firmly in the
corporeality of experience. In this chapter, I focus on working out a more theoretical—or
general—understanding of perception and everyday life, and the place of critique,
creativity, and action in the realm of quotidian experience. I begin with a general
consideration of perception and the co-constitution of body and world—or organism and
environment—by way of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “flesh” alongside an
ecological model of perception and action. This leads to a discussion of what MerleauPonty calls the perceptual faith, which, I argue, is largely consonant with the way that we
operate in everyday life, as theorized by Henri Lefebvre. Both describe processes that
naturalize socio-corporeal practices and attitudes while simultaneously offering us an
entryway into critique and—potentially—creative action.
In my treatment of everyday life, I draw in particular on Lefebvre’s work and continue to
do so in the discussion of space that follows. In the context of global capitalism, how
space is experienced, what it ‘means,’ and how it forms our everyday experience involves
an ongoing tension between the dominant forces of social and economic reproduction and
a deep-seated improvisational impulse that is as persistent as it is protean. This creative—
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and utopic—aspect to the everyday, I argue, can be understood as expressing the
common skills of the generalist, the amateur, the bricoleur, in a way that connects us all
to the pre-reflective corporeal awareness of perceptual faith. I also, in this chapter, touch
on the subject of sound and of acoustic experience, and introduce the concepts of rhythm
and resonance which will reappear in the subsequent chapters. Beyond their import in
acoustic phenomena, both resonance and rhythm serve as useful concepts in better
understanding and describing the interrelational and processual nature of perception as a
distributed activity amongst multiple agents operating within a dynamic environment.
This chapter ends by returning to some of the points made thus far, positioning my
overarching argument within a detailed theoretical framework that draws on multiple
sources.

1.1 Organism and Environment
The conceptual tools and analytic approaches that we adopt are inevitably derived from
experience, from the world—a world that both precedes us and that is continually
reformulated by our participation in it. For Merleau-Ponty, there is no a priori omniscient
perspective upon the field of experience that would make of it an object for us; we
proceed by way of experience toward knowledge. As such, “there remains only to study
what the world and truth and being are, in terms of the complicity that we have with
them.”14 It is the world as we come to know it that establishes the conditions of
possibility for any form of inquiry. To critically interrogate phenomenal experience—to
ask: What is there? What is the truth of my perception? And: might there be other
sensoria, different ways of engaging with the world—we must first have concepts of the
world, of a world and we cannot find these in a purely self-reflective, non-sensing cogito.
We must first experience the world; and, insofar as we experience anything, we do so
through sense perception, through and with our bodies. From Merleau-Ponty, I
understand sensation as providing the ground within which perceptions take shape, as
perceptual awareness coheres in the body—a body that is an arrangement of integrated
perceptual modes, that is already in the world of which I become aware in my activities.
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This perceptual awareness precedes and allows for my conscious reflections yet also
exceeds my critical judgement, reaching into the objective (i.e. pre-subjective) body of
sensation.
I walk along the sidewalk, cross the street during a break in the automobile traffic, enter
some building—a library, grocery store, movie theatre, my home—that beckons to me,
invites certain bodily movements and dispositions according to its construction,
according to the possibilities it affords me, and according to my mental and corporeal
dispositions, conscious and non-conscious. I exit and once again cross a street. As I near
the opposite curb I hear the screech of a car’s breaks. Although I immediately know that
the sound source is at some distance from me and that I am in no imminent danger, my
head has already turned, my muscles tensed: my body is ahead of me, it would seem. The
raw sensation of my environment that informs my perceptual being—and thus provides
the foundation for conscious reflection—animates my body such that I possess (or,
perhaps more accurately: I am possessed by) a pre-reflexive corporeal awareness that
allows me, in Merleau-Ponty’s phrasing, to gear into the world. In the moment that I
reflect on some sensation, I am already implicated in the world. I come to know the world
through my everyday activities, and it is by way of my body that I find myself positioned
in relation to others and my surroundings. “The thing and the world are given with the
parts of my body” in the same way as “the living connection that exists among the parts
of my body itself,” writes Merleau-Ponty.15 Before I conceive of an I who reflects, who is
engaged in such and such an activity, there exists some mutual correspondence between
my body and the world. In the act of sensing the world, the world also senses me, as it
were: a concordance between the flesh of my body and “the flesh of the world,” an
intertwining of the sensing and the sensible, for it is “the flesh of things that speaks to us
of our own flesh, and that speaks to us of the flesh of the other.”16
For the organism in its environment, there is a pre-established mutuality, a relational coconstitution between self and world. That we identify a given entity (be it individual
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organism or species, material object or social process) depends upon its position within a
broader environment that becomes its environment insofar as that environment makes
available—affords—certain possible courses of action. Conversely, any organism is a
participatory agent in its environment—which it shares with other like and unlike
organisms—such that its activities modify future possibilities. To inquire into possible
forms of action residing in the everyday involves understanding what the psychologist
James J. Gibson, who draws widely from biological, ecological and cognitive sciences,
names affordances. This term is introduced in his influential The Senses Considered As
Perceptual Systems and later refined in The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception,
where he writes that “the affordances of the environment are what it offers the animal,
what it provides or furnishes, either for good or ill.”17 Unlike a mechanistic
understanding of the world as being composed of passive objects and self-contained
active organisms, in Gibson’s ecological model the concept of affordances “implies the
complementarity of the animal and the environment.”18 Already, I am in the world and
my perception finds itself within a pre-established relation between my body and the
world.
I pause to note that in my use of the word world, I mean firstly the sum of all that is
perceptible in some respect (i.e. the ‘natural world,’ including what might only be
detected by complex technologies such as powerful telescopes or electron microscopes),
as well as all that might be inferred, all that we might suspect but do not know (whether
derived from scientific calculation, artistic imagination, or mythological understanding).
The world is, in this sense, also the possible world: the totality of all that is and that might
be, beyond our own individual human perceptual and cognitive capacities. I also employ
the word ‘world’ in various places in a more specifically vernacular sense—as in: the
modern world, or the world of high art, or again in a more precise sense such as the world
of urban everyday life. These more specific instances refer strictly to the world of human
experience. The distinctions should be clear, from the context in which the word appears.
When I speak of an environment, I mean a locale that is historically and materially
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specific, that encompasses a host of relations that work together along with the organisms
and ‘things’ within that environment in an ongoing process of auto-reproduction. An
environment has porous borders if it has borders at all; but, it refers to the specifics of a
local area with its own particular integrated conglomeration of organic and inorganic
materials. Such ecological arrangements, which may range from the relatively small
(such as a pond) to the expansive (such as the northern boreal forest), also include what
we may describe as the social, material, economic, political, and technological forms and
relations that comprise the world of human experience.19 Thus, the modern city of latestage capitalism can be thought alongside the so-called natural world without a sharp
divide between the two, without essentializing or romanticizing either but understanding
them as approximate realms, arbitrarily delineated, within the world in the very broadest
sense of the word. The urban environment may be drastically unlike a forest but both can
be thought of as aggregates of things and relations, of movements and materiality that
afford different possibilities to the various organisms within those particular
environments. We might say that, although an environment has a horizon, any
demarcation line will necessarily be vague, permeable, and transitory. On the other hand,
the world, in a general abstract sense, seems unbounded—or its limits are ever-shifting,
always expanding, and can never be grasped.
Thus, at the most rudimentary level, to be means to be in an environment. Experience is
always, in the first instance, grounded. The organism hollows out a space within which it
is; it is delineated by its space and expresses the possibilities that lie therein. Following
from this, we can state that space and subject, environment and organism, are mutually
constitutive. A given environment presents multiple but not unlimited, nor completely
random, affordances: these are the conditions that define the range of possible activities
open to an organism, the rough pathways already established in the tissue (social,
biological, psychic, as may be the case) of that particular environment, which mould the
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interests and desires of diverse organisms.20 At the same time, it is an environment in
flux, in constant self-reproduction, and the organisms that inhabit it are the agents of that
productive activity; they thus both sustain and modify their supporting environment.
There is a generative correspondence between the sensing body and the world: a mutual
resonance that expresses our enmeshment—or our “complicity,” in Merleau-Ponty’s
words—in the world of experience.21 Although I note some points of interest concerning
acoustic perception and the role of sound in everyday life at various points throughout
these pages, resonance should not be thought of as a strictly sonic phenomenon. Rather, it
describes, in a more general way, a co-constitutive relationship between organisms and
their environment, as well as between seemingly inert objects and material assemblages.
Indeed, according to Gibson, the dynamic flux that characterizes the organismenvironment relation can be understood as a form of “resonance, that is contact with the
environment” that expresses a mutual attunement between stimulus and perception.22 The
perception of resonance is the perception of the expression of particular affordances in an
environment, in the present of their actualization.
Resonance, as material phenomenon and as perception, happens ‘all at once’ and is
indicative of a pre-established agreement between organism and environment, and the
seemingly discrete things that are encountered in the world. When we say that something
resonates with something else, we understand there to be a consonance between them, a
“concordance between the exciting frequency and the object put into vibration”23 that
would imply some pre-existing characteristic or capacity in the resonant agents, such that
they are already receptive to such a relationship. Resonance describes a form of mimetic
relation that is not strictly or simply reproductive but one that is creative, generative, that
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adds to and modifies the fabric of the lived world.24 Acoustically, to speak of a resonant
force is to describe a movement of energy between a source of activity and a receptive
agent that is enlisted into the unfolding activity. For example, a tuning fork is struck,
causing it to ring, and is brought within a few inches of a second tuning fork that is tuned
to the same frequency: the vibrational waves emitted by the first tuning fork cause the
second one to also vibrate and sound out.25 This is similar to the process of ‘entrainment,’
whereby pendulum clocks in operation together will synchronize themselves over time if
sharing a resonant surface.26 That is, in both cases, there is a tendency toward
consonance, toward mutual atunement. As we will later see, this can also be true of
crowds in motion in certain kinds of public space.
The concept of resonance, as per Gibson, is helpful in imagining the pre-established set
of possibilities—the affordances—present in every activity: there is a latent resonance in
every moment. The organism (and I explicitly mean to include us in this concept: Homo
sapiens as species, and the individual subject: you, me) is fully attuned to—or, in tune
with—its space when it inhabits the world to its utmost, in the fullest expression of what
it is afforded in that moment. The organism fulfills itself in its niche: “we feel pleasure
and protection,” writes architect Juhani Pallasmaa, “when the body discovers its
resonance in space.”27 We can also think of the emotions as being forms of resonances
that operate between people on the level of the body (though this might be characterized
as much by dissonance as by consonance). Although I leave the subject of the emotions
aside for the moment I note, here, that the affective resonances between individuals that
are formulated as emotion are indicative of a corporeal mutuality that exceeds the
individual self or body—an excess that ties us to each other and to our shared
environment. And, while I am not concerned solely with the sonic properties of
resonance, paying closer attention to sound and acoustic experience is helpful in
understanding the porous boundaries between sensory modes and between the sensing
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and the sensed. Indeed, a broad and critical consideration of sound—of acoustic
perception, of the social role and embodied experience of sound, and of the potential for
sound production as tool for, and field of, critical research—can be a helpful counterweight to the ocularcentric bias that is present in much of the theoretical literature. And,
as will be see in later chapters, the sonic dimension of urban life has a special relevance
as concerns the arts of the street, toward which we are working.
This expanded understanding of the everyday sensorium emphasizes the “ecological
approach” that underpins my position—an approach that, according to anthropologist
Tim Ingold, “take[s] as its point of departure, the whole-organism-in-its-environment.”28
We are always already enmeshed in a world of sense. The question is, then: how is it that
we negotiate these myriad sensory stimuli, all the while maintaining a cohesive sense of
self? How do we ‘make sense’ of a world that is in perpetual flux? For Merleau-Ponty,
this happens first and foremost at a level of pre-conscious perceptual awareness that
inheres in my corporeality, when “my body is geared into the world,” such that “my
perception presents me with the most varied and most clearly articulated spectacle
possible, and when my motor intentions, as they unfold, receive the responses they
anticipate from the world.”29

1.2 Perceptual Faith and Everyday Practical Knowledge
At the level of our everyday activities, we generally assume that things will follow
familiar patterns; like all organisms, we seek predictable regularity so as to orient
ourselves within our environment. It cannot be otherwise: to make sense of our
surroundings and procure the needs for survival—to simply ‘get by’ in the day-to-day—
we cannot engage in detailed reasoning at every moment before taking action. It would
be completely impractical to consider all potential outcomes stemming from our actions
in every daily encounter and situation. We thus rely on a pre-reflexive understanding of
ourselves and our surroundings. We get by, at a pragmatic everyday level, by way of
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what Merleau-Ponty calls “perceptual faith”30: a sort of ‘taking at face value’ the way that
we experience things, which allows us to carry out daily activities without considering
the conditions that make those activities possible. This is not a faith based on conscious
inner reflection or a reasoned consideration of the world. Rather, it is founded in the
fleshiness of being, in our sensorial entwinement in the world—a corporeal faith that
precedes concept formation and provides the basis for subsequent rational thought and
critical interrogation. Insofar as the world ‘gives’ me my body and is the ground of my
experience, my body—in advance of my ability to reflect upon my own bodily
experience—knows its place in the world and does not interrogate the veracity of what it
senses, unless explicitly provoked to do so. Without our even noticing it, a perceptual
faith allows us to accommodate the contradictions we are faced with when we try to
reconcile our own subjective experience of the world with a more objective perspective
that seeks to account for the very possibility of a world, that there is something that I and
others can experience. “The ‘natural’ man,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “holds on to both
ends of the chain, thinks at the same time that his perception enters into the things and
that it is formed this side of his body. Yet coexist as the two convictions do without
difficulty in the exercise of life, once reduced to theses and to propositions they destroy
one another and leave us in confusion.”31
That there is a common world of which we are a part rests not on some universally
accessible self-reflexive consciousness but, in the first instance, on what Merleau-Ponty
designates as “natural perception, which is accomplished with our entire body all at once
and opens onto an inter-sensory world.”32 This pre-reflexive experience of the world—of
my body in the world—is the basis for any subsequent action or interrogation. Even as
we focus our attention and critically interrogate the world, we are still in and of the world.
The transition from a pre-conscious corporeal investment in the world to a reflexive
position of remove (or, rather: of partial remove, a feeling of holding the world at arm’s
length, even as we are always already invested in the world) involves a series of
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abstractions. But, the very possibility for critical interrogation depends upon an already
accomplished bodily disposition: a being-toward that allows myriad sensations to cohere
in such a way that, not only can I say, a posteriori to conscious reflection, that ‘I felt this’
or ‘I had that experience,’ but that this awareness constitutes the very ground of the I, of
the ‘I-as-the-one-who-perceives-that.’ In this pre-conscious sensorial cohesiveness, that
Merleau-Ponty describes as a gestalt experience, the world and my body are given for
each other, in advance of the perceptual awareness that gives me my body as distinct
from that which surrounds me and those others with whom I share the world.
Consequently, to carry out any form of critical interrogation we must start from our own
enfleshment in the world. We begin in a world that at once delineates the realm of
possible action and is always made anew, a world that is dynamic, processual—in a
word: experiential. “The world itself,” says Merleau-Ponty, “is the totality of perceptible
things and the thing of all things… the universal style of all possible perceptions.”33
A style: not a script or a stage, much less an abstract, reasoned understanding, but a mode
of being that confirms for us our place in the world alongside the presence of others. It is
my body, as a general project in the world, that is the precondition for my own individual
projects and the activities that sustain me and animate my life—a life that is at once ‘my
own’ and that proceeds from a shared realm of pre-personal corporeality. My activities
are my own but they are preceded by my body, and this body is not “the momentary body
that is the instrument of my personal choices and that focuses upon some world, but
rather the system of anonymous ‘functions’ that wraps each particular focusing into a
general project.”34 We take up projects in the world, first, in the midst of ambiguity and
imprecise perceptions relative to others and the world and in our use of the things in the
world. The pre-personal ground within which our own intentional activities take shape
cannot be fully grasped by us as individuals and implies some excess beyond our own
perceptions. This collective—because pre-subjective—experience of the world “gives
every subsequent perception its sense, and it is started over at each moment.”35
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The vital world of our singular actions and of historical-material processes must ever be
started anew. The social relations, corporeal habits, and material arrangements that
comprise the lived experience of daily life are not fixed and enduring: they must be
continually enacted and reproduced in our activities. The quotidian is maintained by, and
in, our daily practices—practices that are largely sustained by normalized responses to
existing conditions and thus tend to reproduce those same conditions. But this is only a
tendency, not a certainty. Just as Merleau-Ponty describes the world as a “style”, we
might think of the everyday as an ensemble of relations and improvisational techniques
that is put to use in a wide range of situations but that cannot be understood as a
comprehensive system or cohesive field. The everyday can be said to be less of a
territory, discourse, or performance than an attitude—which is not mental or physical but
both at once.36 And if the world and our presence in it is expressed as a style, it is one that
is malleable, readily adaptable, yet maintains enough of durability to be apprehensible; it
is one that seeks novelty as much as it is routine-bound—an attitude in and through the
body, a disposition that lends itself to a wide range of situations and conditions, while
still being largely constrained by past conditions. In practical terms, the field of play
between body and world, between sensation, perception, and reflexive consciousness,
articulates itself, in the first instance, in our everyday activities that weave the matrix of
our experience and give it a temporal and affective durability. “My body is wherever it
has something to do,” writes Merleau-Ponty,37 affirming the active, processual nature of
perception and consciousness. Perceptual faith, as a pre-reflexive practical awareness that
organizes our perceptions and gives form to our projects in the world, operates on a logic
of approximation and of ‘making do.’ In our everyday activities, we draw upon the
common skills of the generalist in a sort of improvisational and adaptive bricolage (of
which more, below) that matches the protean and processual nature of lived experience.
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Comprised largely of habituated procedures and dispositions—but never a fully workedout project that achieves completion—the everyday hovers mid-way between our
subjective lives and the impersonal movement of total perception. It is in this crossing
over that individual social actors inculcate the habitual spatial-corporeal practices that
reproduce the dominant relations of social and material production and reproduction. In
any given cultural-historical setting, a conventionalized set of mental and corporeal
attitudes/aptitudes, corresponding to the “stock of knowledge” as theorized by Alfred
Schutz,38 is maintained and reproduced both collectively and individually.39 This general
stock of knowledge (the conventionalized ‘ways of doing and being’) provides the basis
for how corporeal and spatial relations are enacted, according to the particular occasion.
As a sort of behavioral guideline, this ‘common knowledge’ informs us in how we are to
behave, carry ourselves, react—what is expected of us—in everyday situations. And, for
the most part, people seem to ‘just know’ these things.40 However, it must be emphasized
that none of the foregoing implies that all people experience the world in the same way,
or that we may posit some universal perceiving subject to which all particular
subjectivities would conform. Indeed, despite the social or general character of the shared
stock of knowledge, we cannot overlook the variability of bodies and their singular
interactions not with space, as an abstract category designating a universal condition, but
with particular concrete spaces. In reality, we all experience a space somewhat
differently from each other. In addition to the particularities of our own singular
experiences, factors such as race, gender, class, physical abilities all weigh heavily in
this. The concrete spaces of modernity are not neutral but built with purpose—primarily
to facilitate the smooth functioning of global capitalist exchange, and the reproduction of
compliant subjectivities. It is, thus, necessary to consider how built space and spatial
practices work together in allowing some people to readily fit into their environments,
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while others my struggle on a daily basis to do so, or are marginalized within everyday
spaces, or excluded altogether.
“One of the hallmarks of modernity is the effort to control and standardize human bodies
and to bestow status and value accordingly,” writes Rosemary Garland-Thomson who
argues that disability—or ability, for that matter—is never an inherent characteristic of a
person but is always constructed in a specific spatial and temporal context.41 Dis/ability is
defined relative to the space of experience, which bears the imprint of what has preceded
that moment. Spatial-corporeal practices lend a continuity and cohesiveness to our
perceptual experiences and ensure the reproduction of existing socio-economic relations.
Space is never neutral: the dominant relations of class, gender, race, language, corporeal
and cognitive capacities, and a range of other classificatory categories, help structure
modern human society.42 Everyday ‘casual’ racism, of the kind that may be barely
registered by its promulgators, is but one of the ways that existing forms of division and
oppression are continually re-inscribed through daily habits.43 Age is also an important
factor in our ongoing ability to gear in to the world—not simply, or only, as a natural fact
of our bodies but because of the social and material structures that guide the experiential
flow of our individual lives. As we age, or as our bodies change in other ways, we must
adapt the means that we use to get by as we attempt to mesh with our surroundings.44
Nonetheless, major disruptions to our perceptions may often, with requisite time, be
overcome and we adapt, learning to gear in anew, as Merleau-Ponty demonstrates.45 The
extent to which we may do so, however, will depend upon the nature of the disruption, an
individual’s prior history—their experiential trajectory—and what strategies and support
may be available. However, sometimes the conflict between a person’s subjective
experience and their surroundings is such that they simply cannot comfortably fit in:
bodies that do not fit in, that misfit.46
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Indeed, if the way that we orient ourselves in the world involves a gearing in, in which
the body finds itself at home in the world, we might, then, ask: what happens when the
gears slip, or simply don’t mesh? As Mariana Ortega points out, much of the literature in
the phenomenological tradition has been amply descriptive of being-in-the-world as a
form of being “at ease” in one’s wider environment, sometimes including an account of
disturbances to this ease, though these are typically treated as occasional or exceptional.
However, for those who are marginalized because of race, gender, physical or linguistic
ability, or any of the myriad other ways in which some bodies are marked in opposition
to a normalized sensorium (above all, that of the affluent, hetero-normative white male),
this is an everyday reality. “While all selves may experience not being-at-ease
occasionally, multiplicitous selves at the margins experience it continuously.”47 And yet,
it is possible for our own sense experience and perceptive capacities to be fundamentally
altered by being close to others who may be sensorially marginalized— ‘close’ on a
personal, emotional level, or even by working with and around them. For example,
Christopher Fletcher reports that, over time, doctors and other staff in a specialized clinic
for patients with extreme environmental sensitivities (primarily triggered by odors from
chemical compounds such as cleaning and personal care products) develop an extremely
acute sense of smell.48 This suggests that, in some instances at least, bodily co-presence
and focussed activity can help reconfigure our sense perceptions and change how we
engage with and understand the world. This point will become more important later when
I examine forms of everyday creativity and informal, or minor, art practices. It is this
apparent capacity to modify spatial and sensorial experience—our own and that of
others—that underlies the project at hand. It is my contention that the productive
disturbances to the dominant sensorium as may be encountered in everyday life can
provoke moments of possibility, of other ways of being and doing—ones that may or
may not be more equitable and inclusive but that invariably show us some other way of
engaging in our environment. We orient ourselves in the world by taking up projects that
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may then become processes of reorientation: “it is at the heart of the everyday,” says
Henri Lefebvre, “that projects become works of creativity.”49
The everyday allows us to reach into the pre-conscious being of the world and interrogate
the conditions within which we find ourselves. The everyday touches the objective body
of the world but can never contain it—there is always some excess beyond routinized
spatial practices, that escapes the most complex aggregates of social relations and
biological forms. Because of this excess, this ‘beyond-me’ whose presence can
nonetheless be sensed, the everyday presents moments of difference that stand out against
a background of average anonymity. Such moments may be ‘lifted’ to a more focussed
level of engagement, becoming material for new projects, for creative action. There is,
thus, a problematic at the core of everyday life that allows for a broader critical project—
one that sees reflected in individual subjectivities the ideological machinations of
capitalist interests. Rather than an individualized, isolated phenomenon, Dorothy Smith
argues that subjective everyday experience “presents itself to us… as a point of entry, the
locus of an experiencing subject or subjects, into a larger social and economic process.”50
The everyday, as much as it reproduces and naturalizes ideological obfuscation, provides
openings for reflection, for critique, for action. The very material-practical basis of
everyday life offers itself as the means by which we may take up creative, critical
projects that themselves exceed the half-lit world of daily habits and unreflexive sociocorporeal practices. The everyday gathers together subject and object within these
practices—in my pragmatic activities—and coheres in a space that it is both my own and
that of others. My body finds itself guided by the objects and relations that comprise my
materially grounded pragmatic concerns. My hand moves among things; touching them, I
bring a coherence to the world, to my vantage point upon the world; the things assume
form and solidity under my touch. At the same time, these things order space, guide my
hand as it moves among them. I am, according to Merleau-Ponty, both the touching and
the touched, and I come to find my place, as one body, among these things.51 And if the
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things in the world are receptive to my touch, if they show themselves to my sight, it is
because there is some shared nature between them and myself, some sympathetic
relation, some resonance that precedes my conscious attention and that opens up the
world of experience before me.

1.3 Space: Production, Reproduction, Rhythm
The activities and attitudes that comprise the everyday do not, of course, take place in a
vacuum: bodies do not move in empty space—there is no ‘empty’ space. Body and space,
self and world, are inconceivable one without the other. “Our body,” says Merleau-Ponty,
“is not primarily in space but is rather of space.”52 Space is here understood as being both
phenomenal and social. As an experiential fact, it is produced by human activity and sets
the stage for the ongoing reproduction of those activities. For Lefebvre, body and space
are co-productive of each other, much as body and world are understood by MerleauPonty as creatively entwined, never fully separable one from the other. Moreover, just as
the body and space are not fixed and entirely circumscribable but always unfolding in a
process of becoming, so too any attempt to theorize and act upon the world must
understand both subjective experience and the world itself as historically located, thus
bound to changing social, political, and economic conditions. It may be that the
productive correspondence between oneself and the world represents a generalizable
relationship; however, as both terms (i.e. oneself and the world) are not consistently
determined but historically contingent, it follows not only that the nature of that
correspondence as ‘actual’ (lived) is mutable, but that any attempt at critical reflection
takes place within, and is tempered by, existing spatial-corporeal relations. In the
contemporary world, these relations are formulated within the globalizing forces of
capitalism. We may, then, turn to Lefebvre’s analysis of spatial experience which locates
questions of alienation, action, and the possibilities for difference and emancipation,
squarely within the conditions of capitalist modernity.
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In The Production of Space, Lefebvre provides a detailed argument covering the
historical transition from what he calls absolute space to abstract space, and from thence
into contradictory and, finally, differential space. The first of these corresponds, loosely,
to the undifferentiated space of a ‘natural world’ before human conceptual mapping but
which already contains the human as species. The expansion of mercantile interests in
late medieval Europe fuelled the increasing abstraction of space, with the levelling power
of the money economy homogenizing all places—just as the nascent forces of capitalism
transform the use value of things into the exchange value of commodities. In the global
project of late-stage capitalism, space undergoes a process of homogenization,
fragmentation, and hierarchization.53 All spaces are stripped of their cultural and
historical significances, their unique characteristics suppressed (these differences being
reflective of the bodies that produce and inhabit those different spaces), producing a mass
of homogenized spaces that, then fragmented, are rendered exchangeable, discreet and
alienable from their surroundings. Finally, spaces are hierarchized and reproduce existing
relations of production, with centers of wealth and power dominating peripheries. This is
seen in everything from global geographic concentrations of wealth versus poverty to the
hierarchization of classed and racialized neighborhoods in urban centres, to the
individual’s occupation of—even right to—personal corporeal space in daily life. One
can think of the people who live in overcrowded tenements or refugee camps, compared
to those with spacious homes and even multiple homes; the people who crowd onto buses
and trains compared to those who drive alone, or perhaps even take an airplane, to go to
work; or, on a smaller scale, the space that each person occupies, feels entitled to, on a
bus or walking on the street, which is reflected in how we ‘carry ourselves’ and how we
move. My body’s position in space and the possibilities for action—the realm of
affordances that presents itself to me—is already implicated in relations of social and
economic reproduction. Yet, from within the fragmented space of late capitalism,
differential space, “the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” offers itself as a site of struggle
and creative impulse, of potential action and opening onto difference.54
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While we may find fault with Lefebvre’s tendency to universalize certain elements of the
historical and economic development of western Europe from the Renaissance on, his
overall analysis provides a viable framework for understanding what space is—that is:
how it moulds the field of our activities, how we experience it, and how we participate in
its production. In this analysis, space is simultaneously perceived, conceived and lived.
This tripartite understanding of spatial experience has its corollary in the three ways that
space is encountered and enacted; in Lefebvrean terminology, these are (somewhat
awkwardly) labelled as spatial practices, representations of spaces and representational
spaces.55 The first of these describes the standardized and naturalized social and
corporeal behaviours through which we construct the space of inhabitance that then
enables the reproduction of those same behavioural attitudes (in both the mental and
bodily senses of the word). Our spatial practices make up a sort of social code that we
adopt, and adapt ourselves to; all members of society partake in and contribute to the
reproduction of the spatial practices that structure our day-to-day perceptions and
interactions (though the ways in—and extent to—which this is true will, of course, vary a
great deal among individuals).56 Representations of space, on the other hand, involve a
certain technical authority. Mapping and urban planning provide convenient examples of
spatial representation: they simultaneously abstract space, make it productively available
to us, and define how it is to be conceived of and engaged with on a practical level (by,
for example, determining the flow of traffic and regulating the movement of citizens). In
the modern context, this mastery over space involves an explicit process of
rationalization, as space and everyday experience are increasingly quantified in terms of
their productive value. Finally, representational spaces can be understood as the lived
embodiment of space: space as locus and process of inhabitance, space as sensed and
performed, as unfolding experientially. It must be emphasized that, for Lefebvre, these
three terms—the perceived, the conceived and the lived—operate in tandem and cannot
be treated as fully separable, one from another: they describe spatial modes of being that,
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together, formulate spatial—thus social and sensorial—experience. The streets of the city
are not simply mapped out in the abstract but directly onto the body, through daily use.
Consider speed limits, crosswalks, parking regulations, bus routes, sidewalk maintenance
schedules, public accessibility building codes: all are representations of space that
discipline bodies and spatial practices, condition responses and impose limits on the
possible, thus helping to formulate the representational—that is: lived—spaces of
quotidian urban life.
The production of space is a multi-modal process that takes place simultaneously on
multiple levels: material (involving our bodies, objects and materiality, and the wider
environment), social-practical (the routine framework of procedures that structures our
daily lives), and subjective-psychological (which includes reflective emotional states,
creativity, and critique). Space itself, as can be said of sensation, is processual, thus timebound. And, in the context of advanced capitalism, the rapid and ever increasing pace of
technological change is such that the individual is all but overwhelmed by the need to
‘keep up.’ A constant frenzy of activity—of ‘updates’—ensures that our attention, and
thus our productive energy, remains hostage to market exigencies, to the necessity of
‘earning a living’ (a phrase that expresses well the socio-economic demand that one
justify one’s very existence in terms of productivity and marketability). Space comes
under the sway of a perpetual drive toward consumptive growth that envisions ever new
territories to absorb, well in advance of satisfying its needs in the present. No longer a
stable integrated field, such as might be said of absolute space, global urban space is an
amalgam of shifting, overlapping spaces held together and subsumed under the workings
of capital. Economic imperatives knit together disparate places, abstracted labour, and
distribution networks, but only insofar as they serve productivity and profitability.
In the contemporary world, centres and peripheries, countryside and city are all integrated
into one global urban project.57 But, this is a non-systematic project that always delays
arrival. That is: capitalism’s colonization of space—at the three registers of perceived,
conceived, and lived—is processual, always incomplete, an endless attempt to reach
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beyond its capabilities and produce new spaces to be territorialized. This unstable
‘becoming’ is, in a sense, capitalism’s greatest strength—it accounts for a seemingly
limitless capacity to adapt to and exploit new, unforeseen circumstances—but it also
suggests possible openings that point beyond its monetizing logic: ruptures that may well
up from within the subtle variations in subjective experience and the minor idiosyncrasies
that characterize both our own individual habits (in a socio-psycho-corporeal sense) and
the material particularities of any given moment in our daily lives. Fragmented and
malleable, space must be continually (re)produced by social actors whose individual
quotidian spatial practices are subtly but singularly coloured by their own subjective
positions, giving each experiential moment a unique inflection. Consequently, if
capitalism’s production of space, as an on-going condition of its own ceaseless totalizing
drive, always includes rifts, disjunctures, cracks,58 it is in these spatial interstices that we
may locate all that which is not (or not easily) contained and appropriated by the forces of
wealth-creation and market growth. In the marginal and the mundane of everyday life,
the richness of emotional, sensory, and socio-spatial experience that exceeds the logic of
capital may find expression and make itself available to us—to our interrogations.
Representations of space, in the Lefebvrian analysis, are largely conceptual and can be
universalized, or at least applied in the abstract to many situations. While they may
represent the language of the bureaucratic planner, their abstractive power also suggests
an inherent potential for critique, for theorizing the general. Representational space, on
the other hand, is precise, concrete, it “is alive: it speaks. It has an affective kernel or
centre,” writes Lefebvre; “it embraces the loci of passion, of action and of lived
situations, and thus immediately implies time.”59 The unity of space and time in the lived
body can be said to articulate itself as movement and as rhythm. In the ecological model
of perception of Gibson, Ingold, and others, movement is essential to perception. Ingold
writes that “far from working on sensations already received [perception] involves the
continual movement, adjustment and reorientation of the receptor organs themselves.”60
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As we move within an environment, the richness of our perceptual awareness increases,
is continually modified. The eyes are in constant motion; the angle of the head shifts as
the ears seek out sonic details in the surroundings; the whole body moves, thus imparting
an endlessly shifting perspective on the world, and it does so in relation to other bodies in
movement. The temporality of multiple, interacting forms of movement unfolding in
space is organized and expressed as rhythm: the everyday is structured by the rhythms of
our quotidian activities and of the wider relations of social and economic reproduction.61
From this, Lefebvre proposes rhythmanalysis as a method of critical interrogation, of
bringing into evidence the relations and movement of the body in space and the
reproduction of social practices that uphold the everyday.62
Lefebvre’s rhythmanalytical project understands the body—which is, itself, comprised of
multiple rhythms—as the gauge of the rhythms of the lived world. Not simply movement
itself, but the variations and irregularities that give each moment its unique characteristics:
“In the body and around it,” Lefebvre writes, “rhythms are forever crossing and
recrossing, superimposing themselves upon each other, always bound to space.”63
Perceptual experience is formulated into a cohesive whole and held together—assumes a
duration—by the patterned rhythms of everyday practical concerns, by the habituated
repetition of social and material processes with the minor rhythmic variations that
characterize any given moment and particular position. Rhythm expresses a materiallyemplaced temporal relationship between two or more elements, a dynamic unfolding that,
in its patterned regularity, provides an anchorage point for perception.
In the modern city, the rhythms of industrial output and urban infrastructure,
transportation and shipping networks, and the ubiquitous automobile, all help structure
what and how we perceive.64 There is a tension, argues Lefebvre, between the cyclical
time of ‘natural’ rhythms (the procession of seasons, the movement of tides, etc., and the
internal rhythms of the body: lungs, circulatory system, digestion, etc.) and the linear
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rationalized time of the clock, of the factory and the globalizing economy. We sense this
tension in our bodies, but can raise it from there to the level of conscious awareness. The
rhythmic structure of daily life is performed in and through the body: a spatio-temporal
process that is never complete and contains caesura, interruptions, unanticipated
concordances and discordances—polyrhythmic and eurhythmic consonances, and
arrhythmic breaks. As with space, the rhythmic structuring of daily life suggests a
potential for play, for improvisation, for appropriation and redirection. Major disruptions
to conventionalized quotidian temporality can cause one to “enter into another
everydayness,” says Lefebvre.65 The more ‘natural’ rhythms of life—deep rhythms of
biological processes and of long-established cultural forms and social relations—can
never be fully subsumed under the mechanized meter of economic functioning: the body
resists, it maintains its own rhythms. Whether through determined negation or sheer
inability, the body refuses to completely synchronize with, and submit to, the logic of
instrumental reason and spatial abstraction. But in more extreme cases, rhythmic
disjunctions and discord characterize the experience of the body that cannot fully gear
into the world, that ‘does not fit’ into the everyday space of global modernity, or do so
only with great difficulty. And these different rhythmic experiences imply a spatial
experience that is different for those at the margins—people living in shelters or on the
streets of modern cities, for example—but that largely goes unregistered by the majority,
such is the compelling force of entrainment that lends cohesion to social space and
everyday corporeal practice.66 Nonetheless, as with resonance, paying close attention to
rhythm can provide an entryway into a critical mode of being, as a means to reckon with
the largely unexamined processes and practices that structure quotidian experience.
Body and space, time and movement and the finite detail through which these are lived:
these, then, are the terms which underlie, at a primary level of investigation, the argument
pursued throughout these pages. In the next chapter, I examine in greater detail the
production of space in the context of late-stage capitalism and the formation of the
modern urban sensorium. For the present, however, I further elucidate the more
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theoretical aspects of sensation, perception and everyday experience. While I aim to
delineate a theoretically robust approach to these questions, I do so with the
understanding that all forms of questioning find their origins in the particular, in the
finite—in the fleshiness of the world and our own singular emplacement within it.
Moreover, the formulation of the finite, the material, the lived, is to be found both in the
mundane (re)production of the ordinary world and in the creative act of making—of
making the new.

1.4 Creativity and Resistance
It is in the minutiae of the everyday, in its movements and moments, that we may locate
what Merleau-Ponty calls the “anchorage points” that ground our experience by lending
form to perception,67 and that may become points of departure for a critical unsettling of
perceptual faith. It is in the everyday that pragmatic concerns—which can be thought of
as first existing at the biological level as a simple life-drive, the satisfaction of basic
needs, and from thence developing into the complex projects whereby we implicate
ourselves in our present world—cohabitate with a more abstract level of engagement with
the world, with our ability to think beyond our immediate circumstances and discern the
less-than-obvious ways in which our world is structured. In “the lived,” Lefebvre writes,
there is “a focussing of practical knowledge”68 that both enables the reproduction of
existing socio-material relations and provides the means to realize and mobilize an
intersubjective consciousness, with the potential to transform social and economic
relations. The pragmatic concerns of our ‘projects in the world’ underlie our ability to
question and to seek out difference. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s perceptual faith
accommodates the inconsistencies and lacunae in ordinary experience but simultaneously
presents us with potential points of entry into a critical mode of reflection that can
destabilize the ‘naturalness’ of our everyday state of being—of perceptual faith itself—
and force us to reckon with the incompatibilities in our perceptions of ourselves and the
world. When we focus our attention and closely interrogate the world, we begin to notice
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the inconsistencies, contradictions, and ruptures in the fabric of everyday life. “The world
is what I perceive,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “but as soon as we examine and express its
absolute proximity, it also becomes, inexplicably, irremediable distance.”69 We project
ourselves into the world and come to know it through our relations with others and our
surroundings, but there is also a potential for critique, for disrupting the uncritical attitude
of “natural perception.” Unsettling the corporeal confidence of unreflexive everyday
activity provokes a questioning of the taken-for-granted that may then inaugurate a
critical perspective and initiate creative action. “To know the everyday is to want to
transform it,” writes Lefebvre; and, to carry out a critique of everyday life “is to
understand the real by seeing it in terms of what is possible, as an implication of what it
possible.”70
Whereas perceptual faith might be thought of as a trans-historical condition of humanity,
a way of negotiating the indeterminacies of the world so as to procure the means for
survival and reproduction (both social and biological), the problematic of everyday life in
Lefebvre’s analysis is, as previously noted, specifically concerned with the conditions of
modernity. The modern everyday involves a process of mystification: the naturalization
of bourgeois values and of the socio-economic relations of mature capitalism—an
ideology of dominance hiding in plain sight. The everyday presents itself as a site of
possibility that can expose the ambiguity of lived experience, and in the process “leads us
towards a decision which will negate [this ambiguity] and reveal it, bringing it to an end
and unmasking it.”71 The ambiguity at the core of lived experience presents us with
dilemmas, with the need to make decisions: this tension, according to Lefebvre, expresses
a dialectical relationship between ambiguity and decision that drives the everyday. This is
not a determinative dialectic that achieves a logical resolution. It is an open relation that
always posits something beyond its own terms. In this sense, the dialectic in Lefebvre
bears a resemblance to Theodor Adorno’s “negative dialectics” in that both imply
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something beyond, or outside of, in the negation of the actual (i.e. of the world as it is).72
Similarly, Ernst Bloch conceives of a dialectic that, in accounting for nonsynchronism,
accommodates rather than overcomes the negative.73 There is a generative impulse
underlying our quotidian acts that, along with its reproductive capacities, aims for the
new, for difference. Although it coalescences in the commonplace activities of life, this
impulse expresses a creative desire for something other than what is: it implies a
movement toward action.
However, it is important to emphasize that this is always a potential creative capacity. As
Lefebvre notes, such “spontaneity is not always creative every time… it makes mistakes,
and it fails more frequently than rational prognostication and calculation.”74 Any moment
of rupture in the fabric of the everyday, when we are confronted with the reality of how
our lives fit within the wider relations of global capitalism, is just as likely—more likely,
even—to collapse back into unreflective passivity under the weight of ideological
mystification, as it is to initiate critical assessment and action. In this sense, there is a
utopic desire in the spaces and moments of everyday life: an unrealistic demand for the
impossible that may provide the necessary rupture with the determining realism of global
capitalism’s rationalization and commodification of lived space. It is an impossible
demand that defies the logic of planning, of the cartographic and the economic, that may
thus locate in the fissures of modern space openings for critique, creativity, and the new.
Only the negation of the present can inaugurate creative movement, difference, change:
“demanding the impossible may always end in failure but doing so is the first step toward
other possibilities nevertheless.”75 The negative is the necessary condition for creativity,
for creative acts; failure is thus a virtue, a strength. Failure, in this sense, can be
understood as a refusal to embrace achievement and a rejection of standard norms of
success. It then becomes a tactical operation that is ‘successful’ to the extent that it can
continue to fail and thereby confound the logic of capitalist economics, of productionconsumption ad infinitum. This dialectical impulse, which does not overcome but simply

Adorno, Negative Dialectics; Gardiner, “Everyday Utopianism.”
Bloch and Ritter, “Nonsynchronism.”
74
Lefebvre, Critique II, 218.
75
Coleman, “Utopian Prospect,” 349.
72
73

40

negates by refusing to comply with the terms at hand and thereby directs us toward some
beyond—toward that which is not yet—finds its most ‘refined’ expression in art.
I will deal more explicitly with questions concerning art and the space of politics, in the
exploration of the arts of the street toward which we are working. For the moment, we
may note the negative on which the possibility for imagination, for resistance, and for
creative action rest: it is the ‘useless’ work that, by being ‘good for nothing,’ resists the
commodification process. Yet at every turn, creativity and difference are threatened with
co-option by financial interests. Avant-garde art movements and elements of subversive
political programs are all too easily recouped by capitalist interests and put into the
service of private wealth creation, as attested to by many examples from the massproduced calendars of surrealist art to the multi-million dollar sales of (what had been)
street art—an art, moreover, that is formulated in opposition to the world of gallery art.
This seems to present a problem, if we claim that there is a procreative force in the
everyday that might exceed capitalist reduction. But this is only a problem if we conceive
of the creative act—that is, the production of difference—as aiming for completion, as
aiming to produce a work. Such a work may then act as a product and be available for
commodification, even if conceived and enacted otherwise. But the creative act, to
remain freely creative, can never congeal into a work or inhabit a proper position of its
own: “creation is perishable: it passes because it is an act.”76 If the creative act is just
that—an activity and not simply an object or an effect—it does not become objectifiable,
a property that is alienable from the context of its production. It never settles into a
‘proper place of its own’ and thus continually risks extinguishment. And so it is with the
utopic element in the everyday: the creative drive and urge for difference always risks
extinguishment in the largely monochromatic repetition of quotidian routines. The
everyday encompasses the very procedures that maintain existing relations of power, but
remains imbued with hope nonetheless. Hope is the utopic sentiment, and it is
inextricably bound to failure. “Hope is not confidence. If it could not be disappointed it
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would not be hope,” says Bloch; “hope is critical and can be disappointed.”77 Hope is
critical—it asks for something other than what is—and, insofar as it is utopic, it is always
on the verge of collapsing into disappointment. This fundamental drive can be seen as an
expression of a vital force that animates even the most seemingly simple life forms and
processes. If we understand the affordances available to an organism as given by its
environment, the organism is also stimulated by a desire for difference, for novelty, and
for distinction. The ongoing tension between simple replication—the maintenance of a
status quo—and the drive toward something other than what is—the irrepressible forces
of change—finds expression in everything from the ‘natural word’ (the world of
experience understood first at a biological, material and natural-historical level), to the
human world of social relations, to the constitution of a sensing, reflexive subject.
Operating on multiple levels, it is this dialectical tension that drives change while also, by
and large, maintaining the reproduction of existing formal relations (whether biological,
material, social, corporeal, psycho-affective, linguistic, etc.).
It is this dual question of ‘what keeps things the same, imparts continuity?’ and ‘what are
the mechanisms that enable change?’ that Karin Barber addresses in the context of
cultural-material forms and practices, arguing that “things do not last through inertia…
[but] are made to last, through intense human creative efforts.”78 The maintenance of
artistic traditions, ritual practices, and social conventions demand concerted and continual
effort: they must, therefore, achieve enough cohesive durability to be socially (and
materially) transmitted and committed to somatic memory through a process of
abstraction and incorporation.79 In fact, in many so-called traditional (or non-modern) art
practices, innovation and variation are, by and large, discouraged: the point is not to
express individual ‘vision’ or experience, but to maintain the forms that themselves help
maintain the wider cultural setting, such that it may identify itself in those forms.80 Thus,
while the idiosyncratic variances between individuals may be the basis for creative
innovation, these always operate against the backdrop of conventional practices and
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narrowly replicative traditions. This does not, however, imply that there is an essential
core to artistic forms and practices, any more than there is an enduring centre to
subjective consciousness; but, it does indicate that the embodiment and enactment of
these various practices, both express a tradition, belief, or ideal and gives it form such
that it may be taken up again and again. As Barber notes, this process is exemplified by
performance—dance, music, vocal and ‘stage’ arts, etc.—in the way that it conveys a
reproducible form which becomes a measure for future performances, while also making
evident the reproductive activity that goes into the performance itself. And if the ‘core
message’ of the performance is that it must be continually re-performed, this then implies
that there is no durable essence at the centre of the performance—or, by extension, in the
ritual, the custom, the cultural tradition, or the art practice.
Performance gives form to emotion and idea, imparts them with a transmissible unity but
not necessarily a stable identity. Moreover, this is as true of the activities and relations
that comprise our daily lives as it is of the more rarefied practices of the arts and of
rituals. As already discussed, our spatial practices and affective relations are given form
in our everyday reproduction of them, but they do not, thereby, assume a perpetual
consistency. “A spatial practice must have a certain cohesiveness,” writes Lefebvre, “but
this does not imply that it is coherent (in the sense of intellectually worked out or
logically conceived).”81 Our everyday spatial-corporeal practices operate according to a
certain perceptual faith that allows us to carry on ‘as though’ our activities are logically
and consistently formulated, yet all the while vaguely aware that we are always making
things up as we go along. Thus, improvisation is as central a concept as is reproduction,
in understanding everyday experience and, more specifically, in the examination of
various creative urban practices to follow in these pages.

1.5 Improvisation and Bricolage
Improvisation is not a matter of simply making things up freely without any constraining
parameters—an unbridled free-for-all. Any creative endeavour, any “form-giving
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activity… always draws upon the conventions of genre, and at the same time subtly
modifies them.”82 The play of improvisation takes place within a pre-arranged ‘field’ or
‘structure’ (musical, verbal, spatial, etc.) that provides the basic materials which the
improviser then attempts to rearrange in novel, unforeseen ways. In many contemporary
musical practices improvisation typically involves a form of free-play in which harmonic,
rhythmic, and melodic patterns may repeat themselves but always do so with internal
variations, such that the overall form (e.g. song, but also recitation, dance, even simple
movement) is unique in its singular enactment. All of this is done, however, against a
background of embodied standards and practiced skill.83 Indeed, improvisation is “a
defining aspect of music making”84 and is found, for example, in traditions stretching
from renaissance and baroque improvisational methods to modern jazz techniques.85 For
musicians, there is a virtuosic quality in improvisation that, in some traditions and circles,
is understood as the preeminent expression of skill. But there is also a virtuosic potential
in the minor practices that comprise the bulk of any one person’s life, in our mostly
unremarkable quotidian activities. In this case, however, the skills are those of the
generalist—the common abilities of the species, of the collective body of pre-personal
awareness—but always contextualized and concretely specified in their everydayness.
The ability to improvise, to work within pre-established terms and boundaries, might be
thought of as the most ‘pure’ or refined (as in: purified, condensed into a concentrated
form) expression of decision-making, of the free-play of the imagination. Accorded a
limited range of affordances, the individual nonetheless creates something that might not
have been predicted and most certainly would not be actualized if not for the precise
choices made, the specific options favoured over other possible choices. This ability to
work creatively with what is found to be already present in an environment—the at-hand,
whether material, linguistic, conceptual, etc.—permeates our participation in the world,
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from the most mundane tasks to the most celebrated artistic outputs.86 This basic
ability—in the sense of fundamental, collective, pre-personal—is a defining feature of the
organism engaged in its environment. And, it is precisely in the everyday that the
universality of our skills as improvisers is most eminently expressed. Although we tend
to follow standardized patterns and, in general, deviate very little from set routines, how
we do so—the precise, singular micro-choices we constantly make (though usually
unthinkingly) that, coordinated together, comprise our actual daily activities—is
organized in a play between precise repetition and random selection. We may follow the
same route home every day, but occasionally make or are forced to make unexpected
changes—for example, by traffic delays, a chance meeting with an acquaintance, or
suddenly remembering an errand to fulfill, etc.— that may present new opportunities,
sudden new perspectives and experiences. How we react, what we do with the unforeseen
depends, at least in part, on our improvisational abilities. Improvisation relies on tactics
rather than strategy, in the sense that Michel de Certeau draws a distinction between the
two.
A strategy, according to de Certeau, involves a certain formal relationship in which “a
subject of will and power… can be isolated from its ‘environment’… [and] serve[s] as
the basis for generating relations with an exterior distinct from it,” whereas a tactic is an
evaluative operation that “cannot count on a ‘proper’ (a spatial or institutional
localization) nor thus on a borderline distinguishing the other as a visible totality.”87 The
strategic is the method of planning, of a certain scientific rationalism; it delineates a field
and adopts a defined position, imposes itself on space and demarcates a place of its own
(or attempts to). The tactic, on the other hand, “does not have a place [but] depends on
time—it is always on the watch for opportunities that must be seized ‘on the wing.’
Whatever it wins,” writes de Certeau,” it does not keep.” In the context of the Western
musical traditions, we might think of the strategy as being the formal structure of the
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piece of music—with the written score uniting the logic of writing (and of the writing of
history) with the authority of the map—and of tactics as the improvisational skills of the
performers who insert themselves into the text of the strategy, always with a general
sense of the whole but without ever knowing precisely where the next action will lead to.
The tactical, like the improvisational, “constantly manipulate events in order to turn them
into ‘opportunities.’”88 But those opportunities are ever mobile and mutable. The strategy
is the domain of formal dimensions and definitions, of institutional power, while tactics
belong with the particular interests of the everyday inhabitants of space as actual,
concrete, experiential—those who use but do not necessarily own: “the ordinary
practitioners of the city.”89 In opposition to the top-down strategies of urban planners and
developers who employ the discourse of property (“the proper”—le propre), the everyday
users of space, according to de Certeau, appropriate what scraps of time they can, and in
the process subtly modify the future affordances available within strategized space. The
strategic, then, expresses a will to dominate and codify space, defining it “in conformity
within abstract models” while the tactical aims to “use, manipulate, and divert these
spaces” according to the singular desires and motivations of the everyday user of those
spaces.90
Our ability to improvise, to creatively act in-the-moment—upon which the tactics of
everyday inhabitance rely—amounts to a form of bricolage, a way of working with the
at-hand without a master design in mind, using a loose set of skills that is transposable
across diverse settings, materials, and projects. The French verb bricoler means, loosely,
to fashion, ‘tinker with’ or ‘cobble together,’ and implies a degree of playful
experimentation without a project assuming authority. The concept enters the
anthropological and wider theoretical literature via Claude Lévi-Strauss, who describes
bricolage as a form of science (in the sense of a practical techne) that is not inferior or
‘primitive’ relative to modern science (science proper, the way that the word is typically
used in the contemporary) but, instead, precedes it in the historical development of
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complex civilizations.91 Bricolage—our ability to develop projects that are practical
(concerned with particular ‘problems’) and experimental (concerned with how certain
pre-given elements can work together), by cobbling together the materials that we find
around us, in an informal but coherent way—is the common heritage of the species.
Bricolage functions on the terrain of the sketch not of the architectural master plan. It
designates the modus operandi not simply of so-called non-modern peoples but also the
ordinary everyday activities that all people engage in, outside (or on the margins) of the
totalizing logic of modern science. The critical difference between the procedures of the
bricoleur and those of the (modern) scientist, says Lévi-Strauss, is that the former are
those of a generalist who adapts to a wide range of concrete conditions, whereas the
modern scientific mind is capable of formulating general abstract laws (objective
knowledge) and implementing more precise operations. But, because of its rigid division
of labour and high level of specialization, modern science lacks the same versatility and
ability to adjust ‘on-the-fly’ that characterizes bricolage. “The ‘bricoleur’ is adept at
performing a large number of diverse tasks,” writes Lévi-Strauss, “but, unlike the
engineer… does not subordinate each of them to the availability of materials and tools
conceived and procured for the purpose of the project.”92 When we tinker with some
home project, experiment in the kitchen or the garden, build something out of necessity
or simply desire, but do so in accordance with some recycled material already on hand,
we orient ourselves in the world through a common set of operations derived from the
collective abilities of the pre-personal body: in the everyday we are all bricoleurs.
There is a fluidity to the improvisational tactics of the everyday users of space that is
speculative and experimental. Relying on a diversified and adaptive skill-set, employing
left-over materials from other projects, industries, intended uses, the bricoleur moves
across what are, within the workings of capitalism, sharp divisions in the productive
process. This ability to move between different categories and codes (forms of speech,
discursive practices, technical language)93 applies not only to the materials of daily life,
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but to the concepts by which we form an understanding of ourselves and our
environments, which then modify the relations that order space. For Lévi-Strauss,
bricolage describes mythic thinking; the organizing logic of the myth continually recycles
recurring themes and formal structures, but always with modification. Similarly, the
materials of the bricoleur are not ‘raw materials’ in the sense of unformed, basic material
substances, nor specialized secondary materials (of the type that go into high-tech
industrial production), but scraps and left-overs that may be scrounged, saved up, or
stolen. The bricoleur may set aside all and any materials (including what may no longer
be able to serve as originally intended—‘damaged goods’), not knowing ahead of time
how they might be put to use.94 It is the nature of a particular project, combined with the
available resources, that will determine how and what materials are used, as well as the
trajectory it follows. But it is an unscripted trajectory, the product of its own activity: “to
improvise is to follow the ways of the world, as they open up, rather than to recover a
chain of [pre-established] connections.”95
A simple mundane illustration: duct tape and a stretch of old baling wire can both be used
to lash together two poles—to build a fence or a wood frame for some use, for example.
However, their different qualities change how the work is done and the use it is put to.
The duct tape is easy to work with: the poles can be bound tightly together and the job is
quickly done. The wire, on the other hand, is harder to wrap tightly around the poles;
tools may be needed for tightening or for crimping the ends and cutting off any excess.
However, the wire is more durable than the tape, and if the job is done skillfully, the
result will have much greater strength. Finally, the lashed-together poles may eventually
be put to other uses, in which case the choice of binding materials has different
implications: the duct tape is easily cut but the wire must be unwrapped (which may
again require tools); on the other hand, the wire can then be used again for some other
project. Thus, as much as it is the needs and desires of the bricoleur that give shape to the
project, the participatory role of objects and materials cannot not be underestimated.
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Bricolage involves a conceptual mapping out of materials and (potential) uses—but it is a
provisional mapping, continually modified according to changing conditions and,
consequently, reconfiguring the particulars of our ways of doing and of making do.96
Moreover, in both the original French verb bricoler and in the theoretical concept of
bricolage, there is a sense of free-play, of ‘puttering’: a procedure that, as much as it
serves concrete needs and desires, is ultimately an end in itself, an activity that has no end
but its own activity. Bricolage is a pragmatic response to existing conditions that
expresses a fundamental mode of our being-in-the-world. The improvisational tactics of
making and using operate on the level of the approximate: they form a non-systematic
science, worked out in the moment as the occasion demands. This necessitates an
awareness of how various parts (materials, tools, skills, projects) might fit into a broader
approach within the indeterminacy of daily life—it requires a pre-established familiarity
between bodies and things and the world, in all of their fleshiness. As such, the logic of
the bricoleur involves a perceptual faith: a positioning of oneself ‘in the midst of things’
with an understanding that the rough calculations and adaptive techniques of daily life
may smooth over contradictions and inconsistencies in the world but that this is a
practical requirement of making do, of simply getting by in the day-to-day.

1.6 Projects in the World
Throughout the preceding pages, I have drawn on a range of sources—general research
and specific thinkers, especially Merleau-Ponty and Lefebvre—to lay the theoretical
groundwork for the subsequent chapters. My goal has been to provide a general
understanding of perception and creativity in everyday life and to an account of the
generative relationship between organism and environment. In the process, I have
explored various connecting threads, from the nature of our phenomenological presence
in the world and the perceptual faith of the natural attitude, through the production and
experience of space and the ambiguity at the heart of everyday life, to the improvisational
tactics of bricolage. This last, I contend, can be understood as a pragmatic expression of
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perceptual faith as it is applied to the projects that orient us in the world. It is in taking up
projects—activities that are organized into a cohesive fashion, whether with some
ultimate end in mind (work) or as an end in itself (play)—that we are implicated in our
environment and that we find our way in the world. We are projected into the world in
our activities, as we orient ourselves relative to the space of our environment and the
things that we find therein. It is not only the space within which we move that may be
welcoming or unwelcoming to individual bodies; objects, too, help us to orient ourselves,
but they may also resist, hinder, disorient. “An action,” writes Sara Ahmed, “is possible
when the body and the object ‘fit’ … [but] objects, as well as spaces, are made for some
kinds of bodies more than others.”97
But if we are thrown, such that these activities are always already circumscribed for us,98
it is nonetheless within the co-productive relationship of an organism in its environment.
And this indicates that we are also already anchored in a preconscious corporeal
awareness that brings us into contact with the negative, that is, that which exceeds us.99
And it is a generative relationship. Through its activities, in concert with those of others,
an organism modifies future affordances—not simply its own, but the general affordances
of the environment. As we hollow out a space of inhabitance, a perceptual faith allows us
to experience, without apparent contradiction, both our own subjectively embodied sense
of self and an objective world (a world of objects) that we share with others. I find myself
in my practical activities: “my body is wherever it has something to do,” as MerleauPonty puts it. 100 When we engage in any activity, in the most rudimentary sense, we are
already embroiled in the flesh of the world and we orient ourselves by drawing on the
abilities of bricolage, which itself is a product of the general affordances of the
environment.
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The project at hand is, then, a practical one, concerned with how it is that we gear into the
world—or don’t, such as when ‘the gears slip’—and what possibilities this presents for
critical interrogation and creative action. This is a true of the research intentions that have
propelled this present work as it is of any other complex phenomenon. The world is fluid
and, in this particular case, the affordances (i.e. the potential that my planned fieldwork
seemed to offer) which I believed to have identified, were transformed or seemed to
wither away altogether, thus redirecting the trajectory of my research. At the same time,
my own everyday sensorial and perceptual experiences—of myself, of the world, and of
my relations with others—morphed in response to both personal and global factors, but
not without some slippage of gears. Despite these disruptions, this entire process (which I
discuss at greater length in the final chapter of this text) reinforces the lesson that
thinking, as founded in perceptual experience, is inextricably bound up with and in the
world: thinking, like all forms of doing, or making, takes place within an environment.
And it is in the flux between the two—between organism and environment, body and
space, sensation and reflection—that creativity emerges, that difference can assume
enough cohesive durability to present other ways of being and doing. Creativity hovers
between repetition—not necessarily one-to-one reproduction, but repetition that suggests
variation, novel reconfigurations of existing elements—and the autopoietic movement
that touches on the excess of the negative, that produces a different possible world and
formulates the new.
Creativity is intrinsic to our everyday activities (and thinking is in this sense an activity),
to how we orient ourselves in the world, and we are attuned to—resonate in consonance
with—our surroundings to the degree that we are able to express the affordances
available to us to the utmost. All of our attempts at inquiry begin in everyday perceptual
experience, in the particular. While the everyday expresses the generally pre-reflexive
activities that sustain our shared world, it can only be apprehended and described in its
singular manifestations—and by way of this description, or critical attention, we can
bring into focus what had only been sensed and but dimly perceived. When we focus our
attention in some project, we draw on the particular, embedding ourselves in the possible
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as it unfolds: lived space is always concrete and emergent. The “spatial body” acquires its
“material character from space, from the energy that is deployed and put to use there”101
It is a product of the generative relationship between bodily practices and an environment
that informs, and is in turn continually modified by, those practices. It thus gives us
access to other ways of doing and of being. The pre-conscious body of inter-corporeal
awareness that underlies our activities exceeds our own individual perceptions yet,
through repetitive habit, assumes and largely maintains a normative form, and this
form—as well as any modifications—is characteristic of a particular regime of sensation.
In the following chapter, I examine in more detail what Jacques Rancière calls the
“distribution of the sensible.”102 This concerns the ways that the senses are conceived of,
normalized, regimented and regulated within particular socio-political and economic
modes; what can and cannot be sensed, what counts as sensible—that is: what is deemed
to be perceptible and what ‘makes sense’ (i.e. seems reasonable). As will be seen, the
perpetuation of the social-sensorial order of late-stage capitalism relies upon forms of
spatial-corporeal and cognitive ‘training’103 that involve a process of abstraction and
alienation—of worker from product, of commodity from production, of self from world.
Abstraction and rationalization, key characteristic of capitalist modernity, spring from
what we may call categorical thinking, which works in the first instance by division,
assigning every new consideration (percept, thought, fact, or question) to a position, or
category, within a global—strategic—classificatory system, operating by way of
reduction (to basic elements, first principles, or final causes) and universalization. It is a
process mirrored in the fragmentation, homogenization, and hierarchization of space
described by Lefebvre. And, as we will see, it underpins the logic of the money economy
and the formation of the modern sensorium. This is not to say that categorical thinking is
necessarily ‘bad’ in itself, or always leads to error. Like the scientific method, it expands
human capacities in new ways; but it does not serve well in all situations and, more

101

Lefebvre, Production of Space, 195.
Rancière, Aesthetics and Its Discontents.
103
Discussing the rhythmically structured habituation of everyday gestures and bodily
comportment, Lefebvre uses the term dressage—which in French is used to describe the
‘breaking-in’ of animals, particularly horses, as they are trained. Lefebvre, Rhythmanalysis.
102

52

importantly, it errs when it attempts to apply its own power of abstraction to itself and
supposes that interrogation—critical thought—can free itself from sensory perception,
from the conditions of its own unfolding, from the confused world of lived experience,
and thereby assume a transcendental objectivity. Rather than limiting ourselves to the
categorical thinking characteristic of Cartesian dualism, I suggest a Spinozist
understanding of perception and experience—one that relies not on categorical divisions
but on modes of being and of expression,104 that is largely congruent with MerleauPonty’s description of perceptual awareness as a gestalt that, rather than imparting
objective distance, implicates us firmly in the world.105 Although Spinoza is not a major
figure in this present work, the influence of his thought, particularly of his Ethics,106 may
be felt as we proceed.107 This is notable in the idea that the different modes of perception,
and the sensory pathways that support them, are not fundamentally distinguishable
categories but modifications of the body—of the one and total body—that constitutes our
perceptual being in the world. But, as I stress throughout these pages, understanding how
these different modes actually function cannot be treated separately from the specific
material, cultural, historical and political contexts within which they are formulated.
Consequently, in the next chapter we turn to a more detailed examination of the
structuring of the specifically modern sensorium and consider some of the consequences
of the politics of the sensible of global capitalism.
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Chapter 2

2

The Modern Urban Sensorium

If we walk down the streets of a given city, take public transit, visit various workplaces
and sites of daily transactions—markets, stores, malls, and so on—or look in on schools
and other institutions of bodily and mental training, we may note that people ‘carry
themselves’ and move in specific ways; and, comparing these to similar habituated
patterns in other places, we will see that the details of these daily practices vary from
place to place, from society to society. Distances between bodies are regulated by
relatively fixed norms of behaviour; there are discernable patterns in when, how and with
whom people make eye contact, whether and when they smile at others, how or if they
touch each other, and a host of other daily corporeal behaviours. And, there are different
bodily ways of being that are assigned by gender, class, or cultural sub-group. More often
than not, these habituated practices go unnoticed—they are fully naturalized. Within the
familiar realm of quotidian habits, few will question this state of affairs: it’s ‘just how it
is.’ The everyday presents itself, in the first instance, with the matter-of-factness of the
perceptual faith. If someone behaves in ways that contravene these habits, they are
usually sanctioned, either overtly (for example: fines for jaywalking) or more subtly (as
when passersby may modify gaze, gait and facial expression in an attempt to avoid an
apparently intoxicated panhandler on the street).108 Our own socio-corporeal habituations
and those of others within our home cultural settings are difficult to discern, for us. As
the saying goes, a fish does not ask “What is water?” But, travel to a different region, to a
different cultural setting and one immediately notices that people do things differently
there. Like the natural attitude that characterizes our usual everyday activities, there is no
need to think about how to behave: one ‘just knows.’ These internalized habits help
condition the possible, determining spatial relations between bodies through sets of
normative socio-corporeal practices. As such, they foster distinctions between members
of a specific cultural grouping, and between that grouping and others. Customary spatial
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practices and corporeal habits are intrinsic to the formation and maintenance of social and
economic relations—and consequently, to everyday perceptual experience and any
potential therein for creative action.
Space, as Lefebvre reminds us, is not a blank slate upon with we transcribe the details of
our actions. It is produced within and conditioned (but not determined) by the socioeconomic order of late-stage capitalism, while we, in our routinized quotidian practices,
reproduce the relations that help sustain this everyday state of affairs. Social practice and
corporeal habituation are intimately entwined. In all cultures, the ways in which we ‘use’
and conceive of our bodies is largely socially prescribed. I should note, here, the seeming
contradiction in the idea of using one’s body in a particular way, as this suggests a self
that is independent of the body and that ‘puts the body to use.’ However, I maintain that
body and self are as inseparable as are body and space. Nonetheless, in everyday speech,
we speak of my body and of using my body for certain ends, in certain ways—all of
which highlights the limits of language. Yet, hitting this limit can help expose the ways in
which everyday language contains the irresolvable contradictions that our perceptual faith
obscures.
From earliest childhood, we learn how to integrate ourselves into our environment, first
through unconscious repetition—a process of mimesis—followed by the deliberate
attempts at imitating the quotidian adult behaviour that we witness, then finally through
formal education in whatever guise—all of which train us and continually reinforce what
Marcel Mauss names “the techniques of the body” in his influential essay of that title.
These techniques can be understood as the traditional, socialized norms of corporeal
dispositions by which the dominant beliefs and values, the habits of mind and the ethical
considerations of a given society, are not so much inscribed upon the surface of the
body—much less exist as some external signifier to which we make reference when we
act—as reproduced by and within the body, and between bodies in space. “Through
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gestures,” writes Lefebvre, “ideology escapes from pure abstraction and performs
actions.”109
In this chapter, I draw on a broad range of literature to examine the ways in which our
bodily comportment, our habits of mind and spatial practices, work together to reproduce
the social and material forms that help maintain the everyday and, by extension, the
relations of capitalist society. I begin by arguing that how and what we sense is not
simply ‘given’ by nature but is as much socially as it is materially or biologically
structured. This shows that we err if we naturalize and attempt to universalize our own
everyday sensorium, ignoring its unique historical formation. I then take up Mauss’
seminal essay in detail alongside other relevant literature and outline a theoretical
understanding of our everyday socio-corporeal practices, but do so by critiquing some of
the shortcomings I see in his text. This leads to a discussion of the emotions—a topic that
Mauss raises, then abruptly drops—where I turn to other writings, including those of
Georg Simmel, to further the discussion of everyday sensation and affect in modern
capitalist society. I compare the sensorial-emotional numbness of Simmel’s “blasé
attitude” to similar depictions of the fragmentation and estrangement of everyday
experience in other writings, including Lefebvre’s theorizing of space and some of
Walter Benjamin’s writings on urban sensation. Throughout this chapter, I refer to
Jacques Rancière’s concept of the “distribution of the sensible” and François Laplantine’s
“politics of the sensible” as means of describing how our perceptual possibilities are
organized according to particular material-historical processes and ideological
commitments. I discuss how, within the distribution of the sensible of modern society,
vision has assumed a highly privileged position amongst sensory modes. In examining
the hierarchization of the senses, I discuss the central role of actual technologies (in their
primarily material form—another lacuna in Mauss’ essay) in forming the urban
sensorium, and touch on the role of architecture in this context. I close this chapter by
further examining visuality and make the case that is necessary to reconsider some of our
fundamental assumptions about vision and the senses in general. In this chapter, I flesh
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out in greater detail the central points made in the previous chapter concerning sense
relations, perceptual experience, and the possibility for the new in everyday life; and, I
introduce new elements concerning the emotions, technology, and creativity that will be
further explored in the subsequent chapters.

2.1 The Social Construction of the Body
Just as lived space is not some trans-historical abstract void in which we move but is
defined by activity, by bodies in motion, so too our bodies and our senses are not neutral
facts, simply given universally as conditions of our existence. Rather, they are informed
by the dominant relations of production and reproduction (social and material) and thus
are as much cultural and historical as they are biological. What constitutes the sensible,
what the senses actually are and what they do—for example: that there are five senses, or
certain types of definable taste sensations, or what colours may be perceive—is given
form by particular cultural orders of meaning.110 My analysis of how these orders take
shape is mutually informed by a phenomenological understanding of experience, a
Marxist-inflected critical account of late-stage capitalism’s sensorial regime, and the
expanded worldview of an ecological anthropology that places “thinking, perceiving,
remembering and learning… within the ecological contexts of people’s interrelations
with their environments” and each other.111 There is, for example, a considerable range of
cross-cultural variation in the perception and coding of colours amongst human
populations.112 Indeed, the anthropological literature is replete with examples of different
ways that people relate—corporeally, affectively, linguistically, conceptually—to each
other and to their environments. In his now classic work in the Bosavi rainforest of
Papua-New Guinea, Steven Feld details the central role of sound and speech in the lives
of the Kaluli.113 It is not simply that hearing is largely privileged over sight for basic
survival (the utility of sight, compared to hearing, is greatly reduced in the dense
mountainous rainforest), but the far greater emotional and communicative breadth and
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depth of spoken language in Kaluli society (compared to most modern European
languages, for example) is indicative of the primacy of sound in the Kaluli sensorium
and, consequently, worldview. From this, Feld develops the concept of acoustemology—
an acoustically-focused understanding of how perception and everyday experience is
meaningfully organized.114 For the Kaluli, sound appears to be especially important in the
structuring of perceptual experience though in their basic biological capacities they might
resemble any other human population. For the hunter-gatherer Jahai of the Malaysian
rainforest, olfaction assumes a prominence—and power, in social significance—far
exceeding that of the typical Euro-American sensorium. This heightened olfactory
awareness is evinced by the accuracy and detail with which the Jahai can identify smells,
in marked contrast to their horticulturist neighbours who—much like the average
Westerner—have great difficulty accurately identifying even familiar smells under
controlled conditions.115
We need not, however, look so far afield for examples of how sensation and perception
may be organized in ways that we are unaccustomed to. For homeless and street affected
people in large urban centres the ‘usual’ modern sensorium may be disrupted by a
combination of chronic boredom and sensory oversaturation, as individuals struggle to
maintain a sense of meaning and purpose in their lives.116 This sensory displacement and
readjustment (or lack thereof) is intimately linked to space—what kinds of space the
individual has access to and to what degree they have the power to shape them.117 Indeed,
as discussed in the previous chapter, the living body may be disrupted, displaced,
disabled in many ways—always in relation to an idealized conception of The Body
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(‘properly’ upper case and singular) as opposed to bodies (lower case and multiple). The
modern categorizing and policing of bodies may operate most obviously along lines of
gender, race, and a range of physical and/or economic capabilities, but all socio-historical
settings are characterized by culturally construed spatial-sensorial ways of being and
doing. All of this indicates that the biological and ecological do not inextricably
determine the social any more than culture can override biology. In so far as we can talk
about a human species, the biological (or, put differently: the material) presents to us the
most basic foundation of our common lot. To say that humans, in the aggregate, possess
certain common perceptual traits may be uncontroversial, but there is a significant degree
of variability in how these are organized into formal socio-corporeal practices and
relations, relative to time and place, to history and ecology.118 These sets of terms—
biological and ecological on the one hand, social, cultural and linguistic on the other—do
not comprise oppositional dualities. The recurrent theme of a fundamental Nature/Culture
binary is undone by the processual current within which consciousness coalesces and
human history unfolds. That two terms in a dialectical relationship are non-identical does
not make them antithetical—nor, as a consequence, synthetical. But if we can say that the
body— both as an abstract conventional model, and as our own individual bodies—is
produced, or ‘constructed,’ this in no way suggests that it is not ‘real.’ The body—as a
body, my body—is the very crux of perception and the experiential condition of
consciousness; it is ‘real’ as felt, lived.
It may be evident, for example, that the notion of race and of distinguishable races is a
social construct that has no basis in biological or ecological fact; nonetheless, race is
experienced corporeally and subjectively as very real.119 Through the application of
statistical averages that themselves are formulated according to implicit social
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conventions, “race becomes biology.”120 Conceptions and perceptions of the body cannot
be completely disentangled from how the body is lived. It may be that the racialized
body, like ‘reality’ itself, is socially constructed, but the social categorizations of bodies
and of bodily experience—driven increasingly by bio-medical assumptions coupled with
economic interests—is real insofar as it imposes a framework that assigns hierarchized
subject-positions, outlining a range of socio-sensorial affordances for the experiential
reality of lived bodies. Moreover, there is a considerable range of variation between
individuals within any grouping that cannot be discounted—a point that I have already
touched on and that I re-emphasize at various points. For the moment, I focus in a more
general way on what Jacques Rancière calls “the distribution of the sensible”—that is, the
social regimentation of the senses and the political implications that this entails.
“Politics,” writes Rancière, “revolves around what is seen and what can be said about it,
around who has the ability to see and the talent to speak, around the properties of spaces
and the possibilities of time.”121 These are, then, questions concerned with the sensible,
with sensorial possibility. In a more explicitly proscriptive vein, François Laplantine calls
for a “politics of the sensible” that would equitably account for our engagement with the
world and each other as fully embodied activities, affirming “the gap between each
person’s respective sensibility” and thereby “resisting the uniformization of tastes.”122
And yet, within much of the philosophical and critical tradition that I draw upon, there is
a recurrent tendency to objectify the body and reduce the senses to distinct, mechanical
processes—a move that impoverishes our understandings of sensory experience by
imagining an abstract body and reinstating the processes of subjectification that help
maintain the socio-economic relations of capitalism. Nonetheless, in seeking out a
politics of the sensible that would be more inclusive it is necessary, for my purposes, to
work through much of this tradition, while maintaining a critical stance and examining
some underlying assumptions.
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2.2 The Measure of the Body
In the critical theorizing of the body and senses, Marcel Mauss’s relatively short
“Techniques of the Body,” stands out as a foundational text. First delivered as a lecture in
1934, this work provides an important starting point in understanding the relationship
between the dominant social order and how the organization of the senses is enacted and
expressed in everyday bodily comportment that is, for all its communal structuring,
experientially subjective. It is also an important text for understanding the history of how
the senses have been conceived of, and the socio-political consequences of this history.
Although not worked out in some of its wider implications, a key aspect of Mauss’
argument is that how we engage in the world with and through our bodies is largely
determined for us through a process of social conditioning: a disciplining of the body and
education of the senses and of the psyche that both expresses and reproduces customary
social relations.
In the essay, Mauss envisions a social scientific analysis of routinized bodily activities,
arguing that the body is our “first and most natural technical object, and at the same time
technical means” whereby we engage in the practical activities that constitute the social
world.123 Drawing on a range of ethnographic examples as well as personal experience,
the essay proposes an investigation into the “social nature of the ‘habitus’,” noting that
acquired habitual ways of comporting oneself—physically and socially—differ “not just
between individuals and their imitations, [but] especially between societies, educations,
properties and fashions, prestige.”124 Mauss sketches out a schema for classifying a range
of bodily practices that are common throughout human societies. As a classificatory
system, it proceeds by division, with the first differentiation along lines of sex (or, we
might say, assigned gender), followed by categories based on age, or life-stage. This is
followed by a catalogue of dispositions, labours, and other activities, ordered
chronologically from birth to adulthood, including sleep and rest, diverse forms of
“activity [and] movement” (i.e. sitting, walking, dancing, climbing, etc.), eating,
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procreating and various “techniques for care of the body.”125 Curiously, although Mauss
discusses the “techniques of birth and obstetrics” and the care of the body in general,
those of death and dying are passed over in silence. Critically, all of these corporeal
techniques also involve a sustained training of the mind that helps integrate the subject
into existing social relations.
Following the general socialization of the body that takes place within the immediacy of
familial relations, education provides the primary mould for the social affordances
accorded any given subject-position. Education, it should be noted, describes a society’s
common means of propagating bodily and mental dispositions according to station, and is
thus not limited to modern concepts of formal education. Mauss draws on his own
training as a swimmer to show how the disciplining of body and mind follows established
customs but is nonetheless subject to change and individual variation. He goes on to note
that there is a way of swimming and a way of learning to swim, “techniques of diving and
techniques of learning to dive.”126 The educational process whereby one learns to swim
and dive, for example, accords with a standardized form proper to one’s socio-historical
location. Thus, the means of transmission of educational practices are themselves
embodied, learned through specified forms of corporeal training. Knowledge and the
teaching of knowledge are, in this sense, in-corporated—quite literally, ‘brought into’ the
body—largely through imitative repetition. The patterned repetition of mental and
corporeal dispositions enacted in daily practices is essential for social and economic
reproduction but this “work of repetition is not neutral work,” as Sara Ahmed notes; “it
orients the body in some ways rather than others.”127 The politics of space accord with a
distribution of the sensible that affords different possibilities to different bodies. Our
education, in whatever form, comes to mould our habits and dispositions, how we carry
ourselves, occupy space, present ourselves and react to others. But, as much as our
interactions in the world may be structured through the repetition of mental-corporeal
techniques, like the reproduction of space through everyday practice, this is not a
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mechanically replicative process but one that involves continual variation and thus
changes over time. The techniques of the body have their own rhythmic structures that
lend them a cohesiveness, but only so long as they are enacted and embodied in practice.
In many respects, Mauss’ techniques of the body can be seen as an attempt at a concrete
measure of the more theoretically elaborate “stock of knowledge” later detailed by Alfred
Schütz—that is: the collective tacit knowledge that makes up the standardized ways of
knowing and doing of a society.128 The influence of Mauss’s essay can also be traced
through Pierre Bourdieu’s phenomenologically inflected sociology.129 In common with
these other thinkers, Mauss aims at a comprehensive understanding of everyday practices
that is arrived at by closely observing the plurality of singularly-embodied corporeal
habits and activities. From such observations, argues Mauss, “it is possible to produce a
theory of the technique of the body.”130 As with ethnography—which is concerned with
the fine-grained detail of lived experience—Mauss’s ground up approach suggests an
implicit phenomenological basis alongside his more explicit sociological framework.
Emphasizing the importance of “mov[ing] from the concrete to the abstract and not the
other way round”131 underscores the pragmatic nature of his project. But Mauss also
shows that intellectual activity is itself formulated within the culturally codified but
subjectively enacted bodily practices of a given time and place: observation and analysis
are fully embedded in the sensual world. Indeed, by including the processes by which he
develops his outline of a theory of the body—how particular personal experiences
informed his investigations—Mauss shows theoretical concepts developing out of
practical activity. One’s own perceptual experience can open points of entry into a critical
understanding of social relations and the world more broadly. And, this may be
particularly true when the natural attitude is disrupted, when some aspect of the world
appears strange to us, when we feel out-of-place—when we do not or cannot ‘gear in’ to
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the world, when the experiences and capabilities of our individual bodies do not seem to
match the correct way of doing things, the ‘proper’ practices.
The demands of global capitalist management strip our individual bodies of their
distinctive characteristics, matching the fracturing and levelling of space. We are reduced
to producers and consumers of commodity forms, with our sensorial lives consequently
impoverished—the inevitable result of a life ruled by averages and norms, and a requisite
of a world of fixed thingness. By measuring and averaging bodies and sensory modes that
are, in fact, endlessly varied (among themselves, as spatial relations: no two bodies can
occupy the same space) and variable (within themselves, as temporal relations: one’s
body changes over time), an abstract body is produced. This abstract body is despatialized, de-temporalized and defined by a limited set of essential characteristics—
above all: one’s abilities as a socially-integrated consumer-producer. Those who are able
to do so, cluster around the abstract body, modelling their dispositions according to this
abstract-ideal even if it does not completely align with their own experiences. Yet, this
apparently neutral body has an unmarked antecedent: the White Western heteronormative male who is physically fit, economically productive, and dependably selfmanaged. So long as one appears to more-or-less conform to this idealized body-image,
one “fits in.”132 Many will go to great lengths—consciously or not—to adapt themselves
in an attempt to conform to this idealized social-body.133 As an illustration, we can think
of the ways that immigrants arriving in a country such as Canada are expected to
integrate themselves into the dominant modes of socio-corporeal behaviour. As part of
the immigration process (which is further reinforced as one is groomed for, and initiated
into, full citizenship). Although told they can retain their own cultural and religious
traditions, prospective citizens are taught to model their public behaviour upon the
corporeal, linguistic, and socially-expressive aspects of the abstract body of the idealized
citizen-consumer. This, of course, demands that clear and decisive boundaries be drawn
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between public and private (which would, in a secularized state, include one’s religious
affiliations, ethnic identity, or cultural attachments).
We may all experience some degree of misfitting, when the world seems strange at
certain moments in our lives. This may be associated with illness or an accident, and is
often understood as a transient experience. No organism can survive for long without
consequences if it cannot adapt and find a ‘fit’ within its environment. Thus, the
‘exception’ is pathologized and an idealized ‘normal’ body becomes the standard against
which to measure all bodies—a standard that, it is assumed, describes the average
socially-typical, perceptual experience of everyone. But in the context of late-stage
capitalism, many people continue to find that their experience of the world barely
resembles that of the apparently well-integrated and purportedly successful citizensubject. One need only look to the crisis of systemic racism in both Canada and the
United States (each with their own particular historical variants, and thus particularities
as concerns spatial-corporeal modes of oppression), or the myriad processes—both overt
and subtle—that model women into second class citizens, or the ways that international
borders are constructed upon, and often violently contested over, categories based on
birthplace, cultural or religious affiliation, or ethnic belonging, etc.
But it is not only the discourses of neoliberal economics, biomedicine, and the modern
state that attempt to impose an abstract ideal body upon the lived body of perceptual
experience. A great deal of Western learning—and certainly, much of the ‘canon’ of
Western philosophy, insofar as that might be loosely defined—is characterized by the
effacement of bodies as lived (grounded, processual, multiplicitous), while The Body, as
object and fact, is placed in their stead. At the more applied level, the social sciences
have been instrumental in reproducing and naturalizing an abstract referential body
against which deviations, pathologies, and other ‘subjects of interest’ are measured and
defined. In this sense, Mauss’ essay is both an invitation to a relational and historicized
understanding of the body, and lays the groundwork for a rationalist program of corporeal
analysis and management. Destabilizing such models seems a necessary step in fostering
a politics of the sensible that aims for a more equitable space of inhabitance. Such a
reorientation requires taking seriously other perceptual possibilities and resisting the
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everyday normalization of privilege and oppression. It requires a frank and sustained
critique of the ways in which socio-corporeal practices couple with the apparatuses of
corporate and state power (educational, legal, etc.) all but completely erase marginalized
bodies, precipitating a crisis of corporeal as well as social dimensions. Yet, such crises
may, at times, open up moments of possibility by offering some other way of engaging in
the world. Just as hope depends upon failure to be hope, the modern crisis of the body
may harbour a utopic potential.
Because the process of socio-corporeal reproduction is enacted anew ever and again by
embodied individuals, with all their physical, psychological and social variants,
difference and possibility inhere in every moment, even if muted and without being
durably effective. Moments of crisis can bring these possibilities to the fore: instability
requires of any organism a response, and when repetition of the same fails to meet the
demands of the situation, grasping for the new may be the only effective course of action.
Still, we should not naively imagine that crises—whether at the macro levels of social
and economic reproduction or the micro level of personal experience—necessarily
engender creative possibilities and redistributive change. Indeed, as shown in the
previous chapter with reference to Lefebvre, the drive toward possibility and the new
fails more often than not. Similarly, as Bourdieu has argued, while crises may present
opportunities for creative action and the production of the new, moments of crisis also act
as nodes around which structures of reproduction cohere and reassert themselves with
socially hegemonic, if not overtly violent, force.134 Indeed, we can see how effective
capitalism has been at mobilizing its own internal crises into vehicles of growth: consider
the corporatized responses to climate change and environmental catastrophe, from the
ever-expanding ‘green energy’ sector to carbon-offset schemes peddled to consumers like
so many late-capitalist indulgences (which have the added benefit of redistributing and
individuating social, economic, and moral responsibility for the simultaneously
destructive and reproductive forces of global capitalism, thus exculpating corporate and
state players—and above all, the super-rich).
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Nonetheless, there is a momentum toward change in the tension between these competing
forces: a striving for and embracing of novelty, for the new, alongside the drive toward
simple reproduction. That this is the case is demonstrated by capitalism’s resilience in the
face of crisis, by its ability to reinvent itself according to changing conditions while still
maintaining its essential characteristics. The production of the body, of space, and of
perceptual experience, imply both the conservatively replicative and the creatively
innovative. For capitalism to survive, it has of necessity operated along these same
lines.135 These two different tendencies—replication and innovation—are opposed but
they are not opposites. They represent movements that work against each other; but,
neither one can contain or negate the other. As a dialectic, these forces can be understood
as organizing and giving expression to perceptual experience, and on a different scale, as
operating in the spheres of social and material reproduction. Because they do not form an
antithetical binary, they suggest that there is always some excess that both precedes and
succeeds them. The excess that this dialectical tension makes us aware of, but that we
cannot fully grasp (precisely because the negative is this excess), has its corollary in the
pre-personal body of sensation, while our own singular embodied subjectivities cohere
around the productive play between replication and creative innovation. My
understanding of a dialectical relationship that is always unstable and incomplete—in a
certain sense: excessive—derives from Adorno’s theory of dialectics (viz. the ‘excess’ of
the negative and the non-identical nature of oppositional terms)136 as well as Lefebvre’s
treatment of the dialectics of space and the body as a three term relation.137 As discussed
in the previous chapter, this last is understood as operating in a productive tension in
which no one element assumes final, lasting authority. This conception of a multiple-term
dialectic can be extended to Mauss’ techniques of the body, where the human body is
conceived of as a tripartite relation, with the physiological, the sociological, and the
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psychological mutually constitutive of our embodied selves. The biological body of raw
life determines the fundamental conditions of possibility and is given to us in advance of
ourselves, by nature, but the phenomenal presence of the active body, in its responses and
effects, always remains malleable to a degree. The social body is a reflection of the social
order, of custom, ritual and law; it positions us in relation to others and reproduces sociospatial relations. Finally, the psychological acts as a mediating process between social
forces and the individual body as singularly lived: the embodied mind reproduces the
social but it is also the locus of introspection, creativity, and interrogation.
Despite aiming for a relational, comprehensive understanding of the body, Mauss
remains within the framework of a largely Cartesian dualism in which the social—and
with it, reason—ultimately assumes prominence. It is by way of social practice,
inculcated through education, and for “social authority” itself—the organizing principles
that give a particular society its defining characteristics—that various culturally-specific
forms of corporeal techniques assume durable prominence. The social, as the organized
expression of human minds, here takes on the determinative role of fundamental cause
and ultimate aim of human life, driven by a supposed “determinate efficiency,”138 as
human cultures adapt and improve the techniques whereby they make their worlds. This
perspective evinces a rationalist humanism predicated on the Enlightenment principles of
reason and progress in which ‘Man’ betters ‘himself’ (sic)139 by improving the technical
means and abilities that constitute human societies. There is an implicit teleology at work
in this, one that is easily heralded in the service of Eurocentric conceptions of
civilization. Grounded within the philosophical, anthropological, and socio-political
thought of late 19th and early 20th century European intellectual culture, Mauss’ project
depends upon an understanding of a civilizing ‘drive’ in the human psychological makeup that acts as a repressive force.140 The progress of reason and civilization rests upon a
disciplined coordination of the body that is replicated in the mind, with the aim of
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controlling brute biological corporeality and directing its potential toward some rational
goal. But, if the mind is the source and expression of reason, it is also subject to emotion.
The unruliness of the emotions, coupled with our bodies’ tendency to sometimes fail us
in unexpected moments, makes them seem suspect, yet they also provide the raw material
for the project of human society. In Mauss’ analysis, the project of civilization is one of
containment and control that establishes a “resistance to emotional seizure,” for “it is
thanks to society that there is the certainty of pre-prepared movements, domination of the
conscious over emotion and unconsciousness.”141 And if the emotions must be strictly
regulated and governed by reason, so too must sensation be managed and bodies policed.

2.3 Sensation, Emotion, Estrangement
Like sensation, the emotions resist categorical thinking, frustrating logocentric reason
with their unruly excess. It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to accurately and
consistently describe and categorize emotional states and reactions: not only are they
eminently subjective but their cultural variability poses further challenges to broader
historical analyses. Consequently, a great deal of academic scholarship has tended to
bracket these problems, relegating them to some ‘outside of the equation’ category.
Historically, this has been particularly true of the social sciences, with the emotional
aspects of social life set aside altogether or at best treated as de-corporealized cultural
formations with no discernible sensory presence.142 In this sense, the emotions are often
treated as an ‘externality’ in the same way that land and the natural environment are set
aside as externalities in classic economic theory—and, this is true not only of liberalcapitalist analyses. As David Howes notes, the ‘scientific’ materialism of the late Marx
eschews a more corporeally-grounded understanding of human society, as “the senses
seem to wither away and retain only a phantasmal presence.”143 An oddly anti-materialist
understanding appears to reinstate the rule of objectifying rational thought over the
sensing body, while an impersonal historical force that seems to transcend the very
materiality of life assumes centre stage. This apparent dualism in effect bypasses the
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unstable processual becoming of the body as socially enacted and as subjectively lived.
Yet, as I argue throughout these pages, it is not simply the case that sensation precedes
reason, laying the foundation for reflection and interrogation, but that thinking is itself an
embodied activity that grounds reason, action, and human history in the thick materiality
of sensation. But, while reason allows us to reflect upon our material emplacement, with
a sort of perceptual sleight-of-hand that accords us a sense of a-corporeal distance, the
emotions are always inextricably sensual.
Certainly, the diverse developments of affect theory within feminist and critical theory—
and beyond—have encourage a general reconsideration of the significance of the
emotions, with differing attempts to describe and analyze them.144 But, precisely because
of their nature, the emotions remain slippery subjects. The volatile unpredictability and
oft ‘irrational’ operations of human emotions, with their unabashed defiance of the cool
self-assuredness of reason and understanding, seem to present a constant danger in need
of containment. Indeed, Mauss hinges his analysis on “an opposition between social order
and the threat to order posed by forces of emotional origin.”145 And yet, as much as they
may seem to threaten order, intense emotions may also act as forces of social bonding—
which cannot be fully accounted for if our emotional states are understood merely, or
primarily, as irrational impulses that express some primordial state of disorder. Moreover,
strong, even unbridled, emotion may provide a necessary social corrective in some
settings: just as “emotional excess can destroy social order, it can also loosen and lighten
a social order that has become insensitive to life.”146 Our everyday lives are permeated
with a range of emotional responses that cannot be easily disentangled from the social
elements of our environment.
The emotions are, thus, highly ambiguous in that they are intensely personal yet they are
given cohesive form by our social enmeshment. We may feel alone at times, but those
feelings—like any other—are always-already intersubjective. Conversely, moments of
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collective joy, grief, fear, anxiety may intensify existing bonds, or they may initiate new
relations—all of which operate at the crossing-over between the social, or group level,
and individual subjective experience, and between preconscious sensation and conscious
reflection. Although the distinction between emotion and affect may not always be clear,
and remains disputed among theorists, I follow a general trend and understand the
emotions as the tangible expression of the affective forces that animate our lives.147 That
is, an emotion—or emotional response, as the emotions are always dynamic, processual,
never fixed—is identifiable, recognizable, even if it may be hard to pin down, hard to put
into words; and, it assumes a certain coherence within the cultural particularities of a
given locale and material-historical setting (i.e. a human environment). While there is
considerable variation among human cultures in terms of the language used to describe
emotional states, as well as much nuance in understandings of what those terms mean
within those cultures, there are nonetheless common characteristics across human
cultures that include certain basic universal emotional states (i.e. fear, joy, sorrow)
though, once again, how these are locally expressed, whether in words or through facial
expressions, bodily gestures and various culturally-specific forms of behaviour, varies
across time and place. On the other hand, I understand the affects in terms of movement
and intensity, as non-conscious forces that gather themselves into and animate our
bodies.148 The emotions can be thought of as coalescing moments of affective intensity:
what they express has less to do with ‘objective reality’ than with the preconscious forces
that help organize our perceptions. We might say, as a loose analogy that, as the prereflexive body of sensation is to discernible conscious perception, so affect is to
perceived emotion. Although the analogy may only go so far, the key point is that the
emotions, as culturally-organized affective forces, are felt subjectively at the level of the
body, and communally across bodies, coordinating their movements and responses. And,
they are available to us, in that we may critically interrogate them, in ways that the affects
may not be. Thus, following Sara Ahmed, I am less interested in clear definitions of what
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the emotions are than in asking “What do emotions do?”149 Emotions certainly do make
us do things, behave in certain ways: they orient us in particular ways, though we may
not understand why or how. As Spinoza reminds us in The Ethics, we do not know the
causes of things; we merely perceive effects upon—or in—our bodies. As we are alwaysalready in the world, we can only begin by interrogating these perceptible effects if we
wish to understand the affects that we may have on others and our environment.
The emotions might then be thought of as the perception, expression, and participation in
the production of affective forces that resonate in and between bodies within an
environment. And, they express movement and rest within a social field: “emotion is
precisely the experience of embodied sociality.”150 Intense socio-emotional forces can be
felt as strife—as dissonance—that may shatter bonds between individuals; but those
forces seem to lose intensity more readily than ones that solidify human relations. While
a mutual feeling-with—a corporeal recognition that the emotions that animate me
somehow spill over into others, thus unsettling any insular sense of self—may be
transient, such events can foster an awareness of common experiences, convictions and
concerns. This awareness may be limited and provisional, yet at times it can have a
lasting effect on those who share in the experience, nudging their perceptual awareness in
some other direction. Consider the sense of excitement and group cohesion that can
develop in a crowd at a large sports event or in the audience at a top-selling concert. Most
of the participants will have no prior and likely no post-event interrelations, but within
that particular setting the apparent boundaries of the autonomous self become blurred, as
collective emotion swells up and though the crowd. This feeling of togetherness may
sometimes be intense enough to be quite overwhelming, and in some group settings
collective emotion can produce much stronger ties. Traditional communal events and
sacred rituals, for example, may generate more durable group affect, solidifying social
bonds among participants, while shared ecstatic religious experiences can radically
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transform the individual’s understanding of and relationship with the world and with
others.151
Moments of powerful and extended group emotion (extended in terms of temporality,
and/or of numbers of individuals involved and their proximity to each other) can thus
unsettle the ‘normal’ parameters of our selves, showing them to be porous and
malleable.152 This blurring between my body, my feelings, and that of those with whom I
share the experience produces a strong sense of group cohesion. Caught up in the
collective enthusiasm of the moment, we sense that we all feel the same things, that a
common affective force animates and unites us. This is, in the first instance, not an
idea—a concept—that occurs to us: it is a form of corporeal awareness. Our emotional
lives take place at the level of the body but at the same time they are accessible to
conscious thought to a large degree. The emotions thus operate at, and across, the
apparent divide between our inner being and our external expression of self, between
conscious, reflexive interrogation and the perceptual murkiness of the preconscious body.
The emotions, consequently, have as spatial presence: we are bodies in space and the
emotions find expression in us—in and through our bodies. Space is animated by
affective forces; it expresses varying degrees of emotional valence.153 The emotions
mediate between our individual psychic lives and the unarticulated but (generally)
commonly recognized conventions of public emotionality, or affective doxa—the
‘proper’ ways to behave, express oneself and, crucially, how to respond to others.
“Emotion,” writes Margot L. Lyon in her critical take on Mauss’ essay, “is an ongoing
aspect of all social relations.”154 Any human society, in addition to its material-historical
basis and its cultural forms and traditions, is both product and source of affective
relations, of intersubjective emotional experiences that bind just as they threaten social
accord and mutual obligation.
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Simultaneously subjective and collective, socio-emotional relations can be understood as
modes of being-in-the-world, as modifications of the body and of bodies: the body as
mood and style. In understanding sensation, emotion, and reflection, I thus link Spinoza’s
definition of the emotions [affectus] as “modifications of the body, whereby the active
power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained, and also the
ideas of such modifications”155 to Merleau-Ponty’s descriptions of the body, of
perceptual experience, and of the world, in terms of style. For example, the latter writes
that “categorial activity, prior to being a thought or a knowledge, is a certain manner of
relating to the world, and correlatively is a style or a configuration of experience.”156 At
the level of the lived—in the immediacy of encounter with others in the world—the
movements and moods that animate us are experienced sensually, with our perceptions
coloured by the emotional shadings of our past experiences. We are social because we are
effected and affective: “That we get involved in interactions at all,” writes Georg
Simmel, “depends on the fact that we have a sensory effect upon one another.”157 We
sense others—they have a sensory-emotional effect on us, pleasant or unpleasant—and
through sensation we gain “knowledge of the other,” as our sense impressions “lead us
into the human subject as its mood and emotion and out to the object as knowledge of
it.”158 Sensation and emotion confirm for us our presence in the world, and act as a sort of
bridge between ourselves and others, and the objects and materials that make for us a
common world.
While these relations are in the first instance sensorial, the corporeality of the emotions
cannot be completely disassociated from language and social formation: it is these that
help give communicable form to our emotional lives. How we speak about our emotions
depends upon our own linguistic experience, as well as our wider social-historical
emplacement.159 We may speak of getting feelings in our gut or a knot in the stomach,
weights are lifted from our shoulders, our skin may crawl or feel electrified with
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pleasure: these words seem to contain the emotionally charged sensations they connote.
But, to the extent that we rely on what is already given to us to express ourselves, they
are arbitrary, historically contingent, devoid of absolute meaning; nonetheless, they help
formulate the forces that move the pre-personal body of perception, articulating them into
the specific, communicable emotions that we experience. Indeed, as the anthropologist
Michael Jackson notes, it is irrelevant “whether emotions are sincere or insincere, it is
their effect on human relationships that is critical.”160 Emotions are as much ‘real’ or
‘factually correct’ as is the facticity of our own bodies. Yet, there is always a gap
between what we say and what we feel—something that exceeds language and the
organizing logic of reason.161 We might perhaps think of emotion and sense as the
negative of language—not as an antithetical opposition but as that which both
presupposes and exceeds language.
Alongside the techniques of the body of a given time and place, language partitions and
distributes (or ‘shares out’)162 the affective forces within which sense perception
coalesces, and assigns meaning within a broader social context. A wide-ranging study of
how people speak about and classify emotional concepts within nearly 2500 spoken
languages shows that, along with a high degree of variation (primarily linked to relative
cultural-historical and geographic proximity), there is evidence of a “common underlying
structure in the meaning of emotion concepts across languages” that suggests “common
physiopsychological dimensions shared by all humans.”163 There appears to be a deep
level of raw emotion—of unarticulated affect—that is common to all peoples: something
that is fundamental to all humans. But, much like sensation, the processes that develop
and diversify our emotional states, bringing them to the level of conscious awareness and
social expression, are uniquely formulated within the specific conditions of any particular
cultural setting.164 Moreover, language makes emotional states communicable beyond the
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present, projecting them outward over time and imparting a temporal durability that we
quickly naturalize and integrate into our quotidian lives. As with our everyday practices
and dispositions, language tends to neutralize the historical-material context of ideas and
of the assumptions that help structure the experiential world. This, in turn, makes it
difficult for us to relate to sensory and emotional experiences that seem markedly
different from our own. The way that we speak, the words that we use, and the wider
implications these have in how we understand the world are never politically neutral or
objective in any absolute sense.
Where Mauss’ essay aims for an air of ‘scientific disinterest,’ describing and cataloguing
without paying overt attention to the particularities of urban capitalism, Simmel, notably
in texts such as “The Concept and Tragedy of Culture” and “The Metropolis and Mental
Life,” adopts a more polemical position in detailing the sensorial and psychological
estrangement of the individual modern subject. In Simmel’s account, life in the modern
city involves a new sensorial-affective environment and radical transformation in social
relations that mirrors the development of the commodity form and the alienation of
labour. With the ascendency of capitalism and the rapid growth of industrializing centres,
the need for labour draws diverse rural populations from surrounding regions into the
modern city: there, the continuity of traditional community and custom is severely
disrupted. Psychologically jarring, the sudden transformation of social relations. in which
the familiar rhythms and sensations of everyday life are superseded by the
depersonalization and rapid changes of modernity, induces a mental-emotional malaise, a
sense of estrangement that is both psychological and material (economic). No longer
measured against the long complex rhythms of weather and season, of moon and tide, of
craft labour and community ritual, life is now partitioned and parceled out by mechanical
time, by the clock, the assembly line, by the demands of managed productivity. In an
attempt to adapt to these new conditions, says Simmel, the individual psyche adopts a
“blasé attitude”: the mood of a sensorially overwhelmed subjectivity, largely turned in on
itself, standing at a remove from its surroundings and those others it encounters, affecting
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a calculated coolness.165 In this sphere, where “the aggregation of so many people with
such differentiated interests, must integrate their relations and activities,” the nature of
society and of the human mind are transformed by the cold logic of the money economy.
“Money… becomes the common denominator of all values,”166 the great equalizer that
renders everything into interchangeable units and problems of management, as quality is
transmuted into quantity. This leads to an intensification of the intellect, of calculating
reason: the “money economy” and the modern psyche, writes Simmel “share a matter-offact attitude in dealing with men and with things.” The rationalizing logic of the market
mirrors that of the abstracted, monistic intellect of the citizen-subject; the unique
colouration that gives every sensation, every place and moment distinguishing
characteristics is bleached away by the universal solvent of money. “Money,” says
Simmel, “is concerned only with what is common to all: it asks for the exchange value,”
and makes of all interaction an economic transaction that simply asks: “How much?” 167
The subordination of body and mind, of the sensations and rhythms of daily life in
Simmel’s account have a corollary in Lefebvre’s analysis of the fragmentation of space
and experience in everyday life. The formation of the urban sensorium and atomization of
the modern subject mimic the process of homogenization, fragmentation and
hierarchization that renders lived space into the malleable utility of the commodity
form.168 Increasingly, everyday relations and activities are structured around the demands
of production and consumption as strictly economic activities. The division of labour in
capitalist relations of production translates into the intensified divisions between public
and private and between roles or positions within those realms, assigned or assumed,
based on gender, race, class, and other categories that help set the general parameters of
subjective experience. Over time, the homogenization of space and of productive labour
within the capitalist mode render superfluous the specialized skills and knowledge of
trade workers and artisans and the unique-to-every-place relationship with the land of
farmers and pastoralists. Economic relations map themselves onto lived space: with the
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expansion of global commerce from the Renaissance period onward, the city becomes the
absolute centre of political and economic power “constitute[ing] a hub, a privileged focal
point, surrounded by peripheral areas which bear its stamp.”169 These rapidly expanding
centres of diversified activity constitute “pivot points”—spatially fixed centres of social,
economic, and political power that dominate and direct the peripheries.170 Henceforth, all
territories are colonized by an economic rationalism that knows only production and
consumption and perpetual expansion. However, with exponentially accelerating
economic growth and technological development, the city/country (or centre/periphery)
distinction dissolves into a new socio-spatial arrangement: the urban.171 No longer tied to
central cities, capital frees itself within this new economic order, seeking out ever new
opportunities, dispossessing and displacing some populations while dragging others along
behind, as labour is also forced to ‘freely wander’ ever more widely in search of a buyer.
With the rise of mature global capitalism, it is in the realm of the urban—as a total social
(perceived), economic (conceived), and subjective/corporeal (lived) project—that the
spatial and sensorial constitution of lived experience is most radically transformed. The
urban most fully expresses the distribution of the sensible of late-stage capitalist society.

2.4 The Urban Spectacle: Technology, Art, Architecture
In tandem with the transformation of space, the subject’s sensory enmeshment in the
world becomes increasingly fragmented, homogenized, and hierarchized. Although
largely elevated to the status of the sense of objectivity and reason by the time of the
Enlightenment,172 vision is further privileged with capitalism’s restructuring of sociosensorial relations. As such, sight and visuality are valorized in a way that mirrors the
mental and material alienation of modern life described by Simmel. Sight seems to impart
a sense of distance, of standing apart from objects—but also from other people: a sense of
objective remove that provides a basis for the ‘rational actor’ Homo economicus.
Moreover, the visual field seems to lend objects a constancy in a way that other sensory
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modes do not. I can look at a thing in the world, look away, and when I look again, it
appears unchanged—and all the while, I imagine it in my mind as fixed and whole.173
Taste, smell, and audition, on the other hand, are more obviously temporal: they require
my continuous involvement with the ‘object,’ and the sensations that I experience change
over time—they have a perceptible temporality that the visual appears to shed. Touch, in
turn, involves the immediacy of the flesh: it demands direct tactile activity between the
touching and the touched, blurring the distinction between the two, as Merleau-Ponty
reminds us.174 While our other sensory modes—and corporeality, in general—have been
largely devalued in Western thought, deemed unworthy when it comes to assessing the
accuracy of our perceptions, sight has assumed a pre-eminence as the sense that reveals
the world to us, and through which we ourselves appear and make ourselves known to
others.175
In conjunction with the ascendency of the commodity form—which abstracts itself from
labour and the materiality of its own production—under the authority of visuality and the
visual image, sensation and experience seem to become unmoored from the specificities
of place and time, from the granular details of the environments that afford the very
possibility of those same perceptual experiences. With the consolidation of industrial
capitalism and its transition into a totalizing global project, the senses are further
fragmented and segregated. For the first time in history, a multitude of strangers are
suddenly crowded together in workplaces, in cramped living conditions, and face-to-face
with each other in public transit systems “in a situation where for periods of minutes or
hours they could or must look at each other without talking to one another,” severing
sight from speech and audition.176 Simmel argues that the overwhelming effect of the
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urban spectacle, with its saturation of the visual field and general sensory
overstimulation, numbs perception and “incapacit[ates]… react[ion] to new sensations
with the appropriate energy.”177 The subject is thus pacified and sensorial-affective
presence reduced to simple production and consumption.178 As Spinoza—to whom
Simmel is indebted—argues in The Ethics, we end up being moved by passions rather
than consciously engaging in activity.
The blasé attitude of the modern city-dweller also shows up in the emotional coolness of
the flâneur as conjured by Walter Benjamin: the detached visual witness who is a product
(quite literally, in an economic sense) of the modern city and who casually consumes the
urban spectacle. A generation younger than Simmel, Benjamin furthers our understanding
of the increasing interiorization of subject and the atomization of object in modernity. In
The Arcades Project in particular, he details the changes to the life of the senses in the
burgeoning urban commercial centres, as visuality gains an increased prominence.179 This
is epitomized by the specialized fashion stores catering to nascent bourgeois
consumerism and, especially, the department store—a new commercial institution of
visual spectacle and sensorial saturation. In contrast to the protean intimacy of the small
shop, now “goods were largely out in the open,” writes David Howes, “and anyone could
enter simply with the purpose of having a look”180—thus making of consumption a casual
pass-time that is eminently visual. The simple act of viewing commodities becomes a
form of consumption in itself, one that helps formulate the modern subject as a citizen
producer-consumer. Benjamin links the changing sensorium of modern urban life directly
to the transformation of socio-economic relations wrought by capitalist expansion, and,
more prosaically, with changes in common merchandising practices. “With the increase
in displays of merchandise,” he writes, “the physiognomy of the commodity emerged
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more and more distinctly,”181 underscoring the affinity between the commodity form and
the visual image as object. Like the fetishized commodity that cuts its ties to the means
and moment of its production, the reified image assumes an independence and mobility,
exerting a power of fascination yet lacking any continuity or rootedness in the present of
lived experience.
The institution of corporate mass media in the 20th century—and especially television,
with its unending sensually-seductive stream of moving images—has accelerated the
simultaneous reduction in local quality and enlargement in affective reach of visuality.
But, it is with the development of the Internet and digital media that the comingling of
private and public—and the blurring between reportage and opinion, science and private
business interest, community initiative and corporatist state imperative—seems to reach
its apotheosis. And with it, visuality seems to solidify its pre-eminence among sensory
modes: though we can no longer have faith in the truth of the image, all seems to now
depend upon sight. Seeing may no longer be an adequate basis for believing (if, indeed, it
ever was), yet we continue to seek insight into the world and crave illumination; we
watch out for others and look into the facts but may be deceived by illusory claims; we
praise the vision of artists and political leaders, curse the blind, and are suspicious of
what remains hidden in the shadows. We seek an objective view of the world. How we
speak betrays the central place of visuality in the modern sensorium182 seeming to
confirm vision’s power of objective distance and rational evaluation. The modern
subject-position produced under these conditions is distinguished by a visual ambiguity
corresponding to Benjamin’s “dialectic of flânerie”—the experience of feeling that one is
“viewed by all” yet is simultaneously “utterly undiscoverable,” hidden within the
anonymity of the crowd.183 We can conceal ourselves and present a constructed image at
will; yet, not only are we under constant surveillance—from our personal and workrelated online activities, to corporate-state apparatuses such as tax filings, passports, or
air mile points, to our public utility use and everyday purchases, to the myriad CCTV
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cameras populating the urban landscape—we now willfully participate in the
promulgation and maintenance of an expansive network of subject-forming systems of
desire production.184 The digitization and diffusion of production and consumption in a
hyper-capitalist mode furthers the fragmentation of sensation and spatial experience set in
motion with the beginnings of the industrial revolution, but now in a way that seems to
dematerialize labour and the reproductive forces not only of capitalism but of the human
being.185 And yet, the very means that capacitate this transformation are eminently
material. Indeed, the ‘Cloud’ of the so-called information economy is weighed down by
millions of tons of heavy infrastructure that must be continually maintained and
upgraded—all of which takes an ever-increasing toll on the global environment.186
Technologies—and above all, visual technologies—thus play a crucial role in the
formation of the modern sensorium.
Material technologies (tools and implements, equipment and machinery, infrastructure
and working materials) are central to most forms of corporeal training that are
requirements of a self-reproductive society. Although Mauss never directly addresses
their role in his essay, objects and materials populate the whole of the text, like so many
mute witnesses to the concreteness of experience that theory may oft neglect. Nearly all
of the techniques that Mauss discusses involve some form of material technology: diving
(from an elevation of sorts?), sitting (seats), sleeping (some form of bedding), cooking
and eating (diverse containers and implements), various forms of bodily care (brushes,
etc.), and so on. Or, at the least, they involve raw materiality: climbing (what?), for
example. Clothing clearly also has a significant effect on our sensorial engagement with
our surroundings. Thick warm clothing has allowed us to inhabit colder climates, a hat
reduces exposure to rain and sun, shoes greatly change the way we walk and where we do
so, etc. Clothes can be also be designed such that they limit our movements, or makes us
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feel vulnerable, or set us apart in relation to those around us. Most of these technologies
are so mundane that they generally go unnoticed: they remain ready-to-hand, in Martin
Heidegger’s terminology,187 yet they are integral components of the politics of the
sensible—how everyday perceptual possibilities are organized and deployed. As much as
the techniques of the body are socially produced they are also reproduced by and in the
material-technical means that are integral to those practices, above all those that we
commonly engage with on a routine basis.
I am thinking of technology in two ways, here: in a very general, common-use sense of
the word—the tools and machinery with which people make their worlds: everything
from millions-of-years-old stone tools to our latest software updates—and in a more
comprehensive sense of techne, as technological process. By this, I mean a combination
of technology in the first sense (tools, etc.); the materials that are put to use; the bodily
practices and socio-psychological dispositions through which particular technological
forms are standardized and are routinized in the body; and, the methods of maintaining
and transmitting those practices (i.e. their educational forms). Our entire existence, as
species and as individuals, is technological: our archaic hominin ancestors changed the
course of our biological and cultural history, with increasingly sophisticated tools and
with the controlled use of fire188 while our lives now are more technologically-mediated
than ever before. Computer technologies have, quite clearly, altered our lives in ever
changing ways, transforming our perceptual worlds—redistributing what is afforded to
us—though we are frequently unaware of this and certainly largely ignorant of long-term
outcomes. This is, of course, true of all technological forms: they help form our
experiential worlds by affording certain parameters, and modern digital technologies,
while dramatically altering human possibility, can be understood as part of an ongoing
process—a fundamental aspect of our existence as species.189
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With reference to the previous discussion of an organism’s activities as always
formulated within the possibilities afforded by its environment, we can say that, in an
ecological model of perception and experience, the technological affordances of latestage global capitalism both act as processes of subjectification that constrain our ability
to discover difference and to think and act creatively, and suggest new forms of creative
action that can foster different ways of engaging with our environments and each other.
While it can be said that the affordances of any environment—which is, itself, neither
fixed nor bounded—both limit and expand the scope of an organism’s ongoing activities,
under the current conditions these two tendencies have given rise to the heightened
tensions and contradictions that increasingly face us in the everyday and that disrupt the
just-so faith of the natural attitude. The crisis of late-stage capitalism is a crisis of the
body and of bodies—bodies that are varyingly quantified, racialized, sexed, gendered,
classed, dis/enabled and policed, but that are also always sensing, feeling, exceeding.
The contradictions between the insatiable demands of capitalist growth and the
fundamental requirements of the base upon which any mode of social and material
reproduction depends—that is: the body itself—strain to the breaking point our ability to
adapt and successfully integrate ourselves into our surroundings. We may find ourselves
misfitting, unable to gear in. Yet, as our everyday experiences becomes ever more
destabilized and our perceptual commitment to a locale dissolves into the everywhereand-nowhere fragmentation of capitalist hyperspace, something in us rebels: although
continually subjected “to social injunctions, the body is prone to resistance.”190 Seeking
security, the body continually attempts to reorient itself, turning this way and that. The
sensory overload and psychological estrangement described by Simmel now reaches a
point where anything may seem possible yet we are prone to doubt everything (and we
may even congratulate ourselves for being such clever sceptics).191 Presented with so
many options—the department store model has now colonized every aspect of our
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lives—any semblance of auratic value seems to have faded into a limitless array of valueneutral choices that keeps us in a constant state of sensory stimulation and simultaneous
psychological lack. In the process we become dis-oriented, as our bodies seek
reassurance, grasp for certainty. We reach a limit state that seems to be both an impasse
and an entryway into other possibilities. The dissonance and rhythmic breakdown
between the misfitting body and the environment of late-stage capitalism hits a limit that
is less of a foreclosure than a “threshold” that we face when the usual perception we have
of a cohesive, enduring self is destabilized and threatened. “What remains constant,” in
such a state, “is a sense of existential risk.”192 This sense of risk is entwined with the
technological means of social and material reproduction: our lives have become hyper
technologized in ways that are beyond our control and our comprehension. Machines are
seen to displace workers, infrastructure networks appear to take on lives of their own,
social media fosters asocial behaviour and smart appliances colonize suburban homes,
while the very notion of the human—so central to the project of modernity—is thrown
into question.
Undeniably, digital media have changed the ways that we interact with each other and the
wider world. Indeed, our understandings of space and community have been altered, with
the creation of virtual networked space and online communities. The question of whether
(or: to what degree) digital technologies might represent a radical break in human history
(and human consciousness) or are integral developments in our ongoing technological
history—going from the earliest tools which altered the organism-environment
relationship to the newest devices, software and applications—lies well beyond the scope
of this present work. But what can be said with certainty is that all technologies
invariably induce particular forms of mental, physical, and social behaviour: they have a
politics. The politics of technology, moreover, are neither strictly deterministic nor
entirely closed off to the marginalized and oppressed. With the progressively fragmentary
nature of perceptual experience in late-stage capitalist society, there continue to be
opportunities in the everyday for reappropriation and creative experimentation. The
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organism in jeopardy attempts increasingly novel strategies as it strives to adapt. The
creative act can be understood not simply as involving a singular agentic consciousness
driven by inspiration—the creative genius of Romantic conceptions of the artist—but as
the response of a being under threat, a subjectivity in crisis. The contradictory forces of
capitalist society—one reducing all labour and experience to exchange value, the other
opening up new liberatory possibilities—are at work in the creation, reception, and
circulation of art—and in the everyday creativity encapsulated in the arts of the street, as
we will see. Modern technologies of reproduction, which replace older tradition-bound
craft techniques, have radically transformed the nature of artistic work. Just as social
relations and everyday sense-experience change in accordance with the capitalist mode of
production, and are further transformed by digital technologies, so too the making of and
encounter with art is brought under the dominion of the market while also finding radical
new channels of expression.
Although considerations of art figure into my broader argument, I am not specifically
concerned, here, with the world of fine art—art, as it is generally thought of in a modern
context. My interest lies more with the nature of creativity, of the creative act—thus,
shifting the principal questions away from a specialized field of artistic innovation to the
more generic creative abilities at the disposal of the species. This position also blurs any
sharp distinctions between technology and art—a distinction that, by and large, assumes
that whereas the former is largely a semi-mechanical (or culturally-determined)
reproductive activity based primarily, if not exclusively, in practical needs, the work of
art is, above all, imbued with representational (or ‘symbolic’) significance.193 In this, my
focus on capacities and affordances—rather than on clearly divided categories of
productive activities—is congruent with Ingold’s position, which avoids the problem of
drawing a clear distinction between art and technology by focussing instead on the idea
of skill, which is a defining element of all (or both) art and technology, regardless of
ascribed ‘meaning.’194
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The nature of creative activity in contemporary society is integrally tied to the everevolving socio-technological means at our disposal. In this context, it is worth keeping in
mind Benjamin’s ideas about the “technological reproducibility” of art in modernity and
in particular what he has to say about film.195 For Benjamin, film is the exemplar modern
means of technological reproducibility in the arts: it fully expresses capitalism’s sharp
divisions of labour, with the various stages and tasks involved in production carried out
independently of each other. At the same time, its very nature gives it new creative
possibilities that reflect the levelling and objectivizing power of the commodity form and
the emancipatory potential of the individual alienated consciousness that attains a
broadened social consciousness.196 The mechanical means of making a film allows for
total segregation between stages (this holds, whether it is the work of an individual filmmaker or that of a large studio); likewise, the filmic image undergoes a process of
abstraction and fragmentation that allows it to be productively manipulated in ways that
set it apart from older art forms. “Film,” writes Benjamin, “is the first art form whose
artistic character is entirely determined by its technological reproducibility.”197 No longer
bound to place and tradition, the ‘content’ of art (its sensuous and affective force)
references not a specific social context, customary belief or ritual practice, but its own
production, itself as product and productive activity.198 Film, in this telling, cultivates and
expresses a new, specifically modern, form of consciousness—one that hovers
ambiguously between the mass stupefaction fostered by the culture industry, and a
revolutionary transformation of social relations and human potential. The visual spectacle
of the filmic experience, at once immersive and alienating, replicates the logic of
abstraction that Simmel ascribes to the money economy. Yet, despite Benjamin’s strong
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emphasis on visuality and the visual image, he was also keenly attuned to sound and the
sonic transformation of urban space.199
For example, in The Arcades Project Benjamin describes the ever-growing traffic noise
on the streets of Paris and notes that only with the application of yet other technological
means—in this case, modern road building methods—was “it possible in the end to have
a conversation on the terrace of a cafe without shouting in the other person's ear.”200 Not
only does this passage accentuate the growing noise of modern cities, which has
continued unabated for over a century,201 it also draws attention to the interactions of
various modern technologies and the built environment in the configuration of the
modern sensorial regime. Indeed, architecture and large-scale infrastructure play an
essential role in shaping our perceptual experience as we go about the day. Architecture
is a form of complex technology, in the expansive sense of a techne, that helps shape the
individual habitus.202 The urban dweller encounters and engages with various built
features of the city that guide, capacitate, or constrain action. Spaces are designed,
opened up, segregated, further enabling some bodies while restraining or excluding
others. Like all technologies, architecture delineates parameters as it “initiates, directs
and organizes behaviour and movement.”203 In the architectural form, power and need,
materials and materiality, social convention and subjective desire, are bound up with each
other in a dialectical tension that proposes an excess: “architecture is always dream and
function, expression of a utopia and instrument of a convenience.”204 Bearing with it a
politics of domination, modern architecture also suggests an other space and a differential
time.205

199

Hall, Dialectical Sonority.
Benjamin, Arcades Project, 420.
201
What constitutes ‘noise’ is largely arbitrary and may differ between individuals. For my
purposes, noise can be defined simply as unwanted sound, much as a weed is merely some plant
that grows where it is undesirable to a human observer (or cultivator). See for example Uimonen,
“Acoustic Communities,” 120-1
202
Panofsky, Gothic Architecture.
203
Pallasmaa, Skin of the Eyes, 68.
204
Barthes, Eiffel Tower, 6.
205
Coleman, Utopias and Architecture.
200

88

If there is a utopian desire that animates modern architecture—a reimagining of built
space and the relations that this engenders—it is one that aims to delineate a different
space according to a preconceived plan, employing the strategies of the engineer, of topdown planning. Like the totalizing perspective upon the city from atop the World Trade
Centre described by de Certeau,206 the architectural gaze involves a conceptual mapping
that flattens space, rendering it mechanically functional. The mapping of space, both
historically and conceptually, has involved a process of abstraction and expropriation, of
dispossession, acquisition, and consumption. Coupled with expanding European trade in
the Renaissance, the development of linear perspective in art helped pave the way for the
visual objectification of space207 while the increasingly sharp divisions of labour of
nascent capitalist forces expanded and intensified the segregation and hierarchization of
the senses. In the 19th century, professional and scholarly geography took shape as a kind
of visual possession of the land based on principles of property and reason. This
ideological commitment gave rise to the “landscapism” that, according to Kristin Ross,
takes itself to be “the science of objective space par excellence”208—what, in Lefebvrian
terms, we might call an arch-representation of space. Throughout this historical process
reason, property and sight appear to become naturally and inescapably intertwined,
furthering the fragmentation of everyday experience. The flattening of space seems to
reach its apogee, according to Frederic Jameson, in post-modern architecture209 while, for
his part, Juhani Pallasmaa writes that “the contemporary city is increasingly the city of
the eye, detached from the body by rapid motorized movement, or through the overall
aerial grasp from an airplane,”210 underscoring the relation between sense perception and
the acceleration of technological change in modern society.
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2.5 Visualism Reconsidered
I have sought, in this chapter, to describe the various forces and processes that constitute
the ‘modern sensing subject,’ emphasizing their cultural-historical emplacement while
also acknowledging that there is something of the body—of our bodies—that always
resists categorical thinking, some excess in the flesh of experience that we can only know
through its perceptual effects—in the effects upon our bodies. I have emphasized the
mutually productive nature of the body and of technology (in an expansive sense), and
the material and historical emplacement of this relationship. Moreover, by critically
examining these processes, we can understand the apparent primacy of vision not simply
as a given—as a ‘natural’ fact—but as a consequence of both biological/material
processes and of a particular intellectual history that has identified in sight a sensory
corollary to the idealized disinterested logic of pure reason. The general assumption
behind this history is that vision distances and affords us an objective relationship with
the world.211 In contrast, other sensory modes seem inextricably subjective, embedding us
in the immediacy of experience. Indeed, there is a whole “audiovisual litany” that
contrasts the supposed objectifying distance of sight with the perceptual immersion of
audition.212
All of our senses, including sight, may of course deceive us: they can only ever offer us a
partial understanding of the world, simply because of their nature. Our sense of smell is
attuned to certain kinds of chemical processes but not others, and our sense of touch can
easily detect certain kinds of material forms but not those that seem less solid (such as
various gases) and then only those that are within our grasp. Indeed, the hierarchization
of the senses is in part structured around the relative reach of our sensory modes: all of
our senses extend our perceptual being beyond the apparent boundaries of our physical
bodies but to different degrees.213 Touch and taste depend upon immediate proximity,
while our olfactory abilities expand farther out into our surroundings. Audition extends
us even further: we can hear sound events from a great distance, but as distance increases
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so does the time delay between event and audition (e.g. when we see someone
hammering on something, in the distance: we hear the blows a split second after we see
the hammer come down). Sight appears to distinguish itself not only by its great reach but
also by its temporal qualities: it seems to imbue the things in the world with a durability,
granting them a solidity that eludes other sensory modes. And, it presents us with the
world all at once in its immediacy, for we appear to see things as they are happening,
with no time delay. And if it is by way of reason—as the operations of a reflexive mind
turned in upon itself and away from the partiality of the senses—that we may arrive at
clear and distinct ideas, vision, more than any other sensorial mode, seems to present us
with a world of objects that may be clearly and distinctly apprehended, if perhaps only
fleetingly.214
Certainly, the centrality of sight in the human sensorium is undeniable. Our binocular
vision and complex colour sensitivity have helped define the species215 and it can be said
that, for most people, sight generally occupies the greatest portion of our everyday
perceptual attention. Yet, while sight seems to impart a solidity to objects and afford us a
more-or-less reliable gauge of our emplacement in the world, we are constantly reminded
of the limits of vision. We know that, at best, we are only afforded a partial view of the
world—that we see from a point of view, one amongst many. Nonetheless, largely
because of its reach and the way it presents a world of distinguishable objects to us,
vision has generally been accorded special status, making it among the senses what
reflexive reason is to other faculties of the mind.216 The apparent constancy, perspective,
and reach that sight affords us appears to mirror the objectifying gaze of dispassionate
logical thought. 217 Moreover, the distancing power of vision seems to amplify the sense
of estrangement from the world, from others, and ultimately from oneself, that reaches its
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full expression in capitalist modernity.218 At the same time, this process of
objectification, by causing the individual consciousness to become estranged from itself
(more precisely: from the immediacy of its own conditions of production), enables
consciousness to critically reflect back upon itself and to better understand (see) its
position in the world. Abstract thinking demands that we take leave of our senses, as it
were; but, it affords us a perspective from which it is possible to develop the concept of
the general (the rule) and an understanding of the socio-economic and historical forces
that elude us when we operate by way of perceptual faith. Yet, reassured by its ability to
operate strategically and account for the world, the pure disinterested reason of abstract
thought finds that it faces an endless series of perceptual contradictions.219 This crisis of
contradiction played out within the spectacle of urban modernity affords us the possibility
of critical reflection. But just as the utopic impulse within the everyday has a propensity
to fail more often than not, with hope collapsing into disappointment, the logic of the
reflexive mind does not inevitably lead to a transformation of understanding but may, on
the contrary, affirm the apparent primacy of its own position as a self-produced
consciousness that gazes upon an objective world without necessarily participating in that
world. In such a case, abstract thought would not foster critique and an enriched
awareness of our place in the world but would instead naturalize the estrangement and
atomism of the money economy220 and the instrumental reason that reduces all life (as
process) to an operational world of things.221
If I seem to have left behind the more practical considerations of perception and of the
body that have been the focus of this chapter and strayed into the realm of abstract
philosophical thought, this is not a departure from but an integral component of my
overarching argument. That is: we think with and through our bodies; and, in our
everyday socio-corporeal practices we both naturalize established norms and habits and
have access to other ways of sensing, other ways of being—thus, other ways of thinking.
If perception involves a condensation of sensation that is further distilled into reflexive
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mind, then we can suppose that the pre-conscious body of sensation always exceeds our
subjectively embodied selves as reflexive agents: the world leads mind. “The first
element which constitutes the actual being of the human mind,” Spinoza writes in the
Ethics, “is the idea of some particular thing existing.”222 For Merleau-Ponty, in The
Visible and the Invisible, the fundamental philosophical question correspondingly shifts
from the an sit (Could there be something? Is there something? Or even: Why is there
something?) to the quid sit (What is there? What is it? What is the nature of my
perception?). I perceive something and already I am in entangled in the flesh of the
world. My interrogation begins in experience. And with this, “there remains only to study
what the world and truth and being are, in terms of the complicity that we have with
them.”223 The very possibility of abstract conceptual thought not only originates in its
worldliness but this worldliness always posits something more: some other sensation,
perception, action. The excess of the body of pre-conscious perceptual awareness both
negates the individual sensing subject and renews its commitment to the world by
affording ever new ways of sensing, of thinking and being. In the following chapter,
these ideas will become explicitly relevant within my discussion of various creative urban
practices that may act as vehicles for critique and resistance. However, before turning to
such considerations, I draw attention to the fact that I have been dealing with sight and
visuality in ways that are meant to question many of the assumptions that accompany our
understanding of vision and of the senses more generally.
I have deliberately spoken of how sight seems to operate at a level of objective things, of
how vision appears to mirror the calculations of reason, in contrast to other sensory
modes which are assumed to be more obviously processual and perceptually immediate.
But are all of these assumptions well-founded? A dominant understanding is that sight, in
effect, happens in the head (or the soul, as for Descartes). We see objects in the world as
light that is reflected off of them and that reaches our eyes. This then causes a series of
nervous excitations (to grossly oversimplify) that allows us, as conscious subjects—and
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here the atomized Cartesian cogito inserts itself—to see things ‘out there’ in the world.224
Other senses, on the other hand, seem to integrate our bodies into the world more
seamlessly. Taste and smell suggest a comingling of our bodies and our surroundings, as
various molecules are absorbed through specialized sensory receptors; and, we
understand sound as a vibrational force that penetrates our bodies. We simultaneously
hear space, hear in space—and we hear ourselves in space, as part of space.225 Moreover,
we hear inside of ourselves when we speak: we hear our voice both without and within
our head. “The sound of the self is ultimately entwined with the environment.”226 And,
we do not doubt the immediate veracity of our tactile impressions: if something feels
heavy, cold, smooth, etc. then it is those things in terms of our perception of it. But sight
feels different: we see things ‘out there’ but we see them from ‘in here,’ and thereby
ascribe sight to an interior consciousness. Sight seems to naturally and inevitably presents
us with an objectified world of things. Vision thus assumes dominance as the pathway
that leads between the mind and the world—a pathway that is truncated by the gateway
of the eye, an absolute boundary between myself and the world and those others who
inhabit it. But is this necessarily the case? Tim Ingold argues that this relationship
between sight and an interiorized cogito is precisely the opposite of what is commonly
proposed. It is through its “co-option in the service of a particularly modern project of
objectification,” he writes, that “vision has been reduced to a faculty of pure,
disinterested reflection, whose role is merely to deliver up ‘things’ to a transcendent
consciousness.”227 On the other hand, there is in much modern philosophy an
ambivalence—bordering on anxiety—toward the visual realm as being the realm of
appearance as opposed to substance.228 Exalted or disparaged, vision thus seems to
demand greater attention than other sensory modes. However, by focussing on the multisensory nature of everyday experience—and consciousness, more generally—we may be
able to attenuate the preponderant focus on vision and the objectifying reason that has
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become associated with the visual realm. The point is thus to better understand how our
senses both implicate us in the world and may act as pathways into a different way of
experiencing—of sharing in—the world.
The goal, then, is not simply to invert an existing hierarchy of the senses any more than it
is to deny the importance of vision in the human body (and thus mind), but to treat the
senses as an integrated whole in which different perceptual modes (modifications of the
body) attune themselves to different characteristics in an environment. In this context, a
critical account of acoustic experience helps demonstrate how differing sensory modes
are not isolated fields but dynamic processes that overlap and blur into each other.
Indeed, a full account of aurality exposes problems with trying to link a specific organ (or
organs) to a single mode of perception. Although it is true that our ears play the greater
part in our perception of sound, we in fact sense the vibrational forces, that for us
constitute sound, with our whole bodies. In addition to the ear, we also sense vibrational
frequencies with other parts of our bodies—notably the diaphragm and long bones, which
are more attuned to very low frequencies at the threshold of our sensory capacities.229
The resonant forces that translate into sound for us indicate the fundamental
inseparability of sensory pathways: the perception of sound exceeds the very organ that is
designated as the organ of aurality. It is perhaps worth noting that this is not true of sight
and of the eyes: complete blindness suggests that no information from the visual field is
perceptible. But sound is not a bounded field, nor is its apperception limited to one
sensory pathway. And of course, hearing cannot be ‘turned off’ the way sight can be by
closing one’s eyes. We are continuously alerted by sonic cues in our environment and we
respond (for the most part, preconsciously) to these cues. At the same time, we are
always acoustic participants in the world. We not only emit sounds (intentionally or not)
but our bodies absorb sound: our mere presence alters the sonic realm, and thus the
perceptual affordances available to others.
Another important aspect of the sonic realm that I have already discussed is highly
significant in the present context—that is: resonance; and, more specifically, how
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reverberation is helpful in understanding how we integrate ourselves into our
environment. As do all our sensory perceptions, audition implicates us in the world in
advance of reflexive thought: when we listen, we are always already hearing in the world.
Although we are not consciously aware of it most of the time, the sounds that we hear are
not ‘made’ only by the originary sound event with which we associate a particular sound.
When we hear something we hear it in space and we hear space. The parts of our bodies
that are tuned appropriately (again: primarily but not only the ears) detect both the
vibrational force emanating directly from the sound source and a series of reflected
waves: energy frequencies originating in the sound source that then ‘bounce off’ of
surrounding surfaces. These secondary sound signals add specific qualities to the
perceived sound, and “are merged by perception into a single sonic effect:
reverberation.”230 The time-delay between the sensations of the sound event and of these
secondary vibrational forces may not be consciously perceived by us but it is a critical
factor in everyday acoustic experience. The size, shape and material components of any
space, as well as the presence of other objects and of living beings, all impart particular
qualities to the reverberation that is perceived in that space.
Where reverberation refers to the sense of a sound blending with the surrounding
environment, and is perceived as the totality of overlapping refractions of the sound
event, an echo is a perception of reverberant sound that, due to the amount of delay231
has, in a sense, broken free of the original sound event. Though we cannot clearly
distinguish between the sound event itself and the reverberation that colours it, the echo
detaches itself from the initiating event and returns to us as a distinct reflection of the
original sound, like an auditory copy that imitates yet also differs, marked by the spatial
signature of a given space at a particular time—an acoustic image of a past event: “an
echo is nothing if not historical.”232 Though all spaces impart some degree of
reverberation, we usually only notice this in certain situations (e.g. inside a large, empty
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hall or a stone-surfaced cathedral, or as we will see, the long corridors of metro stations).
However, reverberation is a key component in how we locate ourselves in space: the size,
shape, and materiality of any space impart particular acoustic qualities, sonic spatial cues
which inform us, at a pre- or barely conscious level, and to which our bodies respond.233
Even in wide-open outdoor spaces, sound reflects off the ground and other nearby
surfaces, though this effect is often well below the threshold of conscious perception.234
Objects and other living beings have their own sonic presences—presences which I
perceive relative to myself and relative to each other in space. Moreover, beyond altering
the acoustic fabric of a space by ‘making’ sound (speaking, simply breathing, etc.), our
bodies absorb certain energy frequencies, so that even passive presence has an active
acoustic effect. Thus, contra the idea that sight, uniquely, affords us a sense of depth
perspective (because we see things as closer or farther from us and positioned relative to
each other), the role of reverberation in our perception of sound indicates that our
acoustic immersion in the world is equally important in how we locate ourselves in space.
We simultaneously hear in space and hear space.235
We must, however, be weary of a romanticizing tendency—in opposition to a seemingly
ocularcentric rationalism—to privilege sound and acoustic experience as somehow
providing a more authentic, or direct, experience of the world. This is to be seen in the
nonetheless important thought of composer and foundational sound theorist R. Murray
Schafer,236 and in the work of many who have followed his lead.237 In this analysis, the
‘natural soundscape’ is often favorably contrasted with the ‘noise’ of modernity. Against
the idea of a distinct ‘soundscape’ that might somehow compensate for the command of a
strictly visual landscape, I would emphasize the integral nature of perception. In this
context, I draw attention to the Spinozist idea of the senses as being modifications of the
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body (and I must emphasize: of a body, within its own singular conditions) which itself
expresses a more general force that exceeds us as individuals, in conjunction with
Gibson’s analysis of the senses as forming a cohesive (if mutable) whole, and MerleauPonty’s understanding of perception as a gestalt experience that, for the most part,
integrates us almost seamlessly into our environments.
Thus, while it is undeniable that vision occupies a place of privilege in the sensorium of
late modernity this is not simply a ‘natural’ or inevitable outcome but the result of
specific historical and cultural processes—as is the case with all sensorial regimes. And if
the social and material affordances that underpin our everyday corporeal experiences are
not fixed but processual, and are tied to a particular sensorial regime—a distribution of
the sensible that in the contemporary expresses the specific political and economic
interests of late-stage capitalism—then it is possible to imagine, and perhaps actualize,
different ways of sensing and different ways of being-together. To do so would involve,
amongst other things, reconsidering the primacy of vision and understanding it as one
sensory mode amongst others that is integral to human experience. And as do these other
modes, vision has its own particular properties that are attuned to certain characteristics
of the world (e.g. light, movement). There is already an agreement between my body and
the environment in which I move, which affords me certain possibilities. Vision, as do all
sensory modes, helps integrate me into my environment but can also allow me to enter
into a different relationship with the world.
When in the natural attitude, I see but I do not necessarily look—though this seeing
should not be thought of as a passive affair. Indeed, my sight is always actively involved
in the world, but when my perceptions remain unexamined they seem to quietly confirm
the naturalness of my impressions. However, if my conscious attention is directed toward
what I see, such that I am intentionally looking at things, my perspective shifts and I ‘see
things differently.’ Once again, this is true not only of vision: acoustic perception also
seems to seamlessly enmesh us in the world until some particular sound event attracts our
attention and we shift into a more a focussed mode of listening. We then conceptually
isolate ‘a’ sound from the broader environment. Such shifts in perception can in some
cases be traumatic, distressingly disorienting; but, they may also present moments of
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possibility, of experiencing the world in a different way, with imagination leading
perception. Art—and painting in particular, for Merleau-Ponty—can help us understand
our perceptual embroilment in the world, just as it can shift the way that we see and what
it is that we see.238 When I operate by way of the everyday perceptual faith I do not pay
attention to the productive relationship between my senses and the world. But facing the
work of art, my sight and attention are reoriented: it is the painting that leads my vision.
Indeed, “it is more accurate,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “ to say that I see according to [the
painting], or with it, than that I see it.”239 Art is more than simply an aesthetic pleasure
that stimulates the senses and mind (though it can be all that, as well). When we see with
a work of art, our perceptions are modified by what the work proposes—that is, the effect
it has on our senses. Art thus has a critical capacity in that it can present a different way
of experiencing the world. However, we needn’t limit ourselves to vision in these
considerations. I have already stressed the importance of not overemphasizing the role of
vision and of not reverting to a scopic model of perception. Thus, if a painting can
modify our vision, we can also say, for example, that music has much the same power
over our sonic immersion in the world. All of our senses are informed by the things that
we encounter in the world. But art, as the deliberate attempt to formulate something out
of the unformulated, offers particular possibilities in terms of reorienting our perceptions
and altering our engagement with each other and the world.
In the next chapter, I explore in more detail questions concerning the critical capacities of
art and its potential to transform socio-spatial experience; but, I will do so by positioning
these questions within the context of everyday creativity and amateur virtuosity. In this
chapter, I have demonstrated that what we conceive of as the senses are merely different
modes of sense perception—modifications of the body—and that these take shape within
the sensorial regime of a given social, material, and historical setting. The sensory
pathways that lead us into the world all work somewhat differently and each has a degree
of independence from the others, but they are integrated with each other in our perceptual
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awareness.240 Finally, I have emphasized that, while as individuals our perceptual
possibilities are largely already determined for us, it is also the case that the dominant
sensorium of late-stage capitalism is no more fixed or final than that of any other age or
society. Indeed, the fragmented nature of this sensorium—as with the fragmentation of
space—presents numerous potential openings for interrogation, critique, and creative
action. In the following chapter, I show how the various practices I group under the loose
term the arts of the street offer novel ways of engaging with the everyday urban
environment and with others who share in this environment; and, how these diverse
practices, by suggesting other ways of sensing and of being, may potentially foster a
different politics of the sensible.

240

Gibson, Senses Considered; Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception.

100

Chapter 3

3

The Arts of the Street

This chapter expands upon ideas fleshed out in the previous chapters with regards to
space, perception, habituated socio-corporeal practices, and moments of possibility
present in the everyday. Here, I move into a more practical domain, to delineate a class of
creative urban practices that, as disparate as they may seem, share certain key
characteristics such that it is possible to discuss them in the aggregate while still keeping
in mind that the terms by which they are designated remain malleable and mobile. What
interests me is how these diverse sets of practices—each with their own particular
technological affordances and mental-corporeal dispositions—can act as forms of
resistance that propose different possibilities in terms of how we experience and share the
world, have a share in the world, and share in the partitioning of the world. This grouping
of practices includes, but is not necessarily limited, to street performance and street art
more properly, punk, hip hop culture, and skateboarding. An odd mix, it might seem; yet,
all of these practices have certain common characteristics: while they operate within the
habituated common spaces of everyday life they also suggest some other possibility,
some other way of conceiving of, perceiving, and acting in the world—both for the
individual practitioners and for the casual witness. This loose conglomeration of practices
and dispositions demonstrates different possibilities beyond, or alongside of, our largely
unreflexive habituated ‘ways of doing’—the techniques of the body that help maintain for
us a cohesive sense of the world. The arts of the street render perceptible the excess of
possibility that is already present in the everyday. As such, they are political insofar as
they operate ambiguously between reproducing and normalizing existing relations of
social and economic power and actively resisting the logic of capital and the imperatives
of instrumental reason.
I begin by turning to Jacques Rancière’s theorizing of politics, the sensible and art, but in
doing so I problematize and critique certain aspects of his approach. While I find
Rancière’s description of the critical and transformational potential of art in the context
of late-stage capitalism to be compelling, my aim is move the discussion out of the more
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rarefied world of ‘high art’ to that of everyday urban experience and the ‘life of the
streets.’ I do so by outlining what I call the arts of the street: a grouping of practices that,
each in their own ways, involve creative reappropriations of urban space by and for the
practitioners of these ‘arts,’ that may simultaneously modify the spatial-sensorial
experiences of others who move in and through those spaces. In what follows, I discuss
in varying degrees busking (which includes all forms of street performance), graffiti and
street art, punk, hip hop culture, and skateboarding (specifically: street skating). All of
these have emerged from—and remain associated with—the life of streets and have an
implicit critical capacity that I link to the transformative potential of Rancière’s critical
art. In simple terms, all of these creative practices—in different ways but with similar
effects—suggest other ways of conceiving, using, and experiencing public urban space. I
examine each of these sets of practices in turn and together, to illustrate how their
creative and critical potentials are already present in the contemporary world. However, I
pay somewhat greater attention to punk and, especially, busking. This is largely because
of my own familiarity with and involvement in these practices, for various lengths of
time (although I might also include street skating, on this count). This approach is in
keeping with my exploration of how we think with and through our bodies, and the
critical potential that resides in everyday experience—a transformative capacity that ties
us back to the pre-conscious body of experience, to each other, and to the world.
I discuss the everyday do-it-yourself (DIY) creativity and improvisational tactics of these
arts of the street, linking these to the intuitive débrouillardise241 of the bricoleur
discussed previously. This, I contend, suggests that these varied ‘arts’ are tangible
expressions of a fundamental human propensity to experiment and explore that helps
secure our sense of a functionally ordered world whilst in the natural attitude, but that
may also present itself as resistance and a desire for difference. The arts of the street can
(and indeed, do) bring into evidence the productive possibilities that inhere in the
everyday—specifically: in the fragmented urban space of late-stage capitalism. However,
as we have already seen, while possibility may be present at any moment, hope seems to
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fail more often than not. And this tendency to fail is equally true of the creative and
critical impulse of the arts of the street. Consequently, in closing this chapter, I consider
the limits of critique and the degree to which these ‘arts’ may resist the forces of
commodification and how much they may, in fact, help normalize and naturalize the
distribution of the sensible of late modernity.

3.1 Critical Art and the Space of Politics
I have already discussed Jacques Rancière’s theorizing of the “distribution of the
sensible” as a way of understanding the political implications of how sensation and
spatial perception are organized within the specific material-historical conditions of a
given society. This “system of self-evident facts of sense perception,” writes Rancière,
“simultaneously discloses the existence of something in common and the delineations
that define the respective parts and position within it.” This partitioning—or sharing
out—“of spaces, times, and forms of activity” thus establishes “the very manner in which
something in common lends itself to participation and in what way various individuals
have a part in this distribution.”242 According to Rancière, this allocation of sensorial
possibilities in the name of society is expressive of three regimes of art—each
corresponding to successive historical periods, although the earlier forms can be seen to
overlap with the later ones. The first of these involves the earliest procedures and
products of what we have come to call art, although strictly speaking these do not
constitute “art as such but images that are judged in terms of their intrinsic truth and of
their impact on the ways of being of individuals and of the collective.”243 In this “ethical
regime of images,” the essential characteristics of art have less to do with technical skill
or inspired creativity than with the ability to represent the divine: the ‘truthness’ of the
image testifies to its divine nature. Here, art operates primarily at a religio-mythic level.
With changing social conditions and technological means, this ethical regime of images
is superseded by the “representative regime of arts,” in which the accuracy of the
depiction—its realism, in the sense of attempting to be a faithful representation of an
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ideal—becomes the paramount criteria for judging a work of art, and whether a particular
work in fact constitutes art as such. Historically, this corresponds to a Classical
(European) conception of art. But beginning in the 18th century, this ordering of the
sensible begins to give way, as the “aesthetic regime of art” gains ascendency. I note that,
in this context, I am discussing a conception of art—as a practice, or sets of practices; and
as a tangible expression, or as ‘works’—that has been formulated within the historical
particularities of European artistic and philosophical traditions and of the modern West
more generally. Therefore, it may be the case that this analysis is largely if not wholly
inapplicable in other cultural settings.
Given the range of human activities that have variously been classed as art, it is difficult
to arrive at a definition that is comprehensive enough without being so inclusive as to
become all but meaningless. I would suggest, however, that we can at the least suppose
that art encompasses the tangible expression of various human activities that produce in
us an excitation of the senses and a corresponding perceptual stimulation that is at once
integral to and stands apart from the everyday cultural setting within which it appears.
Whether as sacred object or ritualised body adornment, traditional dance or communal
song, staged musical or dramatic performance, or the art objects of late modernity whose
very objectness has been thrown into question, art is always appropriate to its place and
time. The assigning “to art objects a cultural significance is [thus] always a local
matter.”244 The terms of art discussed herein are thus largely restricted to the sociosensorial order of late-stage capitalism which is characterized, says Rancière, by the
aesthetic regime of art. This idea of a regime can be tied to Foucault’s “regimes of
truth”245 in that both describe the parameters of thinking—of what can be thought—and
the limits of the possible, within specific socio-historical conditions. A regime can be
understood as a set of rules and norms concerning not only ‘the truth’ (or ‘content’ of a
truth-claim) but also how truth categories are generated and assume authority. However,
while I find value in the Foucauldian analysis of power relations, the emphasis on more
formalized discursive practices (which Rancière tends to reiterate) shifts attention away
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from the relational becoming of embodied beings, away from the subjective corporeality
with which I am concerned.
Within the distribution of the sensible that defines the aesthetic regime of art, there is a
fundamental affinity between the aesthetic and the political and between art and
resistance: the aesthetic regime of art encompasses “that which comes within the
province of art through its adherence to a sensorium different to that of domination.”246
Here, politics does not refer to existing formal structures of political power so much as to
the possibilities for a space of open encounter and exchange. Politics, says Rancière, is
concerned not with “the exercise of, or struggle for, power” but with “the configuration
of a specific space, the framing of a particular sphere of experience” and involves
decisions about what is held in common and who is able to address questions of common
interest.247 Thus, if politics centres on questions of who can speak and be heard, who is
able and has (or has been allowed) the time to participate in a common space of
encounter, and what the terms of participation are, then these are also questions of
aesthetics. In this sense, the aesthetic does not designate an interest in the ‘content’ of art,
or historical or technical analyses of various works of art, but is an account of “the
sensible fabric of experience within which [works of art] are produced.”248 Art crystalizes
the socio-sensorial realm, proposing a space of experience appropriate to its own
particular regime of sense. The aesthetic regime of art distinguishes itself with the
creation of “critical art”—an art that emphasizes and plays upon the intrinsic relationship
between the sensible and the political. This is “a type of art,” Rancière writes, “that sets
out to build awareness of the mechanisms of domination to turn the spectator into a
conscious agent of world transformation.”249 This critical art is characterized by two
opposing tendencies that mark out the relations between art and politics: “the logic of art
becoming life at the price of its self-elimination” and “the logic of art’s getting involved
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in politics on the express condition of not having anything to do with it.”250 And, as will
be seen, these are also important characteristics of the arts of the street.
In the first case, there is a tendency for art to dismantle itself, qua art. If anything can
become art and everyone an artist, then art has no claim to its own singularity. If nothing
sets it apart from the materials, sensations, and events of everyday life, art as a category
of things and of relations simply dissolves. This process might be identified, for example,
in the tremendous changes in audio recording and editing technologies of the last few
decades.251 Digital audio production has led to a technological democratization that, on
the one hand, affords new creative possibilities to innumerable would-be artists all
around the world: surely a positive development if art is understood as a potential force
of liberation that opens a (more) egalitarian space of experience. But, at the same time,
we are now inundated with creative mediocrity that attempts to sell itself off as the
inspired genius of a new, globalized consciousness. And while many people have indeed
explored and exploited in provocative new ways the creative possibilities that digital
media afford, such work is easily lost in the glut of self-produced offerings pouring out of
home computers and basement studios or in the endless stream of ‘nice’ or ‘interesting’
photographic images online (Instagram, etc.), and so on. And yet, in blurring the borders
between the everyday world of commodity circulation and art as a singular experience
that distinguishes itself from its quotidian surroundings, there remains an indeterminacy:
a productive ambiguity that speaks of an excess beyond the actual. Art, in this sense (and
here, critical art) has the potential to pull us back into the body—our bodies—as
subjectively lived, and out into the flesh of the world, and the pre-reflexive body of
experience.
Conceived of as a force for revolutionary social transformation, this tendency of art to
undo itself it to be found in the ideals of the Situationist International, who sought the

250

Ibid, 46.
I use this example based on personal experience, as a musician whose first use of rudimentary
home-recording equipment pre-dates the digital audio revolution. As such, I am conscious of the
ambiguity posed by new digital recording capabilities: I am both excited about the new
technological affordances available to me but wary of my expanded role, in adopting such
technologies, as a producer-consumer within an ever-growing decentred global economy.
251

106

means to instigate a revolution in everyday life.252 Guy Debord, the best-known figure
within the S.I., describes a classless society in which there would be no artists as such,
“no painters, only Situationists who, among other things, make paintings.”253 Linked
directly to the conditions of mature capitalism, here art’s ultimate function is to eliminate
the distinction between producer and consumer, thus doing away with the category of
artist—which, itself, can be understood as a bourgeois position of privilege. By taking up
everyday materials, practices, and concerns, art would undo itself as a distinctive activity
and would simply melt into the fabric of a post-capitalist society, just as the state and
ultimately the capitalist mode of production are to wither and fade. But if such
conceptions of art may have a tendency to result in work that is overtly and selfconsciously political, the second distinguishing feature of critical art is that it enables a
politics precisely by its very refutation of the political. That is, by eschewing any clear
political stance, by refusing to adopt either the language of formal politics or any overt
political philosophy, art acts in the interest of a common space of collective encounter.
This relational space of encounter is to be understood as a realm of equal exchange,
whereby we might realize our common mutuality. This is a framing of the political which
locates its origins in ancient Athenian democracy. For Hannah Arendt, who has done
much to bolster these origins and whose writings on politics enjoy lasting influence, the
possibility of a true politics rests upon the ability of individuals to appear before others,
to be heard, and so be recognized as individual persons. In this space of appearance, they
may freely engage with each other and work out the difficult questions of how we are to
live together. Such a “space of appearance comes into being,” Arendt writes, “whenever
men (sic) are together in the manner of speech and action.”254 Speaking and appearing
before others, in this formulation, are fundamental to the possibility of action. Rancière
largely follows this ideal, while emphasizing that political space is never one of de facto
mutual intelligibility, and that it is propelled not by consensus but by disagreement,
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disputation and dissent.255 The place of art, in this, is to act as catalyst, or focal point
around which such a space may cohere.
However, this conception of politics and of art’s power to open a space of free and open
encounter is clearly not unproblematic. I leave aside the more obvious problems with
looking to Athenian democracy for an ideal political realm, given that political
participation was limited to male property-owning citizens, though I would add that it is
not enough to simply say that this model might be differently applied, without the
discriminatory terms of participation. The way that the model is organized is itself
predicated on a partitioning of space and of time, of the social and the sensible, that is
always exclusionary: using Arendt’s own terms, we might say that those who work can
also speak, while those who only labour cannot. A simple reading of Rancière seems to
suggest that art has an inherent capacity to foster a space unencumbered by existing
socio-economic relations and the inequitable distribution of the sensible of late-stage
capitalism. Art, if it is to be critical, is precisely that which defines itself as art by its
ability to foster a counter-space that operates in opposition to existing relations of power
and mechanisms of domination. However, it does not follow that such a space would
itself be necessarily free of inequalities, or that a redistribution of spatial-sensorial (thus
political) relations among participants would be unaffected by the individual affectivecorporeal histories of those participants. Put more bluntly: while art in the gallery context
may well put into play different aesthetic and political possibilities, not everyone has
access to the gallery. Whether in terms of cultural capital, financial means, or of simply
having the time (which can be seen to encompass the first two criteria), the world of fine
art is not one into which we all enter equally or by the same path. As argued throughout
these pages, space is never neutral—there is no empty space: it is defined by the
capacities and positions it affords; and, these present themselves differently to different
individuals. In a sense, art in the modern context is always an elite category in that it
defines itself by the fact that it stands apart from the mundane everyday world of
things—which is precisely what imparts it with critical capacities. But its terms of
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accessibility are, to a large degree, already given. Formulated from within, and in
reaction to, the conditions of late-stage capitalism, critical art may aim to undo the
distinction between art and everyday life—and between art and politics—but if it remains
confined to the rarefied world of ‘high art’ it will inevitably end up reproducing the
mechanisms of domination that it sets out to undo.
Rancière provides a number of examples to support his argument concerning art and
politics. Of these, I focus on one in particular—relational art—which perhaps most
obviously illustrates the problems posed by an unnuanced application of Rancière’s
conception of critical art. Rather than focussing on a work and what it does, relational
aesthetics, in Nicolas Bourriaud’s original conception, takes as its starting point the
whole of human relations.256 For its proponents, which here includes Rancière, relational
art fosters a counter-space of micro-social encounter, with its self-conscious rejection of
formalized political discourse. The ‘work’ is said to set in motion new relations between
artist and public and, importantly, between the individuals who comprise such a public—
an exchange that is predicated on conviviality and play rather than the formal logic of
capitalist economics. This understanding, however, has been criticized as being a rather
naïve misrecognition of art’s position within the capitalist economy and of ignoring
actual relations of power by masking existing social inequalities.257 Despite claims made
for the transformative effects of art-as-encounter encapsulated in relational art, nothing
suggests that differences between individual social agents can be erased and that equal
status can be achieved simply by engaging in an art practice that is posited as a level
playing field. It may be true that, by taking part in a simple common enterprise—such as
sharing food in a gallery setting—audience members can become conscious of their role
as creative agents in a new space of human relations.258 And indeed, these relations may
have the potential to foster a change in consciousness that extends beyond the space of
the gallery. However, as argued throughout these pages, all embodied beings bring to any
field of engagement differing abilities, knowledges, claims, desires. The participants in an
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art-encounter do not possess the same social capital upon entering into the constructed
situation of an art work or performance. These differences cannot be ignored, for they
help mould the affordances available to the individual (the organism) within that
particular setting and, consequently, future possibilities as well. Moreover, from the
outset the artist has a greater degree of authority over the ‘work’ compared to the
spectator, if not strictly in its production then invariably in its final form. Artist and
audience can thus hardly be seen as equal participants.259 The same can be said of
curators and gallery management, who play crucial roles not only in how a work is
mounted but also in deciding what work qualifies for—fits into—the space of the gallery.
Indeed, as Claire Bishop points out, relational art furthers the authority of the curator
while valorizing an abstracted notion of human relations that fails to ask “what types of
relations are being produced, for whom, and why?”260
Keeping in mind de Certeau’s distinction between strategies and tactics,261 I would argue
that while the artist’s work can—and in best cases scenarios does—operate at the level of
the tactical, introducing an element of ambiguity and indeterminacy that fosters a play of
the senses and imagination, the institution of art—of the gallery—tends to function
strategically with the logic of planning, management and, finally, of economic
imperative. Once again: questions concerning the terms of participation in the space
opened up by art—art as a general concept, and through specific works of art—are
crucial. Who gets to play? What constitutes play? Who defines such things, and upon
what authority? In fact, the space of encounter and play posited by relational aesthetics
largely replicates the neo-liberal ideology of a self-directed autonomous social agent
operating on equal footing with other actors in a field of free and open exchange.262 The
logic of the money economy, which is—as seen in the last chapter—simultaneously
reductive and alienating and presents radically new productive capacities, invariably
permeates the experience of art in the contemporary world.
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This is not to suggest that all is lost, that art is inevitably and completely subsumed under
and put into the service of capital, that art’s critical capacities are chimerical or, at best,
are limited to a restrictively formulated public that is always exclusionary. If I have taken
an interest in Rancière’s theorizing of art and politics it is because I find value in the idea
of a critical art that may provoke a redistribution of the sensible and present possibilities
for other ways of sensing and of engaging with each other and our environments. Indeed,
the mutual influence running between art and everyday life has long proved to be highly
productive, but in the contemporary world the increasingly blurred line between the two
presents new challenges and possibilities. However, there is often a tendency to focus on
the migration of elements from the everyday to the world of art that, in emphasizing the
imprecise boundaries between such categories, ends up reinstating the demarcation line
its aims to challenge. Consider, for example, the revolutionary incorporation of the
common-place and trivial by Dada artists into their work which, today, confirms their
importance in the Western art tradition; or, the contemporary high-priced sale of work by
street artists in prestigious galleries and auction houses—work that, at least initially, was
formulated in opposition to the elite world of ‘high art.’ It is accorded value precisely by
that to which it has defined itself in opposition to.263 Indeed, under the aesthetic regime
of art that Rancière delineates, art may collapse the opposition between “museum art and
street art”264 yet it does so by bringing the street into the gallery, by submitting the
street—that rough-hewn urban space expressed through everyday practice—to the more
formal logic of the gallery. We might identify here a certain colonizing tendency at work,
if ‘the street’ becomes simply new material with which to work, new territory to be
acquired. Rancière’s critical art appears to maintain this perspective, where the world of
‘fine art’ is both point of departure and of arrival in the transaction between art and
politics, and between art and everyday life. My intention is not to reverse this view, but to
reorient it—to take some of these ideas and put them to work in the context of everyday
urban life, of quotidian corporeal practices and perceptions, where, I contend, we may
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locate the creative and critical capacities that I have explored throughout the preceding
pages. As such, I turn now to a discussion of what I designate as the arts of the street.

3.2 From the Gallery to the Street
I delineate here a heterogenous class of practices and attitudes, simultaneously corporeal
and mental, that, as different as some of them may appear to be from each other, share
certain defining inter-related characteristics. In the first place, they all involve forms of
creative experimentation that rely on the common skills of the everyday bricoleur already
discussed. As such, they all involve processes that are both productively innovative and
are reproductive of existing conditions. And, as they derive their distinctive attributes
from their everyday surroundings, they operate at the level of the amateur265 within the
realm of the common, of collective spatial and sensorial relations. This, in turn, connects
them to public space—and, more specifically, to urban public space. Indeed, these sets of
practices are formulated within, and are expressive of, the life of streets—that loose,
semi-anarchic space of contending interests and influences. They all, therefore, contain
an element of resistance and refusal that can foster a counter-space of possibility. And, as
will be seen, these characteristics also connect them to the potentially transformative
power of critical art.
It is important to note that I refer to these various practices as ‘arts,’ and indeed some of
them clearly belong to this realm, even if they appear in more vernacular forms that may
not be granted the same prestige as what is more widely attributed to the domain of the
fine arts (or ‘high art’). Street music and street art are perhaps the most immediately
obvious examples of the ‘artistic’ nature of the practices that I have in mind (as compared
to skateboarding, for instance). For our purposes here, these arts can also be thought of as
forms of technology or technological practices, in the more developed sense of techne
elaborated upon in the previous chapter. Although some of these practices appear to be
far removed from the world of the gallery, the museum, or concert hall, I contend that all
share certain essential attributes that make it possible to discuss them in the aggregate, if
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only provisionally and within certain limits. What I conceive of as the arts of the street
encompasses a range of creative urban practices—and in some cases what may be
described as subcultures—that includes busking (all forms of street performance), graffiti
art and street art, punk, hip hop, street dance, and skateboarding (‘street skating’). This
class of arts, as I define it, is provisional: it is open-ended, in that it may include a range
of practices not considered here, and because it is possible that some of those that are
discussed may not exhibit all of the defining characteristics all of the time.
As will be seen, none of these arts can be understood independently from the
environment within which they are practiced. They are contingent and processual in that
they are expressive of, and bound to, the specific conditions within which they are found.
Yet, they may also provoke a productive rearrangement of the everyday social-sensorial
fabric by fostering a momentary space of encounter—an encounter-space. As such, they
all involve claims to space that express the heterogenous conceptions, perceptions, and
lived desires of the diverse practitioners of these ordinary arts. And indeed, they are
ordinary in that they are formulated and encountered within the average everydayness of
the quotidian and because they are associated with the commonplace practices of the
bricoleur, of the amateur. They express the different desires of the ‘common individual’
who attempts to appropriate time and divert space from pre-conceived function, using it
for their own ends and by their own means. These are activities of making and of making
do, of working with the at-hand in an improvisational way, with the aim of transforming
space and sensorial experience in some way (even if this may not seem to be obviously
so). However, it is important to avoid overstating the case and to resist a tendency to
fetishize difference, finding it everywhere and always as affirmation.266 Indeed, we might
consider that these practices can be considered ordinary in that they help order certain
activities and perceptual possibilities. They construct—assemble—spatial-sensorial
possibilities that define themselves in opposition to the power of state and corporation,
but this does not imply that they present unbounded opportunities and are free of all
restraints. And although they have an effect on how a space is experienced, this may or
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may not be the intended goal; nor do all of these practices aim to alter the spatialsensorial trajectories of others. But, in all cases they are directly linked to the social and
material relations that comprise public and semi-public urban space, and if they have a
home it is ‘in the street.’
The street is both a site of possibility, where public and private comingle and the
unexpected may appear at any moment, and an impersonal space of anonymity, of the
anonymous ‘we’ that effaces our singular desires, where creative play is corralled and
given direction by the demands of private capital.267 When I speak of ‘the street’ in a
general sense, I mean roadways and adjacent spaces, particularly sidewalks (which are
arguably more central to public experience than actual streets), but I also include back
alleys, vacant lots, and public squares. Small parks or the fringes of larger urban parks
also figure into the life of streets. We may add to this semi-public spaces, those that are
privately owned but are treated as public, such as an open plaza bordering a shopping
mall, or a pedestrian passageway running in between commercial buildings. Jane Jacobs,
in her influential The Death and Life of Great American Cities, notes how city streets can
enable or constrain, in various ways, the movement of people, with sidewalks playing an
essential role. She emphasizes the importance of relatively short, walkable city blocks,
mixed-use (residential, small businesses, etc.), and variations in design, all of which
encourage a diverse and active street life. Street corners at intersections provide
opportunities for encounter and decision—key elements in the formation and
maintenance of a sense of participatory citizenship. The street, in Jacob’s estimation,
should be a place where people feel encouraged to linger, meet others, talk, exchange.
Public space may then become the locus of politics, properly speaking—politics in the
sense of working out the basic “questions of how to live together.”268
The street is thus not merely a physical location defined by infrastructure and materials,
or design and function; it is above all a human place, a site of potential encounter with
neighbours and strangers, an admixture of the familiar and the unexpected, where the
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dullness of the habitual is punctuated by intermittent interruptions and irregularities.269 It
is a liminal space between public anonymity and the private realm, between social
constraints and individual motives and desires, of competing voices and conflicting
interests. This contested nature means that the street presents opportunities for individuals
to reappropriate fragments of time and to poach upon270 the formal space of corporatestate planning. The arts of the street arise from, and are intimately tied to, this life in and
of the streets and thus can be understood as forms of resistance, for they all involve
claims to space in opposition to the dominant relations of power. Given this oppositional
nature, such practices are generally regarded with a degree of suspicion, if not deemed as
being outright criminal. Busking, graffiti and mural art, hip hop and punk have all been
variously associated with the ‘rabble’ of the street, with criminality and moral
degeneracy, with the subversion of public order and good taste, and in some cases have
been and continue to be strictly regulated or outlawed.271
The arts of the street, as varied as they may be, thus all have a potential critical capacity
in that, constituted as forms of resistance, they give expression to other ways of
experiencing—and, in turn, reproducing—public space. Again, I must emphasize that this
is a potential capacity—one that may or may not materialize in a particular instance, even
if all the critical factors seem to be present. “Politics,” as Rancière’s notes, “doesn’t
always happen.”272 Nonetheless, this potential to foster other ways of sensing and
perceiving suggests a strong affinity between the aesthetic forms of these creative
practices and the formulation of a politics of difference. And it is this distinguishing
aspect of the arts of street that connects them to Rancière’s treatment of politics and
aesthetics and his conception of critical art.
To further elaborate, I list here four essential characteristics that link these diverse
practices to the transformative potential of critical art. (1) They express a plurality of
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motives, practices, and self-conceptions. The arts of the street are concerned less with
traditional categories, materials, and procedures of art than with the resulting effects—the
relations that are put into play. (2) They adopt themes and materials from everyday life,
working in the style of the bricoleur with what debitage and detritus presents itself as
available for use or appropriation. This is particularly evident in punk and hip hop: for
example, many song lyrics focus on issues of everyday life and on the challenges,
conflicts, and injustices of modern urban existence. (3) They distinguish themselves from
their workaday surroundings at the same time that they threaten to eliminate themselves
by being swept up and consumed in the circulation of commodities. (4) They foster
momentary counter-spaces within the fissures of modern space—counter-spaces that may
open up possibilities for encounter and exchange and that, above all, suggest a
reconfiguration of existing spatial and sensorial relations, even if only for a few brief
moments.

3.3 Claiming Space
Graffiti is perhaps the most obvious and simplest example of a creative space-claiming
act. The mere act of writing one’s name, initials or graphic identifier on a fixed surface—
‘tagging’—constitutes an oppositional claim to space—all the more so when there is a
realistic threat of being caught and punished for writing on a surface that is not one’s own
property. The writer poaches upon the architecture of the city, leaving a mark that says “I
was here,” bespeaking a link between self and place, a self-positioning in space that is
communicated to others by the markings left behind. Because the ‘message’ is fixed in
place it acquires a temporal endurance; graffiti binds space and time, temporalizes a
space and materializes time in space. But, given time, the graffito fades: a space’s
durability is ephemeral. This, of course, is hardly a new phenomenon as attested to by the
enigmatic symbols and drawings left by our ancient ancestors in caves, on rock walls, and
even on mountain sides—from the famous examples of southwestern Europe’s cave art,
to giant pictorial representations in South America that can only be fully appreciated
from the air,273 to more recently analyzed sites in southeast Asia and Australasia,274 at
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least one of which predates the figurative cave art of Europe.275 In its most basic form,
the graffito attests to a presence: someone occupied that space, reproduced it but with a
new element such that it will never be the same as it was. Although the individual
‘artist’—whether modern teenager spray-painting obscenities on the side of a building or
some long-gone person working by torchlight in a cave—may not deliberately set out to
alter the spatial-sensorial possibilities of a space, this is an inevitable outcome. Moreover,
these various markings may be intended for specific individuals or groups of individuals:
clues left behind to be deciphered by a select audience.276 But in the realm of public
space and everyday life, urban writing and graphic art—which would include graffiti in
all forms as well as stenciling, postering, mural painting, and even affixing stickers to
signposts or inside public transit vehicles—is more often than not meant to be seen and
either conveys a message or offers an alternative aesthetic engagement. Graffiti can be
employed in an overtly and self-consciously political way to raise awareness of economic
inequality and political repression.277 As such, graffiti or street art is a “reaction against
oppression, a mode of protest, an anonymous way to be heard,” and a means of fostering
“personal or group empowerment”278 by giving voice to those who feel marginalized,
excluded from a space of politics that operates at the macro- level of power relations. By
altering, appropriating, or demarcating existing space according to their own singular
aims and desires, these ordinary artist-practitioners change how that space is experienced.
A concrete retaining wall is transformed from being a functional structure into a
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broadsheet from which to denounce injustice and challenge domination, or a canvas
awash with colour or design that proposes to the passerby a different visual relation with
the urban environment.
Political graffiti has a long history but in recent decades it has branched into and melded
with street art in varying forms and to different degrees. Street art can include, in addition
to painting, drawing and the other above named media, affixing ceramic tile or objects to
different surfaces, and various forms of installation work, some subtle and easily
overlooked, others unmistakably affirming themselves.279 Graffiti may have a long
history but modern graffiti, as art and as protest, developed identifiable styles in the postWorld War II inner-city street culture of major urban centres, first and foremost in the
United States (although Mexican muralism can also be counted as an early influence).
Within these primarily Black American neighbourhoods— most of them economically
disadvantaged, many of them contending with high levels of gun violence, problems with
street gangs and drug trafficking—new forms of creative expression took shape: street
dance in varying guises but most famously break-dancing, and the musical style and
techniques of hip hop and rap. Emerging first in New York City, followed by Los
Angeles, these practices and dispositions (in the sense of a mental-corporeal attitude or
style) quickly spread to other marginalized communities in the cities of America and
beyond. These various incarnations of hip hop culture—in so far as they remain ‘of the
street’—always retain an adversarial stance toward established authority but continue to
add new musical ingredients drawn from different cultural traditions, illustrating the
open-ended malleability of the form while still being identifiable in a general way.280
Although modern graffiti and hip hop culture have some shared history and may often be
associated with each other, they remain distinctive forms of urban creativity, with their
own particular stories and offering their own possibilities in terms of creative production.
Nonetheless, they both involve a blending of private and public, of personal and political,
in which experimentation and play are highlighted both as activity and outcome. This is
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the play of the bricoleur in which means and ends become interchangeable, or merely
different modes of one continuous process. But while graffiti and other forms of graphic
street art may or may not specifically try to provide enjoyment for other people, hip
hop—like punk and, in a somewhat different way, street music—is, in large measure,
focussed on social and sensorial gratification, and convivial enjoyment. It is concerned
with individual pleasure which may be amplified in collective emotion. Music and dance
might seem to simply be opportunities for enjoyment, but they can also foster a different
sociality that is formulated in reaction to existing social and material relations. A group
of inner city youths take over a street corner, turning it into an impromptu dance floor, an
ephemeral space of shared pleasure. The sheer corporeality of these ‘arts’ connect our
individual perceiving selves to the pre-perceptual body of sensation, suggesting an intercorporeal awareness that is expressly cultivated— for example, through street dancing.
Where functional planning envisions efficiently designed spaces of production and
consumption at all levels of the urban, these ordinary practitioners of the street imagine
some other possibility, conceive of other uses, and subtly or overtly reconfigure everyday
space. As such, the arts of the street always involve some form of appropriation, of
poaching or détournement, of acquiring fragment of everyday time and space. In the
process, public space becomes both a site of contention and material to experiment with,
to acquire, to claim. The technologies and infrastructure of the city then become
resources that may be reused, repurposed, reclaimed. Just as Lévi-Strauss’ bricoleur
employs the remainders of past projects to initiate new ones, so too for the artist of the
street, the nature of the materials determines a range of possible uses—thus orientating
the project—but it does not determine how they are actually used. For this, we would
need to also consider the role of the individual practitioner: their social-sensorial
emplacement, the personal trajectory that they have traced out. Yet, it is a trajectory that,
for all its seemingly discreet singularity, may find an intercorporeality in these ordinary
arts through a different sharing out of urban space and experience.

3.4 Architectural and Technological Détournements
In recent decades, the possibilities for playful appropriation have expanded rapidly with
ever new and less expensive technological affordances at the disposal of the would-be
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urban bricoleur. Electronic and digital audio recording, in particular, offer fecund
material for experimentation and play. Through the media of microphone, headphone,
and editing tools, the individual’s sonic relationship with the environment is radically
transformed281 and these possibilities have become increasingly available to many people
of relatively limited financial means. Modern recording and playback technologies were
initially developed and promoted by, almost exclusively, affluent white men of privilege,
whose ability to realize their talent and imagination depended in some measure on an
economic base with attendant socio-corporeal norms of behaviour that favours some over
others: a distribution of the sensible that, as we have seen, is predicated on the cold logic
of the money economy. But, within the dance party culture of inner city America, these
sonic tools have been adopted and adapted to produce and project new sounds with the
DJ and MC emerging as figures of resistance,282 expressing voices from the margins of
urban capitalism, with claims and desires of their own: heteroglossic murmurings and
cries from those who live at the heart of global capitalist society yet who are ever denied
full membership and equal share, or part, in the sensible fabric of everyday life.283 These
insistent voices, as much mockingly playful as forcefully agonistic, refuse to be
silenced—like Lefebvre’s right to the city which proclaims itself as a cry and as a
demand.284 The space in which to be heard, however, is not evenly parcelled out. Space,
the sensory affordances, and the possibilities for being seen, heard, and recognized are
distributed unevenly, inequitably.
It is not only the lyrical content of hip hop (though it is that, too) that draws on and gives
form to the tensions of everyday life at the margins of late-stage capitalist society. Forms
of delivery, rhythmic structures, and sonic—or tonal—qualities can be understood as
expressions of a body in crisis, of the misfitting body that nonetheless has recourse to the
common skills of the everyday bricoleur, which is equally attested to by punk practices
and attitudes. Despite the sensory-affective estrangement and spatial fragmentation of
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late modernity, those who do not have the time and are not allocated the space to speak
and to appear in a formal space of politics continue to seek and claim space of their own
through experimentation, finding momentary openings to exploit, fragments of time to
appropriate, means of expression and tools for action.
The very ordinariness of these practices and materials means that they have a tendency to
‘fall into the background’ when we adopt the natural attitude, but at the same time they
give us access to the pre-reflexive body of sensation upon which our imagination and
propensity for play rely. The art in all of this lies in the ability to bring together certain
elements—a combination of materials, skills, needs and desires—and make
apprehensible what had not been so, by proposing a different way of engaging with
space, a different politics of the sensible. Objects and materials are put to uses other than
those they were designed for. Just as many musicians with more formal training have
continued to explore new sonorous possibilities by modifying instruments or by playing
them in (or playing upon them) in unusual and unexpected ways, so too hip hop artists
have exploited the technological affordances available to them in novel ways, expanding
the understanding of what those technologies mean and how they may be used. The
technique of ‘scratching’ is a prime example of such technological détournement. This
involves starting and stopping, reversing, and otherwise playing a vinyl record by hand
on a turntable (turntables are typically paired, as per the usual DJ practice). Now no
longer dutifully broadcasting the voice of authority—of the state and of an established
music industry: his master’s voice—the turntable “becomes a metaphor for turning
consumption into production,” with “active participation in the arts [giving] people a
voice to express personal and political power on their own terms.”285 That it is on their
own terms is a key aspect of these practices—likewise that these playful but defiant ruses
operate in and upon everyday public space. For it is in this unstable space of contestation
that the possibilities inherent in the fissures of late-stage capitalism may present
themselves, with the intrepid artist of the street seizing opportunities “on the wing,” just
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as the trajectory of the urban walker never delineates a final strategy or a proper place of
its own.286
Urban architecture, although imposing a certain order that places its own demands on the
living body, presents numerous opportunities for creative reappropriation. In this context,
skateboarding—more specifically: ‘street skating’—provides a clear example of the
desire and capacity of individuals to play upon the architecture and infrastructure of the
city.287 Despite the fact that, increasingly, one may encounter any number of
skateboarders in their thirties and older, skateboarding is still generally regarded as a
sport-cum-recreation for children and youths—fun perhaps, but not something to be
treated with any serious consideration. In addition, skateboarding is not infrequently
deemed a nuisance, with complaints about noise and about skateboarders on the streets
and sidewalks posing a danger to pedestrians and automobilists—as well as to
themselves. But the real pleasure of skateboarding is not in simply moving around the
city with ease but in seeing in the urban environment an array of terrains and materials to
experiment with—challenges to overcome. The “architectural and social fabric of the
city,” writes Iain Borden in his Lefebvrian analysis of skateboarding and urban space,
“offers skateboarders a plethora of buildings, social relations, times and spaces, many of
which are free to access.”288 Stairs and railings, public monuments and park benches,
parking blocks and paved embankments, industrial loading docks and empty swimming
pools: subverted from their designed purpose, they become terrains of play, spaces of
pleasure that bring imagination, desire and possibility into contact with the material
present.
For some skaters, part of the appeal of street skating lies precisely in the fact that it is
perceived as rebellious, as challenging the established norms of spatial behaviour. It is a
form of everyday resistance that may seem ‘selfish’ insofar as the focus appears to be
primarily, if not entirely, on the individual skater but that is, in fact, a communal
endeavour. Skateboarding can foster a strong sense of camaraderie amongst practitioners,
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in which the emotional intensity of attempting a difficult trick may be felt by fellow
skaters: a being-with that is eminently sensorial. Skateboarding is a full-bodied practice, a
gestalt experience involving the full sensorium. Skaters learn new tricks from each other
while novices learn and develop technique and style by watching experienced
practitioners—a socio-corporeal education that may be acquired in the street and at the
skate park, as well as through articles and photographs in skateboard magazines and,
increasingly, from videos shared online. This is a form of looking that involves the whole
body, a dialogic vision that confirms the intertwining between the flesh of the body—of a
body—and the flesh of the world. It is a tactile vision, by which the skater ‘reads’ the
urban landscape, perceiving possibility in architecture.289 True to the improvisational
mode of the urban bricoleur, these skills are also acquired through experimentation and
play. Moreover, street skating is a concrete affirmation of imagination and corporeal
possibility specifically in everyday public space—in shared space (although, as noted,
this sharing out is predicated upon unequal relations of power). In this sense, like all of
the arts of the street, skateboarding is a corporeal demonstration to others that it is
possible to perceive and engage with the materiality of the city in different, and
sometimes surprising, ways—ways not envisioned or intended by functional urban
planning. Indeed, as Bäckström and Sand note in their ethnographic study of street
skaters, skateboarding is an imaginative process with “material and social aspects as well
as dimensions of time” that “intergrat[es] skills, previous emplaced experience, and the
desire for future engagements with materiality.”290

3.5 Resistant Bodies
Built around a set of bodily practices and dispositions in relation to the environment and
others, skateboarding is thus a form of techne: a technological relation, with its own
transferable techniques of the body in which the skateboard is a versatile tool that enables
new forms of action. Skateboarding operates by way of a three-term dialectic of body,
board and space, argues Borden, in which the individual produces a counter-space that is
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resistant to capital because it is useless: economically non-productive, a position of
marginality within the dominant relations of social reproduction.291 But skateboarding is
also a form of resistance in the pre-conscious immediacy of the flesh—in the physical
resistance of the city’s built features to the skateboard itself and, more importantly, to the
body of the skater. Skaters may use varying degrees of padding and protection against
harm, but accidents invariably happen and injuries are sustained. These range from
scrapes, bruises and sprains, to broken bones and, in rarer cases, much worse. Although
most of these injuries are minor, a certain degree of fearlessness is nonetheless required:
a willingness to put one’s body on the line and attempt something that is ‘not done’—the
improper—thus demonstrating the possible body through seemingly impossible gestures
and actions, such as riding up a vertical wall or launching off of some built structure—a
staircase, retaining wall, loading dock—and pausing mid-air for what seems a gravitydefying moment before effortlessly landing and smoothly riding on, the whole in one
seamless motion. There is a self-sacrificial element to skateboarding, in all of this: a
desire for danger that sets the body on alert—a utopic demand of flesh over asphalt,
concrete and steel—imparting a corporeal awareness that frequently escapes language.292
The body, in this sense, reflects and contains the tensions of daily life: it is a relational
site of conflict, of experimentation and error. At the same time, it is the expression of a
deep-seated creative urge that discovers itself in resistance and in play.
Like street skating, punk is eminently concerned with the body and the conditions of
daily urban life. Responding to these conditions, they both pursue pleasure, excitement
and different forms of community as antidotes to late-stage capitalist boredom. The arts
of the street, in this sense, involve the projects-in-the-world of misfitting bodies—
resistant bodies that are also desiring bodies, creative bodies. From its beginnings, punk
has been an expression of—and a mode of resistance to—the social and corporeal
alienation of modern life. The on- (and off-) stage antics and abandon of the Sex Pistols
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exemplified the centrality of this resistant body.293 The sheer corporeal presence of Iggy
Pop, singer of the proto-punk band The Stooges,294 also expresses this concern with the
individual body that is recognized as a unique person but that may likewise be swallowed
up by, and disappear into, the mass. This almost sacrificial presentation of oneself on
stage was picked up by many subsequent punk singers. The self-sacrificial aspect of punk
corporeality is also expressed through forms of body modification such as tattooing,
piercing, and, in more extreme cases, cutting and scarification.295 In these ways, the
individual body comes to both incarnate what is seen as the oppressive conformism of
mainstream society and to be a mode of resistance and a way of reclaiming one’s life
from the corrosive demands of capitalism. This corporality is equally a social event, an
embodiment of a different way of being together, exemplified by ‘slam dancing’ and its
evolution into ‘thrashing’ or ‘moshing.’ What began as a form of wild dancing on the
spot, jumping up and down, or generally flailing about, developed into thrash or moshing,
with the dance becoming more violent as participants (typically) move in a circle in front
of the stage, crashing into each other, arms and legs thrown up and out. And yet, despite
the violence of this dance form, participants help anyone who falls down back onto their
feet.296 This violence is in part symbolic, but it is also real and it serves to unite body and
mind and the totality of bodies in the mosh pit. In this way, punk promotes a politics of
togetherness and an aesthetics of corporality that blurs pain and pleasure, self and other.
As both a site of subjugation and of resistance, the punk body can be understood as
expressing Mikhail Bakhtin’s concept of the carnivalesque,297 with a ritual overturning of
the normal everyday order of things. The grotesque body of punk—alternately overcome
with rage at the injustices of the world, expressing anguish or pleasure, howling,
laughing, marked by piercings and tattoos, sweating in the mosh pit—comes to express
the desires of those who no longer (or never did) identify with the aspirations and norms
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of mainstream society.298 The point has been made that the “carnivalization [of punk]
displaces resistance from the political realm of action to the cultural realms of festivity
and ultimately secures social reproduction,”299 in effect making of it yet more terrain to
be commodified and marketed. However, the intention may be less about founding a
space that operates externally to capitalism than about exploiting the existing fissures
within the fractured space of everyday modern life, thus aiming for, in Rancièrian terms,
“a sensorium different to that of domination.”300 Like skateboarding, punk seeks a
different way of engaging with the world and with others.
But, punk and skateboarding also share a certain historical affinity—not entirely unlike
like that shared between hip hop and graffiti art—a relationship that developed in the
urban and suburban sprawl of late 1970s and early 1980s Southern California, to spread
rapidly from there.301 Punk, however, is much more explicitly political in the sense of
consciously opposing the dominant relations of power. Among the arts of the streets that
I consider here, punk and hip hop most clearly espouse a politics of anti-authoritarian
resistance. It is true that neo-fascist elements have been associated with punk, though
these are by and large linked to skinhead style and culture—which seems odd, given the
skinhead style’s biracial working class origins (the association between skinhead and
neo-Nazi ideology only really began in the 1980’s).302 Problems of male chauvinism have
also pervaded punk (just as they do all aspects of modern society), but as with neofascists and other white supremacists, punk scenes have been relatively successful in
maintaining a certain ordered cohesion based on openness and mutual respect.303 And in
this sense punk has proven itself as form of social and political critique that, just as it
denounces and disputes, celebrates the singularity of every unique body as a sensing,
living, being with its own experiences.
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It may appear that much of what I describe as the arts of the street are not political in any
overt manner. Moreover, the objection may be raised that, in many cases, the
practitioners of these ‘arts’ are not deliberately engaging in actions that subvert public
space or consciously trying to foster a different politics of engagement—all of which may
be true. None of that, however, changes the resulting effects of those actions; and it is the
effects of things that provide our entryway into the world and that help formulate the
conditions of future possibilities. If politics, in its most basic sense, is concerned with
how we are to live together—asking: what is the basis of community and how is this to
be organized?—then it is, in essence, concerned with questions of space and the
partitioning of perceptual possibilities, with the allocation of time and the designation of
ability. The arts of the street are political because they hover between being modes of
social reproduction that help naturalize the dominant relations of power, and being
creative forms of resistance that instigate possibility by altering the sensory field of
shared public space. Just as Rancièrean critical art fulfills its critical function in spite (or
precisely because) of the fact that it is in continual jeopardy, always on the cusp of
dissolving itself qua art, so too the arts of the street have a critical function because they
are both unremarkable, mundane, common—are extensions of actual social and material
conditions and the contradictions therein—and are instances of difference and possibility
that suggest that things might be different from the way that they currently are.

3.6 Do-It-Yourself
Creating a space in which disaffected individuals may find a sense of community is a
central feature of punk. I note, here, that by ‘punk’ I do not simply mean a certain
musical style (or spectrum of styles: multiple punk sub-genres may be identified), or a
style of dress, etc., although these may figure in as components. Nor is it simply a
cultural phenomenon or class-aligned subculture304 that might be categorically identified
and analysed by set criteria. Rather, punk encompasses a range of ideals, dispositions,
and desires with an identifiable (if fluid) aesthetic and attitude. These are based on a
rejection of established expectations and norms—of a life ruled by production-
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consumption and endless growth—to insist, instead, on the dignity of the individual.305
But punk, from the outset, emphasizes the extent to which ‘normal’ individual experience
(the average everydayness of the norm, of the rule) is formulated in the interests of the
corporate state. Whether in terms of music, visual art, dress and appearance, or public
behaviour, punk aesthetic practices embrace what is perceived within society at large as
crude, ugly, self-consciously unprofessional and deliberately antagonistic. In the tradition
of the Dada movement, punk is primarily a negation: a rejection of what is perceived as
the failure and degeneracy of western societies that, in the process, affirms subjective
experience and celebrates the creativity of everyday bricolage. As such, punk operates
according to a DIY (do-it-yourself) logic. Whether this means forming a band and
releasing music, perhaps touring; making and distributing art and fanzines; or forming
communal living spaces and networks of mutual support, by relying on their own (often
meagre) resources, punks operate on the assumption that ‘if you need it, you should be
able to ‘find it or make it’ (or perhaps steal it). This is done by rejecting what are seen as
the hollow formalities of the consumer society and avoiding (full) participation in the
capitalist economic mode.
One of the most salient DIY features of punk involves bands and music production. Most
punk musicians have little or no formal musical instruction—or even, necessarily, skill.
Punk, writes Stacy Thompson, is “an attempt to open up the possibility of performance to
people not formally trained in music.”306 Punk involves a desire to communicate
something, and a need to express oneself on one’s own terms. But, the usual means of
doing so (record companies, concert or art venues, etc.) are largely inaccessible, usually
because the ‘product’ is perceived as being offensive or subversive, or simply as
economically unviable. These are, of course, not fully separable from each other: the
subversive nature of punk limits its mass appeal, while the limited market for punk music
helps to confirm its political marginality. Consequently, numerous musical groups under
the broad umbrella of punk have started their own record labels.307 This is sometimes
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done because no established label will take on that band (a profit-driven decision), but it
is frequently also a deliberate choice by punk musicians themselves as they attempt to
side-step the capitalist relations of production inherent in the music industry.308 A band
might independently rent time in a small recording studio, then either arrange for records
to be pressed, or make cassette tapes or CDs that can easily be shipped at minimal cost
(the internet has further transformed this process, making it even easier to distribute and
promote independent recording projects at a relatively low cost). Bands rarely make
much, if any money, this way—but making money has never been the point for punk.
The DIY approach, or ‘philosophy,’ did not of course originate with punk. From the
builder-inventor tinkering at home spurred on by publications like Popular Mechanics
beginning in the early 20th century, to a variety of creative counterculture projects in the
1960s and beyond, to the contemporary ‘maker’ movement,309 the idea of doing and
making for one’s own use and by one’s own means has continued to find new forms of
expression. But for punk, the concept of DIY is not simply a vehicle for spreading one’s
music or message. It is integral to what punk is: it is a defining feature. Doing it yourself
is a conscious rejection of the power structures of the culture industry and the economic
relations that underpin it. Certainly, the initial movement that motivates a project stems
from some specific desire or need. But—and more importantly—the fact of doing, of
making, fosters the individual resourcefulness of practitioners but always in relation to a
collectivity, by drawing on a loosely organized set of practices and understandings that
waver uncertainly between the singularity of art and the reproductive habits of daily life.
If the arts of the street are arts at all, they are minor arts—more unfinished sketch to be
revisited and reworked at any time than finished work: the improvisational play of the
amateur maker. This conceptualization of doing-it-yourself should be understood as
arising specifically within the context of globalizing capitalism. Even for the home DIY
hobbyist, whether the goal is to fashion some functional item that is needed, or to simply
build as experiment and for pleasure—to ‘see if it can be done’—the process involves a
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relationship with tools and materials that reorients the practitioner’s perceptual
relationship within the environment. This reorientation and consequent shift in future
affordances arises because the activity always resists to some degree the world of work,
of professionalism, and of commodity circulation.
Modern DIY practices are, in this sense, a reaction to the conditions of global capitalism.
However, as much as the activities of the amateur hobbyist may seem to be those of a
lone subject within a private realm there is nonetheless a certain organizing principle that
structures a set of practices and of mental-corporeal dispositions into a cohesive,
identifiable and transmissible form. Here a distinction may be drawn between this
creative capacity in the context of late-stage capitalism and Levi-Strauss’ bricoleur. This
last seems to have been assigned in perpetuity to the world of the ‘pre-modern’ subject,
and by being opposed to the engineer (the preeminent functionary of modernity: a fusion
of disinterested scientist and entrepreneurial designer) helps maintain structuralism’s
essential nature/culture binary, in the process reinforcing western hegemony with an idea
of teleological social and technological progress.310 However, we may also say that, in
most cultural settings, creative activities and traditions of making are tied directly to
locally specific materials and social affordances. Their identifiable forms and their
transmissibility are thus largely inseparable from their specific environments.311 But this
is not the case in the context of late-stage capitalism, where the rationalization of tasks
and the management of socio-corporeal behaviour rely on abstraction and
universalization. Because they are formulated within, and in relation to, capitalism’s
fragmentation of space and sensation, the arts of the street assume forms that, like the
fetishized commodity, are alienable from their context of origin—that is, the context
within which they are performed, or made—to be transmissible to a broad range of
locales and conditions, being malleable enough to resist an absolute identity while
retaining enough cohesive durability to be identifiable nonetheless—but, identifiable only
in their actual instantiations.
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The arts of the street are thus comprised of sets of practices and dispositions that are
transferable across global urban space and transmissible by means tied directly to the
social and material affordances of modernity. As such, unlike the traditional functions of
the artist and of the craftsperson, which have their proper place within a wider social
environment, the arts of the street poach upon the space of another, provisionally seizing
what they may, proposing a differential space that in its transience suggests some other
possibility—a counter-space that, though it attempts to resist capitalist productivity, is
never the property of its producer.
Punk blurs the boundaries between audience and performers during concerts, with
frequent movement across the dividing line of the stage in both directions (e.g. audience
members climbing onto stage to dance, or sing along, or ‘stage-dive’ back into the crowd,
while band members, usually a singer, may join the jostling crowd on the floor area).
“You are the scene” proclaimed the 1980s Montreal hardcore punk band Fair Warning,312
an exhortation to audience members to transform themselves into active participants,
becoming producers—makers, tinkerers—rather than simply consumers.313 This might be
done by starting a band, publishing a fanzine, organizing shows, or working in more
direct ways to provide support to others who are marginalized. While I use the term
‘scene’ when discussing punk, I do not delve into the literature dealing specifically with
this concept. However, I note that this term seems more serviceable than ‘style’ which in
this context tends to be associated primarily with fashion or a definable musical style. On
the other hand, the term ‘subculture,’ following the influential work of Dick Hebdige,314
and others connected to Birmingham University’s now-defunct Centre for Contemporary
Cultural Studies, is frequently directly tied to socio-economic class, thus limiting the
scope and malleability of what punk is.315 ‘Scene,’ following Will Straw, is more openended and inclusive: a scene may designate a sense of collective endeavour, a space of
encounter and exchange, the formation of an “ethical world,” and the basis for
community that stretches beyond simply a shared musical interest amongst participants in
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that scene.316 While any scene, in this sense, may end up reproducing the relations of
power that dominate within society at large,317 punk scenes deliberately aim to challenge
such hierarchical power structures.
The anti-professionalism of punk music also attests to the democratic—and anticommercial—nature of punk as a whole.318 To be in a band, one simply has to decide to
do so. Boisterous enthusiasm counts for more than technical musical skill. However,
punk gets caught up in an apparent contradiction, between the rejection of the capitalist
mode of reproduction and the need—or desire—to produce and distribute material
outputs (t-shirts, publications, etc., but especially music recordings).319 Punk thus
struggles with a seemingly irresolvable problem: as a self-conscious refusal of
consumerism and rule of the norm, it exists as a consequence of modern society and thus
relies on existing means to express itself. Its challenge is to overcome itself as reactive
and become a force of creative action. All of the arts of the street exhibit this tension
between the desire to create something beyond mere reproduction and the seemingly
inescapable imperatives of globalized capitalism. Nonetheless, punk—as do all arts of the
street—fosters an ephemeral space that is largely improvised and that goes on to suggest
other subsequent possibilities, even as the performance of this heterotopic space can
never cement itself into a coherent spatial strategy. But of all of the arts of the street,
perhaps the clearest example of ephemerally performed space—and likely the most
accessible to passersby, the non-practitioner who nonetheless share in the spatial
performance—involves buskers: musicians and other entertainers who perform their art
in public with the hope of recognition and, usually, some form of reward.

3.7 Performance Space, Performing Space
The relatively long history of busking—as compared to the other creative practices
discussed herein—is intimately entwined with the development of modern cities. The
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opportunities available to itinerant artists and artisans to secure the material means of
survival are bound up with a specifically modern sense of social space: public space.320
Up until the latter half of the 20th century, however, the history of street musicians has
largely remained absent from written records, other than in the form of various city
ordinances restricting busking, as well as documentation of merchants and residents
complaining about the cacophony caused by vagrant street musicians.321 Historically,
buskers have been associated with vagabondage: wandering entertainers whose roots
stretch back past the minstrels and trouvères of the Middle Ages, to Antiquity.322 The
busker has always operated at the margins of society: an outsider who proffers
entertainment as an other-moment set outside of normal daily activities—and perhaps
intimations of distant worlds and other lives—but who is also seen as a mendicant,
perhaps even a swindler too lazy to get a ‘real job.’ As such, the busker is by nature a
figure of resistance—as much shadowy stranger as creative producer or charming
raconteur. And, while this perceived link between busking and begging is generally much
less pervasive now than in the past, it has endured in the minds of many contemporary
city-dwellers. The modern busker, however, is of a slightly different type when compared
to the itinerant entertainers of the past, being formed by and in the conditions of urban
capitalism (as is the case of all the arts of the street).
Although musicians comprise the majority of buskers encountered in most cities, we may
also count magicians and jugglers, mimes and puppeteers, dancers, poets, acrobats, and a
host of other performers among their numbers. The actual details of their performances
are extremely varied, ranging from pre-planned choreographed presentation to unscripted
creative play, from skilled artistic practice, to craft-based commercial enterprise, to
playful and perhaps cheeky act. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the desires, needs,
and intentions that motivate these performers are so varied that it is very difficult, if not
impossible, to come up with a precise and all-encompassing definition of what constitutes
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busking.323 Instead, I define busking in rather general terms as any form of entertainment
or arts-based performance that takes place in a public or semi-public space, in which the
performer offers the possibility for remuneration from passersby by placing a hat,
instrument case, bucket, or some other receptacle for ‘tips’—although making money
may be completely beside the point for the performer. Busking—specifically as an art of
the street—is a corporeal activity that sets in motion different forms of social, sensorial,
and affective relations which can only be described and designated as such in instances of
actual performance. In this sense, any art of the street is, in de Certeau’s terminology,
more tactic than strategy—always in the doing, never settling on a defined rule.
Moreover, just as punk so clearly does, busking challenges the categorical partitioning of
amateur and professional, and stages a performance space that immediately questions the
distinction between performer and audience, between production and consumption.
In my own past fieldwork in Montreal’s metro system, I have been able to observe and
record different ways that buskers delineate a performance space for themselves—a
stage, in a sense—that is maintained for the duration of the performance.324 The spatialcorporeal techniques that are deployed include where the hat, or instrument case, etc., is
placed within the overall space, and how the performer positions themselves—seated or
standing—in relation to this receptacle. Typically this is placed in front of the performer,
either directly in front or a few feet away, thus creating a ‘stage front.’ Some busking
spots are designated as such, and some of these possess features that the busker may use
to advantage in ‘performing a performance space’: an alcove in a wall that creates a
‘stage’ area, or a staircase opposite the performer that becomes seating for an impromptu
audience. But many sites are much more challenging. A busy downtown street corner
with its traffic noise and jostling crowds of pedestrians, for example, does not so readily
lend itself to musical performances. The acoustic challenges may be even greater than the
spatial ones, determining to a greater degree the performance possibilities at that site. In
the case of street musicians, the acoustic affordances of a particular environment are of
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prime importance, with the musical performance expressing the complex spatial and
sensorial relationship between performer and passersby and the surrounding space. The
degree to which the busker moves during the performance, if at all, also helps to roughly
define the ‘stage.’ There are many factors at play here, including the confidence and
experience of the performer, their conscious intentions (e.g. earning money, practicing an
instrument, perfecting performance techniques, etc.), as well as the actual spatial
requirements of the act (i.e. a single musician needs less space than a small ensemble, a
dancer or larger group of performers may require yet more), and the field of play that is
presented by a particular space. But in all cases, the ‘act’ is as much claim to space as
formal entertainment: a process of détournement that, not unlike street dance and street
skating, carves out some other use from the functional design of the city, by
performing—producing—a differential space.
For some buskers, enacting a performance space is relatively simple. For example, a
singer-guitarist who performs without amplification or pre-recorded accompaniment
track (which is itself an increasingly common practice) may simply arrive at a location,
quickly set up, and start to perform. They may only require a few square meters of space,
although the general preference is to have some extra space in front and to the sides,
allowing for greater visibility—particularly on a crowded street or a transit station during
rush-hour. Other performers, however, must go to greater lengths to delineate a ‘stage.’
Amanda Boetzkes describes the efforts of a dancer performing in a busy metro station
who must claim and hold enough space in the flux of rush-hour commuters for the
performance to be successful.325 Even the most explicitly delineated boundaries remain
porous, with some passersby ‘breaking the fourth wall’ as they walk through the
performance area, although some buskers will actively encourage this, attempting to
enlist passersby in the act. Some performers, however, unabashedly assert their right to
the space that they claim. For example, Paul Simpson recounts the approach used by a
clown duo in a public square in London, England, who use water-balloons to playfully—
and ultimately successfully—clear the area they wish to designate as the performance
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space.326 Following a loud announcement that the performance will begin soon, a few
recalcitrant people still sitting on a curbside that forms part of the intended ‘stage’ are
forced to move by volleys of water balloons tossed by the performers. But, most spaceclaiming acts by buskers are much less dramatic. Moreover, where the potential audience
is comprised largely, if not entirely, of commuters travelling to and from work and others
who are only moving through a given space with no intention of lingering there, the
formation of an immobile audience is a less common occurrence. While the transitional
spaces of the stations and underground corridors of public transits systems are primarily
designed around the requirements of production and consumption, such everyday
spaces—precisely because of their intermediary status—can become spaces of
imagination to which individuals lay claim,327 perceiving them as their own,
“transform[ing] another’s property into a space borrowed for a moment,” as de Certeau
says of the reader/poacher.328 And, when a few passersby do stop to listen and watch, this
can often lead to more people pausing to take in the performance, lingering for a few
moments as trajectories and timeframes are altered, perceptions reoriented, if but briefly.
The first few passersby who act as the ‘coagulant’ of the impromptu encounter usually
remain relatively distant from each other. As others pause, they ‘fill in’ the audience, the
whole coordinated in relation to the surrounding space, the performer and, those who
have already stopped to watch, producing an ephemeral heterogenous audience. The
functionally built space of the city may be further repurposed by this impromptu
audience, with individuals leaning against walls, or sitting on stairs or railings.329 From
within the seemingly aimless and unperceptive mass that follows its regular and regulated
trajectories, a transitory collective coalesces: a momentary interaction of bodies in space
that produces a different space. Unlike in the concert hall, theatre, or gallery, where the
performance space is already delineated in advance (including a pre-arranged
demarcation between performer and spectator), here the ‘audience’ does not set out to
become an audience—does not specifically seek to be entertained. Instead, the
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unexpected encounter precipitated by the busker invites the passerby to share in a
“liminal space-time”330 that demonstrates a different way of imagining urban space.

3.8 Blurred Boundaries
In this sense, as an art of the street, busking is both an invitation and a provocation. While
for some passersby the encounter is a source of pleasure, for others it may be perceived
as a nuisance or even an affront to public order, or perhaps merely of no consequence—
just another feature of the everyday landscape. A busker can thus easily become merely
one of the many elements that comprise the urban spectacle: infusing a little colour in the
often drab routines of daily life, perhaps, but not contrasting in any significant way with
the background that—like the natural attitude—helps maintain our sense of order, of the
normality and naturalness of the world as we generally experienced it. This may often be
the case at spots where buskers perform regularly throughout the day. Some buskers will
perform at the same spot (or perhaps a few choice spots) on a regular basis, for long
periods of time (many years, in some cases), thus becoming regular fixtures of those
spaces.331 But, while the familiar presence of a performer may be pleasant for passersby,
it can also help normalize the relations of social and economic power that underly and
help determine everyday public space. Although this may seem to contradict the critical
capacity that I ascribe to these various arts of the street, their propensity to function
according to dominant norms—becoming, in effect, distracting embellishments that
reproduce capitalist space—is perfectly in keeping with the micro-utopic potential in the
everyday. The possible that resides in any given moment is rarely realized; hope is
inextricably bound to disappointment. “Spontaneity,” as Lefebvre reminds us, “is not
always creative.”332 The creative act, in this sense, infers a different reality, suggests that
something else might be possible—but starts with what is already here: the remainder
that precedes us as individuals, the excess of the body and the world.
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Creativity and critique do not simply begin—nor do they end—with the conditions of the
world as we perceive them. Rather, they locate the possible in the actual, the afforded in
the realized. Of all the creative practices under consideration here, busking is perhaps the
clearest example of this capacity to set in motion other possibilities—spatial, sensorial,
affective—and illustrates well the fourth characteristic of the arts of the street. That is:
they foster transient counterspaces that encourage a spatial and sensorial reorientation in
others who share in, or simply move through, that space. The micro-social moment of
encounter that busking suggests is produced by the participation of multiple agents and
elements: performers and passersby, but also objects and materials such as instruments
and other equipment used by the performers, and the diverse materials and forms of
infrastructure present in that space.333
The arts of the street contrast with a critical art that would make its home in the
conceptual world of ‘high art’—art that is recognized as such because it is accorded
status by a professionalized artworld that tends to re-inscribe the categorical boundaries
and relations of power that such an art aims to challenge in the first place. The arts of the
street, on the other hand, invariably blur these distinctions precisely because, as minor
arts, they come from a place of marginality and are thus, from the outset, oppositionally
organized in relation to the dominant social norms and laws with which they must
contend. Busking is increasingly regulated and restricted by formal and informal
strictures. Punks are targeted on the street by police or drunken hooligans. Low cement
walls have strips of metal affixed on top or along their edges to prevent skateboarders
from riding there. Hip hop, rap and street dancing, as already noted, emerged from a
world blighted by the violence and alienation fostered by the police, the court system,
different levels of government and state agencies (various kinds of social assistance, child
or family services, work programs, etc.). By their very nature, all of these loosely
organized sets of practices refuse to conform to a world of standardization or clearly
delineated boundaries, relying instead on tactical approximation and a do-it-yourself
logic as they negotiate the unmapped terrain of amateur virtuosity. Virtuosity, in this
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context, does not designate a specialized skill or expressive ability that might be
measured against that of other people. Rather, it describes a process in which some
activity, some endeavour, coheres in a way such that it expresses more than itself.
Virtuosity fulfills itself and in doing so, surpasses itself. This idea will be taken up again
and elucidated in greater detail in the next chapter.
It is true that a few street performers may define themselves as professionals—that is: as
professional buskers—but that is not generally the case. Some may identify as
professional musicians (or another type of performer) but not primarily as busking
musicians (or busking acrobats, etc.)—or at least not in the sense that is usually attached
to notions of professionalism. It is perhaps more fitting to instead speak of “musicians
who busk.”334 For many street performers, part of the appeal of busking—indeed, a large
measure of how it is conceived of by many buskers—is precisely this ‘open-to-all’
quality, the idea that anyone can do it, as well as the fact that being a successful busker
(in the various ways that this might be measured) does not necessarily depend on artistic
training or technical ability. Over the many years that I have observed buskers in the
metro stations, in public squares, and on the street all over Montreal, as well as in several
other North American cities, I have seen professional acts and first time performers,
amateurs with years of formal training and young artists with big ambitions, humorous
entertainers and aggressively belligerent musicians, religious proselytizers, panhandlers
attempting some semblance of a performance, and so many others. And though
increasingly regulated (formally by various authorities and socio-corporeally by
dominant norms of behaviour), buskers manage to juggle these difficult conditions and
produce something new—deviant—even if only for the briefest moment. You can, in
effect, do it yourself.
This unsettling of categorical boundaries is a common feature of the diverse creative
practices that comprise these everyday arts. Punk in particular explicitly rejects exclusive
norms of professionalization and refutes the partition between audience and performer,
between active producer and passive consumer. This is especially true in small concert
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venues (bars and clubs) and the many punk shows that take place in informal settings (not
infrequently an unfinished house basement); and, it is true of DIY punk scenes in
general.335 Given that the punk scene coalesces around musical performances, a requisite
concert space must be available, with some form of stage or stage area and—usually—an
open space in front of the stage that acts as a dance floor. But immediately, the dividing
line of the stage is refuted, precisely because it is seen as a form of divisive power that
invariably favours some over others. Similarly, some few buskers will consciously play
with the imaginary of the performed stage, inviting passersby to join in the act. I have
watched spectators being enlisted to serve as assistants in a juggling act (much to the
delight of the other spectators—who are not so recruited). A dancer invites passersby to
playfully break the fourth wall of the stage, enticing them into the performance of an
other space. Audience and performers blend into each other. The participants in a DIY
punk scene all ‘make’ the lived space of the scene—whether by playing in a band or
organizing shows, making posters, producing fanzines, or recording, filming or
photographing concerts and other events. But punks also put on workshops on guerilla
gardening, civil disobedience, self-defense, and more. They organize book fairs, reading
groups, and activist networks. They run squats, and provide material support for each
other. They salvage food from dumpsters to create meals which in some cases are
distributed to through free street kitchens.
Everyone who is the scene is involved in some form of creative détournement, but not to
any quantifiable extent. These are all amateur activities, the makings of a minor art that
never fixes a proper place of its own. From this scene—which is only as durable as is the
focussed attention and activities of the diverse participants—we can trace affinities
running through the temporary encounter enacted around street performance, the street
corner dance party or rap duel, the impromptu transformation of a parking lot or public
square into a skateboard park, or indeed any number of other such creative endeavours
that might be classed together. In all cases, these are practices that express the adaptive
tendencies of human creativity, even under the strained conditions of late modernity.
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However, I pause to note that it might appear that I paint an excessively rosy pictures of
these creative practices and of their potential to evoke something beyond the capitalist
reality which seems to permeate all. I insist, therefore, that the creative impulse that I
delineate herein is not a simply a maybe it happens but maybe it doesn’t possibility, nor is
my overarching argument to be understood as a proscriptive response to the world as it
is—that is: as some kind of manifesto that proposes a corrective. This is an essential
point: the playful adaptations and critical potential that characterise the arts of the street
are already to be found at work in the world today; and, they are expressions of a
common creative impulse that binds us to the world just as it suggests some other
possibility. But, as these different practices are invariably subject to the demands of
capital and the conditions of globalized urban life, the profit-motive continually attempts
to corral them into its service, to make of them yet more commodities on display at the
ready for quick consumption. Capitalist reality, with its accompanying regimentation of
sense and space, has a way of rapidly reinserting itself into whatever might appear to
initially escape it.
In most cities where street performance is permitted, it is subject to various forms of
regulation and restriction, and in many cities, public performers must pay a fee for a
permit—or, in some cases, may end up paying a fine. Although for some buskers, making
money is largely beside the point, the act of busking does presuppose the possibility of
reward, of recognition—in some form, though not necessarily pecuniary. However,
insofar as busking may function as a form of critical street art, I would exclude street
performers who are somehow remunerated by either a civic or a commercial entity,
where the performers’ earnings are made up primarily or entirely of a pre-arranged ‘pay’
(e.g. a municipality or private business arranging for buskers to perform during special
events, often at precise locales and times). In this case, the performance is already
determined predominantly in terms of capital (if not strictly economic then certainly
cultural).336 By its very nature, then, busking does presuppose an economic relation
between performer and ‘audience’ (and possibly some regulatory agent), although this is
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understood by more than a few buskers as being a form of interaction more akin to
Mauss’ gift economy than one based on the calculating reason of Simmel’s money
economy.337 However, a problem seems to emerge—one that runs through of all of these
urban arts: viz. to what extent can street performance resist the capitalist realism that
seems to insinuate itself into every aspect of our lives? To what extent can a transient
differential space resist capitalism’s recuperative strengths and not become simply yet
more terrain to be commodified?
I have already raised the question of just how resistant punk truly is to capitalist forces,
given that it relies on those same forces of production for its very existence. Punk music
has been integrated into the music industry, while the defiant attitude of punk has been
packaged and mass-marketed with the promise of being an authentic expression of one’s
own individuality.338 Although punk may be conceived of as active, lived resistance that
operates on its own term—producing music, fanzines, t-shirts and other graphic arts, and
creating networks of exchange around the world—it is also dependent, to at least some
extent, on the infrastructures of global capitalism to make and distribute those same
works. Similarly, hip hop is also largely reduced to being another brand choice in an
incessant stream of entertainment, stripping it of its truly oppositional character; and,
though skateboarding is a relatively accessible activity, there is still a price attached to
the necessary gear, while the range of associated accessories only continues to grow. I
have also noted the migration of street art into the art gallery, with some artists’ work
now selling for millions of dollars at auction. It may be a truism to say that any activity
that takes place within the conditions of globalized capitalism is formulated in relation to,
and is largely reproductive of, those same conditions. But, it is necessary to bear this
mind when attempting to locate the critical and creative potential that I have outlined
herein. For, if the arts of the street, understood as is proposed in these pages, are
dependent upon the conditions of late capitalism to function as they do, we might ask:
does this then preclude any truly critical potential they may seem to offer? Given, as I
have argued, that the logic of capital has a way of insinuating itself into all aspects of
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everyday life, the question becomes, to put it more starkly: is there no outside to
capitalism?
Indeed, it is very difficult to think beyond—or outside of—what Mark Fisher has termed
capitalist realism.339 However, it may be that the question is misguided—that it is
predicated on a series of questionable assumptions. Or, that it is simply the wrong
question. For, my point throughout these pages is not so much to think outside of
capitalism as to locate evidence of everyday creativity and micro-resistance that is
already at work in the world, and to explore how these might suggest different ways of
sensing the world and of being with others. The arts of the street, I contend, do just that:
they demonstrate different ways of understanding and engaging with urban space, making
the possible actual. Moreover, as we will see in the next chapter, there exists in the
everyday—and in the arts of the street—an ebullient excess that confounds capitalist
logic: the excess of the negative, of the useless. In this chapter I have outlined what the
arts of the street are, how they operate, and why this matters within broader
considerations of perception, space, and everyday life under late-stage capitalism. In what
follows, I argue that these diverse amateur practices belong to the realm of the common
(the commonplace and the communal), that they express something of the crowd and of
the multitude, and that they may disrupt the everyday ordering of sense and space that,
for the most part, goes unnoticed and unchallenged.
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Chapter 4

4

Amateur and Multitude: Toward a Minor Politics of
Everyday Life

In discussing public space, I have treated the concept of space in detail, but in this chapter
I deal more explicitly with the idea of the public, the crowd, and the multitude. To further
examine the improvisational nature of everyday life, collective creativity, and how the
arts of the street can bring into focus elements of possibility in the everyday, I include
here some longer descriptive passages drawn from field observations undertaken in the
context of this present work. These are written in a largely reflexive mode, so as to
incorporate an element of phenomenological description into the more theoretical
treatment that I have pursued herein. This also further grounds the argument that
reflection—thinking, itself—is always situational and emerges from, or with, embodied
perception: interrogation begins in the everyday. The principal argument put forward in
this chapter concerns the ways that the arts of the street draw on—and can draw attention
to—the intersubjective nature of perception and creativity, and the broader political
implications that these have. The arts of the street suggest a minor politics based in
everyday experience and in the amateur virtuosity of bricolage—politics not in the sense
of asserting a response to defined political problems but as enacting a different space,
fostering other social and perceptual possibilities.
I have already noted how the emotions act as a sort of bridge between pre-reflexive
corporeality and conscious thinking, and between our own subjective experience and the
social practices and cultural norms that help regulate our affective states. The emotions
have political import not least because of how they can motivate action.340 Further, the
emotions can be thought of in terms of resonance, a recurrent concept in these pages.
Much as acoustic resonance is perceived as a phenomenal relationship between bodies (or
‘objects’) in a concrete space to which we may turn our attention, the emotions can give
us conscious access to the intersubjective nature of perceptual experience; turning our
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attention to our emotions can blur the lines between ourselves and others. Finally, the arts
of the street touch simultaneously on both the emotional and material aspects of
resonance—of mutual atunement. In this context, the concept of rhythm is also pertinent:
an analysis of rhythm can provide a deeper understanding of the pre-reflexive operations
of, and the creative potential in, everyday urban life. These two concepts—rhythm and
resonance—describe spatio-temporal arrangements in which there exists some accord
between components: a pre-reflexive compact between the sensing and the sensed. These
two concepts are useful in a critical account of acoustic experience and of the life of the
senses in general, showing that our perceptual enmeshment in the world does not, first,
operate by sharp categorical division. The intentional reduction of critical analysis begins
in the ambiguous flux of the everyday, just as critical listening must, perforce, commence
“in the midst of preliminary approximations” for it begins “with the ordinary, by
proximately working its way into what is as yet unheard.”341
Thinking of everyday activities and relations in terms of rhythm and resonance, in a more
general sense, is helpful in understanding the intertwining between ourselves and the
world and between each other. Both concepts are important in terms of sonic phenomena
(which I touch upon again, in this chapter) but they also both express processes that
extend beyond the auditory domain. Rhythm is an essential characteristic of the spatial
and sensorial organization of daily life, of our interrelations with others and surrounding
space: the rhythms of everyday activities structure the day, with “familiar places …the
unquestioned settings for daily tasks, pleasures and rhythmically apprehended
routines.”342 Rhythm, as the measure of bodies in motion, brings together space and time
into one process of becoming. Similarly, resonance is indicative of a sympathetic relation
between different objects and materials and living beings—but one that happens ‘all at
once’ and exists only for the duration of the vibrational force that establishes a
consonance between bodies, things, or processes. Thus, both concepts are intimately
concerned with time; but, whereas resonance intimates a synchronic correspondence—in
the immediacy of perceptual intertwining—rhythm describes a diachronic relationship,
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given that it is only perceived as unfolding over time. Both concepts, I would suggest,
can be understood as denoting the ‘fleshly’ correspondence between body and world, that
Merleau-Ponty addresses in The Visible and the Invisible.343 Both resonance and rhythm
are also suggestive of the interrelation between multiple bodies in motion—of the
movements of a crowd in public—first, at the preconscious level of our habituated social,
mental, and corporeal dispositions. Theoretical concepts such as these, that are explicitly
grounded in phenomenal experience, afford us the means to consciously reflect upon and
critically interrogate the world around us and our place in it. By ‘grounded in
phenomenal experience’ I mean that, although these are introduced as theoretical
concepts, the best—or indeed, the only—way to fully understand them is through our
own subjective experience, in the corporeality of everyday life. Therefore, to critically
interrogate public space and the possibilities therein, I position myself within the
movements of the crowd and reflect upon my perceptions and how these are formed by
and contribute to the rhythmic patterns and resonant forces that help structure everyday
urban experience.

4.1 In the Crowd
It is noon on a Wednesday in March. I am at the lowest level of Berri-UQAM metro
station—at the level of the Yellow line, which runs south under the St.-Lawrence river. I
stand in a wide high-ceilinged corridor that connects multiple passageways leading either
to the train platform below or up to another metro line: to the Green line that connects the
east end of the city, then runs west under the downtown core, ending to the southwest at
Angrignon park, some twenty kilometres from its departure.344 Berri-UQAM is a central
hub where three metro lines intersect. At the highest level is the Orange line which traces
a giant letter ‘U’ under the city: its base runs parallel to the Green line, while one arm
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extends north through the western part of the city and the other, oriented the same way
just east of downtown, reaches under the Rivière-des-Prairies to connect to the city of
Laval. At Berri-UQAM station, multiple stairways lead up to the station entrance—itself
at the centre of a large cavernous gallery that connects to university buildings, central
library, bus terminal, and street-level businesses with office buildings rising above: the
city in motion. Here, where I stand at the intersection of several tile-and-concrete
corridors, deep in the gut of the infrastructure that organizes and enables so much of this
bustling activity, the crowds come in thick pulsing waves. Great masses of bodies pour in
from arriving metro trains and surge up toward myriad destinations, the semi-coherent
waves breaking apart and co-mingling with other incoming rushes, as individual
commuters either catch trains on connecting metro lines or make for one of the many
exits. Down at this lowest level of the station, in between waves, it is relatively quiet in
the troughs that follow the swells: a few commuters trickle down from above to catch the
next departure toward the south shore. As the day progresses, the tide will gradually shift,
with increasing numbers of commuters reversing their course. Drawn by the gravitational
pull of home at the end of the day, they will leave behind work and studies and shopping
and the other activities that lead them into the core of the city. At this arterial intersection
of commuting bodies, you can sense the dynamics of urban life: the swelling, throbbing
pulsations of the crowd, the ebb and flow of the daily rhythms that impart continuity and
familiarity to our experiential worlds. These rhythms help structure our everyday lives,
and while they both express and reproduce the dominant relations of late-stage
capitalism—of productivity, wealth creation, and rapid technological advancement, all
ever-increasing—they are not produced or lived as one, as a unitary beat or calculable
periodicity. The myriad rhythms of urban existence, for all their machine-like qualities,
are the polyrhythms of the many: a chorus of intersecting trajectories, sometimes
concordant, as an amalgam of individual tempi adjusting and aligning themselves with
each other, sometimes breaking apart with the interrupted offbeats of conflict and
disjunction, but never assuming a strictly coordinated form or final totality.
With the arrival of another train from the south shore, another mass of bodies is funneled
up into the branching corridors that lead to the upper levels of the station. A jumble of
intentions and desires somehow coordinates itself enough that a myriad of seemingly
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individual trajectories become synchronized: so many bodies moving in tandem produces
a general collectivized motricity. When walking in and with a crowd in a metro station,
on a sidewalk, etc., a spontaneous coordination of bodies emerges. We have our own
ideas of where we are going and how to get there, but our actions are situated within the
particularities of the urban context. Jane Jacobs famously describes what she called the
“sidewalk ballet” of urban pedestrians as they mutually negotiate their way around each
other along New York city’s crowded sidewalks.345 But in the context of the metro
station at rush-hour, the energy of moving bodies is even more contained and oriented by
the functionality of architecture and scheduling, and by the demands of productivity.
Although we move with the crowd, attuning ourselves to its polyrhythmic structure, we
nonetheless maintain our own singular gait as we adjust our movements and orientation
in relation to the people around us. The spatial limits of architectural design help channel
the kinetic energy of the crowd, but within the mass, individuals move at their own speed
as they position themselves within the forward collective motion. This mobile crowd
possesses a cohesive general structure that is enacted by an association of individuals as
they pursue their own singular projects. There is, thus, a dialectical tension in this loose
public-in-transit. Taken in the aggregate, the crowd’s constituent parts (i.e. individual
commuters, for the most part following familiar routes) allow it to assume a perceptible
form, with individuals coordinating their movements with each other; but, taken as
individual persons with singular capacities, intentions, and desires, each constituent on its
own resists total synchronization, thus keeping the crowd in a state of unstable fluidity.
Walking is a critical factor in the production of public space, with the interactions
between bodies in motion and the built environment helping to define the characteristics
of a particular locale. “Rhythm is an identifiable though dynamic characteristic of place,”
writes urban geographer Tim Edensor, while walking is an essential component in the
“concatenation of rhythms through which place is (re)produced.”346 And, how I walk—
the reach of my step, the swing of my arms and motions of my torso—is reproductive of
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my everyday habitus,347 or general “body schema.”348 Most of the time, I walk in the
largely unreflexive mode of “the natural attitude,”349 though this depends upon the terrain
and the degree to which I direct my attention toward the act of walking. If walking on a
flat surface such as indoor flooring, outdoor paving, or a smooth level path, I seem to
walk in a more automatic fashion: the even, regular surface allows my body to ‘walk on
its own’ as it were, while my conscious attention is directed elsewhere. On difficult,
uneven or slippery surfaces, however, my attention is largely focused on where my next
step will land. But even then, I do not generally think about—I do not need to think
about—how I actually move: the motor actions of my body, of nerve and muscle, as my
leg extends and foot lands where it is directed, the whole weight of my body shifting as it
prepares to take the next step. My body seems to move itself.350 My walk is informed by
all my past walking, but as the particular conditions in which I find myself are always
different, if only subtly, my walk does not have a calculable trajectory that might be
precisely anticipated and that would be mappable in the abstract. It can only be known in
the act. It is held together as an activity not by general rules and formulae but though the
habituated practices which, together, comprise a style, a manner of doing and way of
being that is particular to each body. Walking in a crowd, we coordinate our movements
with the movement of others. We may walk at a different pace from most of the crowd,
or may even go in the opposite direction, but our movements always unfold in relation to
others, with our bodies anticipating the motion that animates the bodies all around us.
When we witness another body in motion, this elicits a sort of neural mimeticism—even
if we do not outwardly manifest the movement ourselves. That is, the actions of other
bodies—other people—can cause activity in our own brains as though we ourselves are
also engaged in that activity; and, rhythm plays an especially important role in this
process as perceptible rhythmic structures can activate a rhythmically coordinated neural
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response in us, as ‘passive’ witnesses.351 In this sense, the motion that animates the body
of the other is already present in my own body; it is simply latent, unexpressed.
Walking in a crowd is eminently relational; moreover, as a transitory mutual coordination
among bodies, it bears a certain resemblance to the way that musicians in an ensemble
coordinate themselves when playing together. In his short but influential essay “Making
Music Together,” Alfred Schütz points to the minute bodily cues that guide the members
of a string quartet as they coordinate themselves with each other.352 This demands of each
musician a continual awareness of the others, each responding to the others as they play,
making micro-adjustments in intonation, tempo and dynamic as they go. As with the DIY
tactics of the everyday bricoleur, they do so ‘on the wing’—in an unfolding process that
is only tangible in the performance, in the precise details of a particular instantiation. The
musicians are thus not directed by an external timing mechanism but, though guided by
the pre-arranged strategy of the musical score, find and express an emergent temporality
produced by and through their own bodies in conjunction with their instruments. This
depends on an intense focussing of perceptual attention on both their own actions and
those of their fellow musicians. Their corporeal synchronization is both action and effect:
the act of playing together is the mechanism whereby they achieve mutual coordination,
and their coordinated effort expresses something cohesive, if dynamic and mutable—that
is: a musical work. Although seen here in the context of a musical ensemble, in a more
general way this mutual attunement and rhythmic synchronization can foster an
intercorporeal awareness in various settings where individual bodies are actively engaged
with each other.
Building off of Schütz’s discussion of the mutual attunement in a musical performance,
Tim Ingold argues that something similar happens when persons walk together, side-byside.353 Direct face-to-face interaction seems to have something confrontational about it.
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Where else am I to look than at the person in front of me? Facing each other, we seem to
demand that one or the other speak, act.354 But, walking together side-by-side we “share
virtually the same visual field” as our individual trajectories become mutually entwined
and a special sort of intersubjective relationship develops between us.355 Even something
as simple as walking with others seems to contain a potential for mutual awareness and
coordination: an intercorporeality that may blur the boundaries between what we
generally think of as own independent selves. But, walking with another person is clearly
not the same thing as walking in a crowd. Although the latter can attenuate our sense of
independent corporeal motion, we may also feel acutely aware of ourselves as
anonymous persons within the urban mass.
Indeed, there is a certain ambiguity of being, both comforting and disconcerting, when
lost in a crowd—alone, surrounded by a horde of others. “In the city, one is alone
because the world is made up of strangers,” and to move anonymously in the crowd,
“silently bearing one’s secrets and imagining those of the people one passes, is among the
starkest of luxuries.”356 The urban crowd is the realm of the stranger: a figure of danger,
intrigue, and of possibility—with possibility comes difference and the unknown.357 The
stranger is at home in the street. The street—in the broad sense of urban public space—
has always presented these two faces: one liberatory, a place of possibility, of encounter
and exchange where the familiar collides with the new, it is the realm of the marketplace,
the itinerant entertainer, the flâneur, and Saturday night out on the town; the other, the
face of danger, of uncertainty and contagion, of the dark treacherous interstitial fragments
that elude the spatial order that helps regulate our lives.358 The street, in a very broad
sense, implies spaces that are inhabited and animated by the movements of bodies—of a
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public. This includes semi-public spaces that are likewise defined—in terms of
functionality but also in terms of how they are subjectively experienced—by the activities
of an agglomeration of individuals, the vast majority of whom will be complete strangers
to each other.
My research has brought me to this particular spot in the Berri-UQAM metro station.
Seeking a critical reckoning of the rhythmic structuring of everyday life, I use my own
body as an entry point in an attempt to gain a sense of “others’ movement and gestures,
[their] attentions and anticipations, [thus] letting different rhythms make themselves
felt.”359 I stand for a moment, gauging the pace of the arriving mass of bodies that moves
up from the train platform. There is a general pace that the crowd of commuters adopts:
most of the people walk at about the same speed, some a little slower, some faster. A few
people hurry ahead, gaining the escalators up when most of the crowd is still far back in
the long corridor. And, trickling up at a declining rate, those who move more slowly trace
their own trajectories. Seeing an opening, I plunge into the crowd. Immediately, the
momentum draws me along and I pace myself to the mass of moving limbs and torsos. I
move with the crowd but am not completely subsumed by it; I am of the crowd but also
retain my singular solitude. Focussing on my own corporeal sensations, I can learn
something about the surrounding space—the practiced manners and learned routines that
lend cohesion to life as social experience. As Lefebvre argues, attending to the rhythms
that structure our lifeworlds offers us a means of critically assessing the broader context
of our own experience (cultural, historical-material, etc.) while still remaining in the
immediacy of the body—of our own bodies.360
I modify my pace to position myself toward the front of the loose crowd-in-motion. A
wide corridor leads to a row of high-climbing escalators in a great narthex of this
cavernous cathedral of subterranean movement. Mid-way in the corridor, a lone busker
occupies the permitted performance spot (I already know he is there) which is spatially
fixed by a metal sign bearing the image of a lyre—a concrete symbol of the standards and
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regulations that regiment everyday interactions. A man in the later reaches of middle-age
stands, tenor saxophone slung around his neck. He pauses, listens, then—with the rustling
swell that signals an incoming rush of bodies in motion—he restarts a pre-recorded
accompaniment track, both insipidly bland and pleasingly familiar in its genericness, of
John Lennon’s “Imagine,” and he launches into the well-known melody. The warm tones
of the instrument resonate throughout the corridors, taking on the sonic colourations of
building material and architectural design. The musical line blends into the ambient
acoustic fabric, expressing the aural possibilities of the place but also distinguishing itself
against the background, gently but insistently demanding the attention of the approaching
commuters who move as a semi-coherent mass through the corridor toward the
escalators.
The subterranean world of the metro has its own spatial and sonic features: dark and
echoey, perceptions become muddied, orientation obscured.361 All around, a continuous
low hum makes itself heard, an ever-present shadowy reverberation, varying in intensity
and tonal qualities throughout the station and throughout the day. There is a rancorous
murmur of machinery; of trains and escalators; of closing doors, revolving turnstiles, and
barely decipherable public address announcements; of ventilation, lighting and other
droning electrical systems; a chorus of machines and materials. It is the voice of the
underground: a chaotic yet coherent resonant force. In the architectural hubbub, peals of
footsteps resonate like great rounds of applause that swell with the arrival of crowded
rush-hour trains, or as unhurried conversations among old friends, or as the gentle
soliloquy of someone slowly but determinedly making their way down a long reverberant
corridor. And in this symphonic tumult another voice is heard. Recognizably melodic, it
announces itself, soliciting the intentional interest of passersby.
It is a challenge for buskers to stand out, to make an impression in just a few short
seconds. If there is an audience, it is one that is always on the move and whose attention
is already focussed elsewhere. Seasoned performers know this and may modify each
performance according to the conditions at-hand, influencing and being influenced by
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changing spatial acoustics.362 For musicians, who by far comprise the majority of
buskers, one of the advantages of many of these subterranean locales (if not adjacent to a
train platform) is that they can be heard from a greater distance. Heard before they are
seen: at many such indoor and underground busking spots performers can acoustically
claim urban space, alerting approaching commuters to their presence. Indoor train and
subway spaces have their own particular acoustic qualities.363 In the metro stations, these
can sometimes be of benefit both by projecting and by enriching the performance with a
deep reverberation—the qualities of which will be dependent on the precise locale.364 The
conditions are generally quite different when performing on the street: there, traffic sound
can all but completely drown out the performer, unless electrical amplification is used
(exceptions are public squares or parks, but even there general urban noise can be a
nuisance). However, regardless of where a performance plays out, its acoustic qualities
are always formed in relation to the specific characteristics of the locale. The
performance, in this sense, gives expression to latent qualities in the general environment:
the performance activates the resonant possibilities that reside in that space.
I forego a detailed discussion of architectural acoustics; nonetheless, as we have seen,
thinking about sound and our sonic immersion in the world is helpful in understanding
the distributed nature of perception. The concept of resonance offers a description of how
a force activates some element in an environment, such that other elements that share
essential characteristics with the first will be mobilized by the same animating resonant
force. The previously mentioned example of two tuning forks resonating together
provides a very basic illustration; but, this process is at work at multiple levels in the
lived world. More precisely, resonance describes the perception of an active consonance
among various elements. For, as Spinoza would remind us, we do not know, in the first
instance, the causes of things; we simply sense their effects in—or upon—our bodies.365 I
do not normally consider how the particular construction of a metro station might
accentuate some frequencies—some perceptual possibilities—over others. But when the
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busker in the corridor takes up the melody on his saxophone, he sets in motion a
vibrational force—a vibrating column of air—that, in addition to projecting out from his
instrument and filling the space, also activates the already-present affordances in that
space such that we perceive them all at once. Again: we do not simply hear in space but
equally hear space. Reverberation, as we have seen, imparts an intimate bodily
knowledge of space, of the architecture and infrastructures that we encounter in daily life.
And architecture, as all built space, suggests—if not outright imposes—a particular
politics, supports a particular sensorial regime, by delineating certain affordances with
certain characteristics. Urban space thus contains a range of political possibilities—
political in the sense of being concerned with the basic question of community, of living
with others—that are tied to the available sensory-affective and technological
affordances. But what is equally important is how these affordances are activated. In the
above description of subterranean urban acoustics, it is the musical performance that
renders perceptible certain latent details of that space. But more than this, the
performance actually changes the space, changes how I experience it. Whether I care for
the performance or not, if I pause to listen or simply walk past without even seeming to
notice, the resonant forces put in motion by the busker have already helped shape the
acoustics of the space that I move through. I may be no more aware of this fact than I am
of the different ways that the planned construction of urban space delineates certain
possibilities for me; these things are largely naturalized as they retreat into the
background conditions of my daily life. However, what can seize my attention and render
evident some of these conditions is the active participation of a performer of some minor
art—who may be no more interested in me than I in them yet who nonetheless alters my
experience of that space. In terms of acoustic experience, this shifts perception from
hearing to listening—which, importantly, is always a listening-to that embroils me in the
world and the presence of others who share in the same space.366 This is first of all a
sensorial-affective transformation367—one that emerges from the intersubjective nature of
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everyday life.368 In the everyday, the politics of space and the reproduction of the
dominant sensory regime is largely invisible, maintained as much by our own quotidian
practices as by apparatuses of state power (legal, educational, etc.). The arts of the street,
however, can not only make evident what is already there but can also initiate other
possibilities, different ways of perceiving and engaging with space for both performer
and passerby.
Although the attention paid to sound and aurality should not detract from the broader
meanings of resonance and rhythm, the arts of the street generally have significant aural
characteristics, such that the practitioners of these minor arts can be said to express a
“sonic agency”369 that can be understood precisely in terms of resonances and of
rhythmic patterns. Both punk and hip hop have their musics along with associated dance
forms, but they are also, more generally, concerned with the urban rhythms of everyday
life. For its part, street skating has its own particular rhythmic forms.370 But it also has its
own acoustic characteristics, with practitioners asserting their sonic presence in the
world. The sound of a skateboard as it rolls down the middle of the street in the middle of
the night, carrying its rider to unknown destinations, has an unmistakable sonority—a
source of mild amusement, indifference, or questioning resentment. More generally,
street skating has sonic effect on others in the urban environment, with the “subtle roar of
wheels on tarmac, hard rasping of truck on concrete, slippery slide of slick deck on metal
rail, rhythmic clicking of paving stones,” etc., altering the acoustic activity in a given
space.371 Whether in acoustic or in other terms, by drawing attention to different ways of
experiencing and ‘using’ space, the arts of the street act as forms of creative resistance
that ground critical interrogation in the thick of everyday life. And, as we have seen, the
DIY practices that comprise the arts of the street are informed by the common skills of
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the bricoleur. By drawing on a latent creative capacity in shared space, they point us
toward the collective nature of creativity in general.

4.2 Common Creativity
I have already stressed the improvisational nature of those forms of urban creativity and
resistance that comprise the arts of the street. As emphasized, improvisation does not
indicate unbounded possibility but, rather, a general approach: a way of being in the
world for which there is no script, only a character sketch to act as a guide.372 And, we
rely upon this ability to improvise, making the ‘on-the-spot’ micro-decisions that
comprise our experiential trajectories as we get around in our everyday lives, all the
while giving little thought to how we actually do this. As we have seen, the obscurity of
our perceptual faith, as Merleau-Ponty has it, allows us to do this. That is, an unexamined
trust in a clear and logical order to the world allows us to live in the day-to-day,
unconfronted by the indeterminacies and contradictions that arise when we critically
interrogate our circumstances. Despite the general routinization of our quotidian habits,
we are nonetheless faced with moments of decision in which we must adjust how we
engage with our surroundings. At a very basic level, an organism’s ability to modify its
activities ‘on the fly’ with only a general trajectory guiding it involves a certain creative
capacity: an urge, or simple necessity, to experiment. This capacity, whatever its actual
power to produce lasting difference, rests upon an implicit corporeal knowledge that
delineates not strict boundaries but the approximate horizons of the possible—the
affordances at the disposal the organism, in James J. Gibson’s terminology.
Improvisation is a form of activity that characterizes the organism-at-home in its
environment, as it simultaneously incorporates itself into its environment while also
producing variation and difference—that is, what is possible but is (as yet) unactualized.
The logic of improvisatory bricolage around which the arts of the street coalesce relies
not on precise formula and replicable verifications but on approximate patterns and
general dispositions that are transferable across a wide range of situations. What these
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practices lack in exactitude is compensated for by their versatility, by the transposability
of the skills involved. To illustrate: some buskers develop a different understanding of
everyday spatial-corporeal relations—of how people habitually move in space, and the
importance of how spaces are built—as a result of practical experience, and so adapt their
performances accordingly, in the moment.373 Such modifications may then be integrated
into the everyday habitus, modifying general corporeal comportment. Or: a street skater
may have a certain relationship with a particular section of a parking lot—with cement
blocks, paved embankments, guard rails, perhaps the occasional security guard who
chases skaters off—that for all its specificity affords a general style and mode of being—
an orientation—that may be serviceable in diverse and seemingly disparate settings. For
the practitioners of these minor arts, all of these factors inform how one perceives the
environment and how one engages with the material and social realities of everyday
urban life. All of the practices under consideration involve some form of intensified
corporeal relation with an environment: a conscious, direct engagement with the world
that expresses the complicity between what Merleau-Ponty calls the flesh of the body and
the flesh of the world—and between the flesh of my body and of the bodies of others.
Moreover, as we have seen—and this is a key point to the overall argument delineated
throughout these pages—in addition to the direct corporeal effects on the practitioners
themselves, the actual performance of these various arts can alter how others experience
public space. And this suggests different possibilities in terms of the co-production of
public urban space, of influencing the broader politics of the sensible that underlie the
dominant social order, insofar as we must always reproduce the social world as an active
practice and that this reproductive activity is not mechanically replicative but depends
upon a general style and set of dispositions.
Improvisation has an unfinished quality about it: without presupposing or necessitating
an end point, a finality, it opens upon a seemingly endless field of play. It is more
creative activity than act, less about a moment than about movement—the orientation of a
force. In musical improvisation, the musical line seems to move from one note to the next
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ahead of the musician’s conscious attention. But the ability to do so—to let the body run
ahead, as it were—depends on endless hours of repeated playing. Like any technical skill
set, musical training involves concerted effort: a sustained mental-corporeal training that
is directly related to the means employed (e.g. a particular instrument) but that can also
afford a certain general know-how—a set of practices organized around general patterns
rather than calculable formulae. In the act of playing, body, instrument and music are
intertwined with each other: the instrument as extension of the body, the body as
extension of the instrument,374 in a productive feed-back loop that operates by way of
patterned sequences that may be adaptive to other situations. Similarly, for the street
skater, the board (and parts of the board: wheels, trucks, deck) also becomes an extension
of the intentional body375 as the skater attempts to pry possibility from the already-there.
There is an almost musical playfulness in this ability to transpose skills that are
developed in a precise setting yet are general and adaptable enough to be transferable
across a range of changing conditions. The musical concept of ‘jamming’—a way that
musicians can play together using standard forms and basic chord progressions that
allows for liberal ornamentation and extended improvisation—has been employed to
explain the way urban youth claim space for themselves as a matter of daily habit376
which is very similar to the ways skateboarders reappropriate both public and private
urban spaces (from streets, sidewalks and parks, to parking lots, loading docks, and
empty swimming pools).377 Hip hop also has its own forms of improvisations tied directly
to the life of the streets, with breakdance and rap duels giving practitioner the opportunity
to demonstrate their improvisational abilities as they competitively respond to each other
in the unfolding performance.378 Graffiti artists may have to, at the very least, improvise
in finding ways to write in visible places without getting caught.
Although punk music is not generally noted for creative improvisation, it nonetheless
exhibits certain characteristics that are germane in the present context. Punk music is, on
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the whole, very simple in terms of compositional styles, typically following standard
chord progressions and verse/refrain structures that are common to rock and roll forms.
Songs are usually devoid of ornamentation and are typically short with a fast tempo and
played at a high volume. Instrumentation also generally follows the common rock and
roll form of vocals, electric guitar, electric bass and drums, with sometimes a second
guitar or other instrument(s) included. As previously noted, punk deliberately encourages
an anti-professionalist attitude: anyone can be in a band, no musical skill or training is
required. A foundational moment in the development of punk is the 1976 publication in
Strangler magazine of the fingering charts for three simple guitar chords followed by the
exhortation to “now go form a band.”379 Here, basic parameters are outlined, delineating
a rough field within which practitioners must draw upon their own capacities,
experiences, and desires to carry out particular projects (in this instance, making music
together). Thus, if punk can be characterized as a “community of practice,”380 it is so only
as a rough sketch, a silhouette of a plan: here is a rudimentary outline, now go do
something, make something of what you’ve got. Meanwhile, usual considerations of what
is ‘good’ or ‘significant’ are deliberately refuted: the precision and univocality of
centralized authority gives way to the heteroglossic murmurings of the crowd, of the
multitude, of everyday social relations.381
Creativity should not be thought of as strictly a matter of individual inspiration—the lone
artist struggling in solitude—but as also involving a basic capacity to experiment, a
propensity for play that touches upon something of the common. ‘Common,’ in this
sense, seems to have a de-valuative connotation: the mundane, the average everyday—
cheap, valueless. But this apparent abasement can be a strength, something to be retained
and nurtured: a “weapon of the weak.”382 Minor, operating near the margins, seeking out
other spaces—interstices in the fragmented space of global capitalism—in their
commonness, the arts of the street resist capitalist logic, avoid being fully commodified
by always retaining an element of the useless, of the irrational and the inconvenient.
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Tarnished by the grime of the street, there is something that exceeds the basic operations
of social and material reproduction: a negative remainder. The possible. Indeed, while the
conception of busking as being a little unpolished—a little rough around the edges—may
be touted as part of its ‘charm,’ providing a highly marketable sense of creative
‘authenticity’,383 the fact remains that street performance, by its very nature, can never be
fully categorized or pinned down as a definite position with precise properties. Like the
open invitation to form a band regardless of any musical ability that punk offers to all,
busking is available to anyone and everyone. How to be a busker: choose some kind of
performance, go do it in public, and set up in such a way that it is at least possible for
passersby to show their appreciation with some kind of reward (i.e. a hat or instrument
case set out for donations), regardless of intentions or actual outcomes. Voilà: you’re a
busker!
But if anyone can be a busker with no more than the simplest defining parameters, does
this not render the term all but meaningless? Sort of like: if anything is art and anyone an
artist, then does not art, as a distinctive practice, cease to exist? This brings us back to
one of the characteristics of both Rancière’s conception of critical art and of the arts of
the street as I have already delineated them. That is, that they distinguish themselves from
their everyday surroundings while they are also always on the verge of being reduced to
mundane if pleasant distractions, merely so many commodified experiences at the ready
for easy consumption. The arts of the street thus exhibit dual tendencies that seem
incompatible, one contradicting the other. On the one hand, they operate as identifiable
(nameable) sets of practices that provide entertainment, recreation, distraction, etc., in
various measures, and as such are quickly absorbed into the existing relations of social
and material reproduction (with the attendant political order that this entails). On the
other hand, because they always remain open-ended and are constantly being redefined
by their practitioners not according to some conceptual program or analytical logic but in
the act of doing and of making, they remain mobile, incomplete, impossible to enclose
and to transmute from process to product. Certainly, elements of all of these practices
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have been successfully commercialized (successful in terms of consumption and
profitability). Punk and (especially) hip hop have generated multi-million dollar music
industries. Skateboarding has opened up a whole new global market for accessories.
Street art festivals are organized in different cities with official approval and corporate
sponsorship, etc. However, we can make a distinction between, on the one hand,
particular elements of these different arts (e.g. a specific musical form, instrumentation,
or compositional style; certain artistic practices; clothing styles or types of body
ornamentation; etc.) that are identified, isolated and extracted from their original context
(which in the first instance is always ‘the street’) to be reproduced in simplified, easilyconsumable forms; and, on the other hand, the arts of the street understood as sets of
loosely cohesive practices that are always incomplete because existing only as activities
that subvert, reappropriate and move on—they never have a proper place of their own,
never assume formal properties.
A number of years ago, I used to occasionally see an elderly man performing in the metro
station near my home. He played—one might say that he attempted to play—a guitar and
harmonica, the latter held by a support-brace resting around his neck, as he faced the rush
of afternoon commuters descending the stairs and escalators. He clearly had no musical
training—nor, apparently, any basic musical skill. His performances consisted in banging
semi-rhythmically on the guitar strings with one hand, while muffing them with the
other—not fully pressing down on the strings so as to play a series of notes or chords—
thus creating a dull thumpa-thumpa sound, all the while blowing and drawing air, in
alternance, through the harmonica, producing a randomly dissonant whonka-whonkawhhhonnn. I can remember noticing occasional looks of surprised amusement or
sometimes mild irritation on the faces of other commuters. I frequently put some change
in the guitar case he had set out. This man, in many respects, perfectly incarnated the
busker as artist of the street: minor but resistant, marginal, performing on his own terms
with no regard for standards of professionalization, momentarily claiming for himself a
scrap of public space, in the process altering the everyday socio-sensorial fabric and thus
affecting others who moved through that space. Perhaps not revolutionary but a minor
instance of creative resistance nonetheless.
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Organized around the non-specialist interests and abilities of the DIY amateur, the arts of
the street are expressions of how perceptions and uses of space can be understood and
altered, even if only subtly, in a way that does not depend upon a set of formal
procedures or regulated standards. This is not to suggest that these minor arts are
somehow more ‘authentic’ than practices that are highly formalized and follow strict sets
of rules (although it might be said that the informal precedes the formal), merely that they
show us other possibilities in terms of what urban space can be. Moreover, the
commonness of these minor arts shows creativity to be a distributed endeavour rather
than the work of an isolated creator. The dominant individualistic notion of creativity
depends upon “an ideology of property [that] isolates the ‘author,’ the ‘creator,’ and the
‘work,’” argues Michel de Certeau.384 In reality, like perception itself, the creative
process is as socially distributed as it is subjectively individuated (i.e. perceived as ‘my
own’ individual experience). Indeed, as James Leach shows by drawing on a range of
ethnographic examples, the prevailing contemporary idea of individual creativity is
bound up with specifically modern ideas about private property, the creation of value
through work (in which the things of nature are removed from the common), and an
autonomous self that is governed by reason.385 Noting in particular the influence of John
Locke’s ideas about private property on modern conceptions of creativity and the
sovereign self, Leach goes on to argue that this “dynamic of possessive individualism” is
not culturally universal in terms of how people understand knowledge and creativity.
Instead, he shows that for many peoples, creation is always a collective process, that
“there is no project that is not already the project of other people as well,” and that the
production of the new does not originate with “any single creator, just as the [individual]
person does not come from a single progenitor.”386
The commonness of the practices that comprise the arts of the street is thus indicative of
the communal, that which may be accessible to all: a common ground that is immanent
to, and in, the everyday—a space of common encounter. But, importantly, this is not a
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space held in common. What is common can no longer (if it ever should have been)
thought of in terms of a commonly-held property, such as the oft-touted model of English
common pasture land doomed to enclosure—an ever and overly romanticized ideal of the
common,387 which has carried over into the rush to idealize the global Occupy movement
as a new revolutionary, renewed commons.388 Part of the problem may be in how a space
of common encounter is conceived of—fixing it too firmly in place. Indeed, as we have
seen, trying to define an open field of equal participation immediately raises problems
concerning the terms of participation, the inextricability of participants’ experiential
histories, and the authority upon which any such definition would depend upon from the
outset. The conceptualization of a space of politics that centers on communicative
language, on speaking and appearing—as is the case for thinkers such as Jürgen
Habermas, Hannah Arendt,389 and Rancière to a large degree—highlights these problems,
in that it seems to rely on a set of a priori abstract rules which make communication
possible in the first place. By failing to fully account for “the embodied, situational and
dialogical aspects of everyday life”390 a separation of the space of politics from the lived
experience of the world is thus maintained.
But if the senses provide the ground of experience (and this includes thinking, reflection,
interrogation) and the body is the common basis for our being in the world, then we
might locate the possibility for communication, for community, first in the facticity of the
body—in the undeniability of our own bodily experience. Indeed, in the philosophy of
Merleau-Ponty, as in Schütz’s sociological contextualization of phenomenology, the
body provides the basis for the intersubjectivity of experience, and ultimately the
possibility for an ethics of reciprocity.391 Note that this in no way means that there might
be some universal potential corporeality to which we (can) all have access; this is clearly
disproved by the variability of bodies and differences in individual socio-corporeal
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experience. ‘The’ body is always a body: specific, temporal, concrete. Rather, what is
important is the simple fact that we all have bodies, that we all are bodies—singular
bodies with particular needs and desires, but ones that embroil us all in the flesh of the
world. To what extent a truly ‘common’ ground is possible may be debatable, but that we
can debate it at all indicates that it is at least possible to try to formulate a conception of
such (i.e. an equitable space of participatory politics). Thus, whereas a theory of politics
constructed around language seems to assume that, even if we all have different linguistic
histories and abilities, transparent communication is at least theoretically possible, a
politics of the sensible founded on the sheer corporeality of experience invariably begins
and ends with difference.392
We should note , however, that this does not permit understanding difference itself as
equivalent with some ideal of the good or equality or openness and equity. One of the
distinguishing features of the contemporary relations of social reproduction is how
difference and creativity have been recouped by capital and put to work in the service of
the smart city, while “the very notions of contingency, complexity and unpredictability
have become instruments of control.”393 But, I would argue that there is something that
distinguishes the arts of the street, in this respect. It may be true that, in transitioning
from a disciplinary society to a society of control, desire and imagination, innovation and
play now further extend the subject-forming influence of the bio-corporate state, but there
is nonetheless a rational reduction at the heart of the machinations of late-stage
capitalism—one that transforms quality into numeric quantity. The forces of capital may
have ‘de-materialized’ themselves, but they nonetheless run on the cold logic of
exchange value: in the end, all must be reduceable to calculable units of exchange.
Indeed, according to Gilles Deleuze, while the disciplinary society is tied to global
exchange underwritten by cash money and gold reserves, the society of control operates
by way of “floating rates of exchange” that are nonetheless determined “according to a
rate established by a set of standard currencies.”394 In both cases, then, the procedure

392

Laplantine, Life of the Senses.
Krivy, “Towards a Critique,” 17.
394
“Postscript,” 5.
393

165

depends on transmuting what was formless into something defined, calculable by some
means—which is as true of the monetization of data sets as it is of earlier forms of market
transaction. But, the arts of the street, I contend, are not constrained by such a logic. That
is, because they do not have a proper place of their own, are never reduceable to defined
properties, they always retain something of the negative excess that evades recuperation
by the reductive logic of calculable value. The excess of improvisational bricolage is
what ties them to the uncontainability of the body and the incalculability of the world.
By demonstrating the potential to conceive, use, and experience public spaces in novel
ways, the arts of street suggest certain manners in which the social fracturing and psychosensorial estrangement of modernity might be resisted, perhaps even turned to creative
use. The urban sensorium of late modernity may be fragmented, spatially unfastened, and
saturated with the rationalizing logic of money, but precisely because of its open-ended
or incomplete nature, it offers seemingly endless opportunities in the cracks and on the
margins of the dominant socio-corporeal order. The arts of the street involve practices
and approaches that have taken shape in, and in relation to, these fragmented spaces of
late-stage capitalism, and they continue to evolve and redefine themselves in every act of
doing. In their mobility, they reach ahead of capitalist reterritorialization; in their
everyday commonness, they are afforded to the general public—they are the arts of the
crowd, the swarm, the multitude.

4.3 The Multitude
Despite the predominance of ideas about creation that are centred on the individual and
the interiority of consciousness in the modern West, the force of creativity—the playful
search for the new, in terms of art, in terms of knowledge, in terms of everyday
innovation—as a collective endeavour and as an ongoing process that surpasses the
individual, is also present in urban modernity: the excess of the body. If there is a
unifying logic at work, a totalizing drive at rational efficiency running through late
capitalism, there is also a generative capacity within urban space that exceeds the
totalizing logic of capital—the element of possibility that, if we follow Lefebvre, inheres
in everyday experience. Finally, as public space is both reproductive of habituated social
norms and mental-corporeal dispositions and simultaneously offers moments of
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encounter, exchange, and conflict—that is: difference and the new—the street, in the
broad sense of the word, is the site and the expression of the teeming urban mass: the
crowd—the semi-coordinated aggregate of multiple agencies in motion. There is a
productive force at work in the distributed activities of the crowd, in the creative
ebullitions of the multitude: “creation,” says de Certeau, “is a disseminated proliferation.
It swarms and throbs.”395
The swarming crowd is always a plurality; and, if the body and the space of its
inhabitance must be understood in the plural—as bodies in spaces—then the assemblages
that constitute the public also present themselves as heterogeneous aggregations of
interests, demands and desires. Multifarious impulses that, in conversation with each
other and with the social and material composition of public space, have something to
say: they speak a public.396 But, if public space and the everyday activities that sustain it
have a discursive formulation, it is never a coherent voice, never becomes its own proper
language. Rather, it is the jumbled cacophony of the crowd within which one may discern
parts of conversations but only ever fragments, a muddled discourse that expresses the
incomplete and the presence of difference in our everyday perceptual experience:
ordinary language,397 idle talk,398 the overheard.399 If we understand speech and language
as expressions of the embodied mind, and this mind is a consequence of our basic
corporeality (doing away with body/mind dualism), then speech and language must
necessarily be grounded in the materiality of the world, in the thickness of being. But if a
discourse says something, it says it in a certain way, using certain tones and idioms, rules
of grammar and wider cultural references; and if there is a dominant univocal discourse
of authority (His master’s voice400) all other voices must either adopt its style and are
subsumed within it, or are drowned out completely. This process of exclusion, says
Michael Warner, precipitates the formation of “counterpublics”—the vehicles of
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expression of marginalized or subordinate sections of a population, operating in
contradistinction (and sometimes in open opposition) to discourses of dominance and
estrangement.401 The murmur of the crowd then seems to represent a counterhegemonic
polyvocality, the productive heteroglossia of the many.402
The post-autonomist Marxist theorist Paolo Virno argues that while it is the concept of
‘The People’ that has underlain the development of the modern state—and, to a large
degree, our basic understanding of politics, of what constitutes the political—there is
another way of thinking the many as one: the multitude.403 For Virno, the Spinozist
heterogeneity of ‘the multitude’ opposes itself to the univocity and erasure of difference
that accompanies the Hobbesian concept of The People. If The People speak with one
voice—the pronouncements of the demos—the multitude, expressing itself in many
voices, demands a polyvocal space of public encounter that does not operate along lines
of categorical division—between work and action, between sensing and thinking. The
vocalizations of the many, moreover, may be cacophonous—a tumultuous chorale of
different voices saying different things—but what is essential is that they speak: as the
many, all have recourse to the shared capacity for human language. In the destabilized
and destabilizing world of late-stage capitalism, workers—those whose labour has made
the expansion of capital possible—are not only stripped of all but the most meagre
rewards of their labour, but are also increasingly rendered materially secondary in the
productive process: with near-full automation, they are reduced to simply the conscious
linkages at various points in the system of automated machines.404 What this also means
in practical terms is that the many, who are now exiled into a world of mobile capital and
decentred production, bereft of their material labour power are thrown back upon the
basic human cognitive capacities, “the more generic attitudes of the mind… the faculty of
language, the disposition to learn, memory, the capacity to abstract and relate, and the
inclination towards self-reflexivity.”405 These capacities are the most general—generic—
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abilities available to us: the general intellect, the common skills of the species not in their
particular expressions but in the mere fact that this capacity presupposes us as individual
subjects and, ultimately, provides a basis for thinking a different politics.
Taking Marx’s passing mention of a “general intellect” in the Grundrisse, Virno develops
the concept to argue that now, in post-Fordist global capitalism, productive activity is no
longer centered on the making of things but has shifted to the realm of the intellect. This
collapses the distinctions between work (that is: labour power that is organized to
produce something) and the activities of the mind—and between work and action.406
Intellect, here, does not refer so much to ‘intelligence’ but to anything that is, at its core,
an activity of the mind—above all, thinking and speaking. Under these conditions, “the
‘life of the mind’ becomes extrinsic, shared, and common.”407 Creativity, then, is
likewise no longer a property of individual initiative, of singular inspiration, but a
common feature of the general life of society—of its generic productive forces and its
cultural forms. The general intellect, in its genericness, is akin to the communal nature of
our enfleshment in the world—that is: the basic fact that all of us are and have bodies.
This essential corporeality, as a general project in the world that precedes conscious
reflection, is the basis of our intersubjective being-in-the-world.408 And it is this common
enfleshment in the world that connects the concept of the general intellect to the ideas of
creativity and bricolage—as driven by necessity and by desire—that I have explicated in
the foregoing. The general intellect, for Virno, refers to “intellect in general”—not actual
instantiations of applied human intelligence but the generic possibility of intellectual
activity as such, in its most basic forms—and it is formulated in the “common places” of
everyday speech.409 Speech, in this context, does not begin as abstract language but is
always a speaking-with, or a speaking-to: every speech act is bound up with a specific
material, social, historical context.410 If there seems to be an endless productivity in
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everyday speech, in idle curiosity and gossip, in speech for the sake of itself,411 it is the
productivity of the body, and of bodies in space. Similarly, the inventive improvisations
of the bricoleur—the amateur—also draw on the collective and the common; but, where
the bricoleur is defined by inventive everyday action—specific, concrete—the general
intellect concerns the generalized—the objective (because pre-subjective) capacities of
the species. One offers a basis for understanding concrete individual action as undivided
from collective possibility, the other an understanding of our generic cognitive capacities
that allow us to think and to express ourselves and that ultimately enable action: the
particular and the general, both emerging from the common.
The arts of the street express the heterodox projects of those who operate at the margins
and in the interstices of urban space; as such, they share with the general intellect a
productive potential that exceeds the individual subject precisely because of their
commonness. In the contemporary context, argues Virno, the possibilities of the general
intellect are most fully expressed not in the pronouncements of the scientist—the
specialist—but in the virtuosity of the everyday speaker of ordinary language.412
Similarly, the arts of the street draw on our basic improvisational and adaptive capacities
but they refine them in a precise context: they are the very embodiment of amateur
virtuosity. Virtuosity in this context does not indicate adherence to some standardized
model of perfection; it lies, rather, in the fullest expression of the spatial-sensorial
possibilities that are afforded to the ‘artist’ who consequently manifests something that
had merely been latent: virtuosity lies in the expression of the unexpressed, in the fullness
of possibility. Moreover, in the everyday performance of space, insofar as it is an
ongoing project of multiple participants engaged in loosely coordinated activities, we all
draw on the common skills of the bricoleur and can do so without immediate recourse to
reflexive analysis, for the body already knows its way. The practitioners of the arts of the
street exemplify—render perceptible—this virtuosic capacity to realize the unrealized.
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Although the arts of the street may not be unique as instantiations of amateur virtuosity,
they position the possibilities that this entails squarely in public urban space. And, it is in
public space—despite formal and informal regulation and regimentation—that we
encounter each other in a (for the most part) perceptually casual but sensorially
consequential way. Public space affords us different perceptual possibilities. The
practitioners of the arts of the street can creatively—at times, consciously—alter the
perceptual trajectories of others by exemplifying different ways of engaging with and
producing space. These practices operate on the logic of the DIY amateur: as embodied
expressions of a general capacity, refined through a technical practice (in the expanded
sense of technology previously discussed), they express the virtuosity of the everyday
bricoleur. The idea of a general intellect helps support theorizing broader concepts
concerning collective experience and action. Like the inescapability of our own bodies,
the political potential in Virno’s analysis—in the sense of raising questions about
collective life—rests on the general nature of our enmeshment in the world and with each
other: seemingly mundane aspects of the quotidian are the ground within which we can
find common cause. Curiosity, idle talk, the tinkering of the bricoleur: in this
improvisational mode, we may find the basis for a politics of the sensible that is not tied
to categorical divisions, that allows for the nuances of difference, while still positing a
common space. The arts of street, by demonstrating other ways of sensing and using
space, may foster such a minor politics of everyday encounter: a politics formed not upon
ideological commitment but practical expediency that finds its source in a collective
sense of enfleshment.
If a broader sense of politics might be suggested by the arts of the street, it is one that is
situational and processual, temporally embodied: coalitional,413 experimental,414 but
above all, an amateur politics of the everyday. These artists of the street, in their different
ways, show how certain kinds of practices can modify one’s own corporeal and affective
experiences and demonstrate this to others as well. They evince a basic sense of
collectivity that might be marshalled in the interest of a more inclusively participatory
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politics of urban space. The performing body of the artist of the street initiates a different
politics (if only a minor politics). It is in such acts of creative reappropriation that “a
body… by putting up resistance inaugurates the project of a different space.”415 The
practitioners of the arts of the street engage in acts of resistance and reappropriation by
laying claim to and reconfiguring public spaces, in relation to but never subsumed under
the planning and regulation of state and corporate interests, and the broader forces of
global capitalism. But, the fundamentally chaotic nature of the world cannot always be
held at bay, no matter how well we plan and manage.
In the summer of 2020, when I had thought I would be deep into the ethnographic
research on street artists and performers that I had envisioned, I found myself instead
wandering a semi-regular route from Montreal’s old port district up through the
downtown core, on the lookout for anything of interest where, previously, street
entertainers of various kinds were a regular sight. The global COVID-19 pandemic that
intensified throughout that winter and spring almost totally emptied public space of its
users—in many instances, leaving only those with nowhere else to go.416 In the metros,
the remaining commuters, by and large, were only those with no choice but to go to
work—with a noticeably less white demographic than the average of the local population
as a whole, remaining in the now potentially toxic public spaces. Buskers were forbidden
from playing in the metro stations and the normally bustling squares of the old city, long
popular among street performers, were all but deserted. And yet, before long, the
everyday practitioners of the city would begin reasserting themselves, laying claim to
fragments of space in acts of creative reappropriation that, for all their seemingly
common averageness, suggest other spaces of encounter, different ways of sensing the
world.
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4.4 “Whose Streets…?”
Montreal hosts a number of important international entertainment festivals: several large
music festivals, a comedy festival, street art and murals fests, film and art festivals, etc.
Many of these events take place in venues (some of them temporary outdoor settings) in
and around a downtown stretch of the city centred along Sainte-Catherine street: this is
known as the Quartiers des spectacles. Most of the large festivals are concentrated in a
few square blocks around the Place des Arts performing arts centre. During the height of
the summer festival season parts of these streets are open to pedestrians only (a few
blocks are closed to traffic much of the year, regardless of any special event). Large
outdoor stages are erected for concerts that attract hundreds, thousands. These festivals
generally involve extensive planning and large-scale budgets, and it is important that the
unruliness of the street be held in check. Barricades may be erected to limit access, with
private security guards checking bags for alcohol (one is only permitted to consume
alcohol that is bought on the premises). Any sign of trouble usually draws the attention of
security personnel. Over a period of years, several city blocks in the quartier have been
entirely redesigned to suit the demands of large arts and entertainment festivals.417 The
streets, especially during summer evenings, can be jammed with festive crowds. But, as I
walk up a side street toward the large main plaza area, keeping to the shade as best I can
on this midsummer afternoon, there are no crowds milling about, no stage sets being
mounted, no vendors or barricades or security guards. Here and there, a few people walk
alone or in twos. There is a hovering fear in the air: the fear of contagion. A couple of
men, tarnished by the roughness of poverty, sit at the back of small shaded courtyard.
Busking on the street in Montreal is licensed, limiting performers to one-hour sets at any
one location (assuring the ongoing mobility of the practice). Sainte-Catherine street can
attract many buskers, but during the festivals in the precincts of the quartier des
spectacles, activities outside of planned programs are generally not tolerated.418
However, with the streets all but emptied and the absence of competition for space from
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the entertainment industry, the ordinary users can more easily stake out claims to space.
A young man with an electric guitar has set up near the end of the pedestrian-only strip of
Sainte-Catherine, the cement block traffic-barriers behind him forming a back wall. He
faces down the gently sloping street, playing for all he’s worth. The sound pouring out of
the amplifier and speaker at his feet is rich with electronic processing effects. A guitar
case laid out a couple of meters ahead of him contains a modest assortment of cash
denominations. There are not enough people on the street to form a crowd, even if he
cared to attract one. A few apparent tourists walking together slow to watch him for a
minute or two before continuing to languidly make their way up the street. He plays on,
clearly enjoying himself: the joy of playing in a wide open space—a true public stage,
even if any potential audience is small and spread out. The sound fills the space between
the tall buildings, resonating down the street.
The rhythms of the city may have been disrupted by the global forces of the pandemic but
in the interlude opened up by this disruption, other rhythms can be felt, other voices
resonate and make themselves heard. Those who cannot afford—are not afforded—their
own space may end up claiming interstitial spaces, the fragments of space and time that
are the waste product of globalized capitalism—the remainder, the useless, trivial,
commonplace. Moreover, there can be a deep pleasure in performing in a public space419
and it may be that this pleasure is increased by the transgressive nature of ‘performing
out of place.’420 This is amateur virtuosity: bringing forth what had not been realized but
merely afforded. This busker’s pleasure in the performance, in the music, in the spatial
staging, are all rewards in themselves for him, but there is nonetheless a transformation of
space for others, for all who share in the sensory horizon of his performance. In the
opening created by a crisis in the system of mass reproduction, everyday amateurs
continue to seize what they can ‘on the wing’ through various tactics and ruses.421 The
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arts of the street are notably mobile: a product of the ‘life of the streets,’ they are imbued
with the mobility of those who have no space of their own. Normally, to perform in such
a location, a busker would need to be licensed—if they were allowed to perform at all.
Today, the whole street, stretching up though to the central plaza, is permeated with
another voice: distinctive, welcome or not, an ordinary practitioner of the city speaks.
When I walk up the same stretch of Sainte-Catherine a few weeks later, instead of the
guitar soloist there is a street dance performance under way at the same spot. Three
young men (probably in their 20s), with hip hop tunes playing from a portable sound
system and a large foam-rubber mat spread out on the pavement, stage a performance
space. They take turns moving to the centre of the dance mat, solo dancing and
impressing their friends with difficult or original moves while the latter keep to the
sidelines—and keep the beat. The surrounding space is thick with the music coming from
the sound system, the deep bass beat asserting a presence, as they laugh and call backand-forth to each other. A hat is produced and ceremoniously placed out in front of the
‘stage area.’ Someone deposits some money in the hat, to cheers and a chorus of “Thank
you!” coming from the dancers. A police car cruises slowly by on the street that runs
behind the cement barricade backdrop, but if the cops notice this reclamation of public
space they pay it no mind. The dancers carry on in their enthusiasm. We have already
seen how emotion can blur our sense of insularity, and how public emotion can ground us
firmly in the common. The joy and enthusiasm of the dancers seems contagious, and it is
hard not to be entrained by the booming beat. “Yeah!”: their cheers to each other draw
the attention of passersby. The movement of the dance—of bodies in motion, producing,
reproducing rhythms—opens a different space: these other rhythms are present in the
bodies of the dancers but are also felt by passersby. Like the resonant frequencies of
music that can enlist our emotions—and in public settings can do so in ways that
specifically embroils us in the thickness of our collective being—dance sets in motion
sensory-affective responses at a level that may precede subjective reflection.422
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I would not suggest that, by taking advantage of the open space to perform—as much for
their own pleasure as for a public’s—these three young men were engaged in some kind
of revolutionary action that might lead to social transformation on a broad level. My
claim for the arts of the street is much more modest than that—but with wide-reaching
implications, nonetheless. What these dancers are doing is perfectly ordinary, commonplace, pedestrian— people engaged in one of the most common forms of socio-corporeal
pleasure: dance—yet also extraordinary, insofar as they reformulate a space of public
encounter with their own rhythms, with their own bodies, facilitated by the technological
affordances at their disposal. Amateur virtuosity: the reformulation of the everyday
according to one’s own conceptions and desires, one’s abilities and experience (within, of
course, the inevitable constraints impose by social, legal, and commercial forces). It is as
if the performing body says: “Look! I’ve acquired this space, making it into this,”
nudging the body of the other—entraining the passerby who, at a pre-reflexive level, may
‘think’ or feel: “Perhaps I can do the same? Perhaps I too can make this space other?”
The arts of the street do not offer a potential politics in the sense of providing a
theoretical model that might be developed into more practical applications; rather, they
demonstrate the intersubjective nature of everyday experience by making evident the
resonant forces and rhythmic patterns that help structure our perceptual awareness; they
show that it is possible to not only imagine but to produce a different reality in terms of
everyday socio-sensorial experience; and, they do so by having recourse to the DIY skills
of bricolage, to a fundamental improvisational impulse, and the “common places” of
everyday language, curiosity, and the propensity for play and experimentation. If there
might be a politics of the arts of the street it would, at the least, refer endlessly back to the
excess of the body, of sensation, as the ground of our potential (if not realized) being.
The arts of the street are, in this sense, political because they help realize the possible.
They act as focal points around which certain creative practices and mental-corporeal
attitudes coalesce, and as points of entry into a critical understanding of everyday life.
They can be seen as simply an amalgam of everyday cultural practices that form part of
the background of urban life; but, at the same time, they also bring into evidence—make
available to conscious interrogation—both the actual and the possible. The busker in the
metro station plays with the architectural acoustics in a way that can draw our attention to
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features in the environment that generally go unnoticed. Moreover, these features possess
a durability that helps structure the everyday, yet are themselves made possible by our
own participation in the environment. The crowd on the move activates latent acoustic
affordances throughout the station: we are participants in the production of our world, but
it is a shared world. The sounds I make as I walk—even simply the sonically absorbent
and refractive effects of my body in that space—comingle with those of the people
around me. The sound of the crowd flows around and through my body. Acoustic
awareness implicates my flesh in the flesh of the world: it means “to be doubled,
folded… to be outside and inside, opened from without and from within.”423 The
resonance of the station permeates the crowd—our bodies—and the busker’s presence
can makes us aware of this, drawing our attention to our collective participation in the
reproduction of the everyday world. Similarly, the movement of the street dancers can
entrain something in our own bodies, activating a response in us—potential movement—
that is firmly situated in the material conditions of that particular setting.
The publicness of the arts of the street (public in the sense of drawing on the resources of
a dispersed social collectivity) connects them back to the body as the first fact of our
being. For those who practice these diverse creative practices (and to some degree, those
who simply encounter and are moved by them), conscious attention is directed to one’s
perceptual enmeshment in the world, while deliberately adopting a particular orientation
and making a claim to space that in the process produces a different space—a counterspace that exists not outside of but alongside and in excess of the functional design of
space. They produce a space that was not planned or foreseen but is made possible
nonetheless precisely because of the fragmented nature of modern space. From the
simplest “I was here” graffito to well-rehearsed street performances, from the streetcorner rap duel to the playful antagonisms of punk’s DIY aesthetics, the practitioners of
these minor arts proclaim the streets for themselves, and in doing so suppose a common
space that would belong to all those who participate in its production: a politics of the
sensible in and of the everyday.
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As life slowly returns to the streets of downtown Montreal during the summer of 2020,
there are a number of street protests denouncing police violence and the systemic racism
that enables much of that violence. I witness one such demonstration, one day as I follow
my regular route from the old port up toward the Quartier des spectacles. The
demonstrators’ chants accompanied by drums resound through the streets as they march
up René-Lévesque boulevard, a wide downtown arterial nearly devoid of traffic, as office
workers from surrounding buildings are mostly working from home. “Whose streets?” a
voice calls out through a megaphone. A line of police officers on bicycles keeps pace a
block or so behind the marchers, while up ahead a couple of cruisers make sure the righthand side of the street is clear of traffic. There are only a few people here and there
walking on the street; it is otherwise very quiet. The demonstrators, like many a busker,
may be performing as much for themselves as for anyone else. “Our streets!” the
marchers proclaim, their voices filling the open space, resounding up between the
towering all-but-empty buildings that flank the boulevard. They make their way to a large
grassy lot that is often used for outdoor events during summer festivals; there, speeches
are delivered. The core of the message: the right to be—to breathe—cannot come from
the state; it is a fundamental claim that is authorized by the simple fact of our corporeal
presence in the world. Thus, while the demonstration is, ostensibly, about broadcasting a
message—an overt political message—the political import may be less in the enunciation
of a statement than in the performative act of marching and chanting together. By
engaging in the collective coordination of bodies, the demonstrators draw on the same
common corporeality of the crowd-in-motion, not unlike the mutual resonance of
musicians performing together. But, the demonstration is largely a symbolic gesture that
depends on some external factor to come into being—a cause to be defended, an issue to
be addressed. It is coalitional, in that a call to action coalesces around some specific
issue, a precise demand. But, where formal political action (exemplified by the party)
“focuses its action upon the state” it will inevitably, in the end, reproduce “state
structures within social relations.”424
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Moreover, it bears noting that the idea of The People dominates in the majority of
contemporary public political demonstrations, such as marches and public speech, as well
as various grassroots social movements (encapsulated in the chanted slogan “The people
united will never be defeated!”). Thus, by clinging to a Hobbesian concept of The People,
the contemporary political street demonstration may be understood as always already
defined within the terms of the state. But, where the political is understood as being
situated within everyday perceptual experience—in space, sensation, and our practical
involvement in the world and with each other—there, we may locate the loose
cohesiveness of the many, the coordinated heterogeneity of the multitude, that can then
express itself (if only ever provisionally) as action and as enactment of the new. The arts
of the street are thus not explicitly political in the usual sense of proclaiming a political
message. Theirs is a minor politics whose potential lies solely in their sensuousness, in
the way that they enlist bodies into the production of a different space. Unlike the
demonstration, they are eminently practical, concerned specifically with everyday life;
and, they are organized around the singular motivations of their practitioners. Their
heterogeneity assures their status as amateur arts.

4.5 Crisis and Possibility
Despite the creative effervescence that these diverse practices seem to suggest, we cannot
ignore the ways that capitalist realism seems to continually reassert itself. There is, as I
have attempted to describe, an ongoing tension between the profit motive and rational
planning of capitalism and the amateur excess of everyday creativity that the arts of the
street embody. Moreover, the crisis of space unleashed with a global pandemic has
wrought rapid and significant changes to the possibilities that present themselves in
everyday urban life. I have already noted some of these changes, with the most obvious
being the emptying of public spaces. In some cases, this has also lead to greater
regulation of the streets. Some of these measures lasted weeks or months; some seem
integrate themselves into existing apparatuses of power. In Montreal, public health
measures have included curfews that forbade all but the most essential movement of
people in the city from evening until early morning. For street performers of all kinds, not
only did potential audiences vanish but further restrictions were imposed that have
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directly impacted them.425 For more than a year and a half, no performances were
allowed in the metro stations. During the winter months, when it is usually too cold to
perform outdoors, this meant that there were no public performance spaces available. In
late 2021, buskers were welcomed back into the metro system but with far greater
restrictions. The number of permitted busing spots is limited—initially just four spots;
subsequently expanded to ten in early 2022—and prospective performers must try to get
a spot through an online reservation system (though there may be much more demand
than supply).426 The increasing shift to online platforms in many aspects of life, which
has accelerated with the pandemic, has also meant new opportunities for some buskers
who have expanded to included online performances.427 This comingling of mediated
space and the more obviously concrete space of the streets does not signal a fundamental
shift or technological break from non- or pre-digital media. As I have shown, the arts of
the street are both specific to modern urban life and touch on something that always
exceeds us; and, there is nothing non-technological about them: their precise technical
means are tied to the conditions at hand. The arts of the street do not depend upon a
separation of inside and outside, or the demarcation of an authentic form and proper
space that might remain untainted by the everyday relations and subject-forming forces of
late-capitalist society. However, moving to the virtual realm of online platforms also
moves the performance out of the urban environment of the street which is my primary
concern. For, to say that one can blur over into the other in some circumstances is not to
say that they are the same, that street-space and digital virtual-space are reduceable to
common essential elements. Nonetheless, continually changing material-technological
factors can never be ignored—as with the effects of the global COVID-19 pandemic on
everyday creativity.
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Some of the other practices discussed herein were affected differently by these events.
The music scenes of punk and hip hop cultures were limited, with concert venues closed.
But in some cases practitioners have found other means of carrying on their activities.
For example: an outdoor punk concert in a large Montreal park, organized clandestinely
and advertised through word of mouth and restricted social media.428 Street skaters, on
the other hand, may have benefited from the emptying of streets, as the disappearance of
auto traffic (as well as office workers and business owners and patrons who might
complain about the skaters), allows for many new skating opportunities. It is too early, I
believe, to make long-range predictions about the effects of this pandemic on public
space, but what is undeniable is the way that such a crisis exacerbates existing
inequities—and makes them more obvious, brings them into focus.429 At least for a time.
For as we have seen, we have a propensity—as do all organisms—to adapt and integrate
ourselves into our environment to the extent that this is possible—within what is afforded
us—though initially marked by difficulty, conflict, resistance. If capitalism is marked by
a series of crises, as Marx theorized, and the acceleration of late-stage capitalism entails
an acceleration in the pace of crises,430 then we may be all the more in need of the
improvisational muddling of DIY bricolage, of an amateur virtuosity that draws on and
remains with the common ground of a shared world, as we struggle to orient ourselves in
a continually changing world. The arts of the street help illustrate the deeply social nature
of perception and everyday corporal experience while at the same time reminding us that
it is possible to conceive, perceive and live everyday space in different ways—other than
how we normally experience it.
The project pursued throughout these pages is more descriptive than proscriptive, and as
such is not meant to provide a historical analysis or defined political response to the
ongoing crisis of capitalism. My more limited claim concerns certain characteristics of
what I have designated as arts of the street—characteristics that depend upon and can
render evident a collective sense of creativity and our perceptual enmeshment in the
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world. And as we have seen, the everyday is never fixed but always being made and
remade, such that failure—in the context of the amateur virtuosity of bricolage, of the
common-places and productive excess of our collective being—is never closure. Strict
closure is a property of formal structures; but of the enactment of the everyday, I am able
to say “I can always do it again.”431 The arts of the street encapsulate this propensity to
experiment and to seek difference and continuity—that is also characteristic of the
everyday bricoleur. As minor arts, they must always be re-performed, maintained though
active practice: mobile and malleable, they are only identifiable as such in their actual
instantiations. And ultimately, this is what distinguishes them from being a productive
activity from which a product—something properly defined—can be extracted and
rendered into simple exchange value. The arts of the street always retain something of the
useless, valueless: the negative.
In the winter of 2020, about a week before the imposition of the strict public health
measures brought on by the global pandemic, I saw a busker who I knew from my
previous research on metro musicians. We exchanged only a few words, as he was in the
middle of performing a set, but agreed to speak at greater length soon (he performed
almost every day at a few regular spots in the metro system). Soon after, the streets and
metro stations were all but emptied and I did not see him for more than a year (it was
during that time that I was forced to abandon the ethnographic research I had planned).
When I did see him again, he was busking outside of a metro station in the core of the
city. It was early evening, the weather was pleasant, and a few people had stopped to
watch and listen. His voice was both gentle and forceful, as he sang a variety of songs in
French and Spanish. It can be a tough gig, playing in the street. But here he was, still at it:
a seasoned performer who knows how to appeal to passerby while still always
performing according to his own conceptions and desires. Not many of the passersby—
including those who stopped to listen—added to the small pile of coins and bills in his
instrument case. But, this is not unusual and it did not deter him. Indeed, while for some
buskers making money is a powerful motivator, the arts of the street—in all of their
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forms—are nothing if not adaptable and, although intrinsically tied to urban space, are
never reduceable to the simple logic of the money economy. They are both of this place
(i.e. specific, contextual) and have no place of their own: ever mobile, these minor
practices express a practical curiosity that is the common lot of the species. Whether or
not we can ever truly think outside of capitalism is not a question that I have attempted to
address. Instead, what I have shown is that the arts of the street do not rely on such
formal—or proper—distinctions; rather, they draw upon and return to an excess that is
both inside and outside, accessible to perception (thus identifiable and recuperable) and
always exceeds any and all of our projects in the world. They operate in and with the
thick materiality of the world, drawing on the common creativity of amateur virtuosity,
and remind us that not only can we always begin again but that we always begin where
we already are—that the world precedes us but is ever made anew by our collective
participation in it.
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Conclusion
In the foregoing I have laid out a broad argument, drawing on many sources, to make the
case that the diverse practices that I have described as arts of the street reveal something
about an innate creative capacity that binds us to the world and each other and that
affirms the presence of possibility and the new in the everyday. I began by examining the
nature of space, the body, and perception from a largely phenomenological perspective,
inspired chiefly by the philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and then proceeded with a
critical consideration of urban experience, everyday life, and the socio-economic
relations of reproduction of late-stage capitalism, drawing primarily on the work of Henri
Lefebvre. I went on to discuss the concept of the bricoleur, arguing that the processual
and unstable nature of space and of the everyday suggest that there always remain
moments of possibility—of creativity and resistance—and that the improvisatory do-ityourself logic of bricolage, which helps us negotiate the myriad micro-decisions that
constitute our daily lives, presupposes a common ground and a realm of common skills
that bind us to each other (common = shared and average or mundane).
In the next chapter, I provided a more concretely detailed consideration of sense
perception and how the perceptual possibilities that are afforded to us are largely formed
according to the particular cultural-historical and socio-economic conditions within
which we find ourselves. Yet, despite the fact that in our mental-corporeal dispositions
and everyday activities we tend to reproduce dominant social norms and power relations,
precisely because the everyday sensorium must be conditionally reproduced—that is, reperformed—there always remain possibilities for difference, for other ways of
experiencing the world. The emotions, I have suggested, help us to negotiate the
transition between collective experience and individual subjectivity and between
‘interior’ reflexive consciousness and the pre-reflexive corporeal awareness that both
precedes and exceeds our individual presence in the world—our ‘selves,’ as self-aware.
Paying critical attention to our emotions and our everyday perceptions can open us up to
other ways of engaging with the world and with each other. Thus, a critical consideration
of how our perceptual experiences are formed by and in relation to the social and material
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conditions within which we find ourselves is essential, if we are to imagine other
possibilities—other ways of being—in both abstract and concretely pragmatic terms.
In the third chapter of this text, we reached the core concept within my broader argument:
the arts of the street—what they are, how the function, and what they suggest in terms of
the overarching theoretical concerns I have explored. There is no need to review in full
detail the different ways that these arts take shape and express themselves. What is
essential can be summarized with a few key ideas. The first of these considers the
composition of this loose class of practices: what makes them arts and, more specifically,
arts of the street. I have delineated these sets of practices as forms of creative techne,
insofar as they involve sets of identifiable material and spatial-corporeal habits and
dispositions that play with various elements of urban space and everyday experience in
late-stage capitalist society. They are arts in the sense that they propose some other way
of experiencing the world; they suggest what is merely latent. They open up a different
space. However modest their effects may be, they remain testaments to the possible
within the mundane: the new, as emergent in the routine reproduction of our habituated
attitudes/aptitudes.
Crucially, these creative practices are specifically tied to the streets: historically, they
have all taken form on street corners and in back alleys, in public squares and subway
stations, and they continue to play with the materiality and the spatio-temporal
possibilities that the street affords. As such, these creative activities act as forms of
resistance by acquiring a space, claiming a remainder, and redirecting it to some other
use. And, while it is true these arts can be, and frequently are, simply reabsorbed into the
seemingly limitless circulation of commodities and value production that characterize
late-stage capitalist society, they nonetheless offer other ways of perceiving—and
thinking—space and our everyday socio-sensorial relations. This is so, in the first place,
precisely because of their continuing association with ‘the street’ in the general sense that
I have described—for the street always retains an element of excess, something of the
negative, the useless, the grime of what is left-over and the untameable of what was
already there. The arts of the street seize this excess, poach upon planned space without
ever establishing their own formal properties—or, if they seem to do so, by becoming
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commercially successful (e.g. top-selling hip hop artists, professionalized busker
festivals, etc.), they nonetheless always offer themselves as forms of do-it-yourself
resistance that can open onto other possibilities, other ways of perceiving, conceiving,
and living (in) shared space. These creative urban practices are tied directly to the spatial
realm of late-stage capitalism while simultaneously suggesting some negative remainder
that always exceeds capitalist recuperation.
The arts of the street thus act as forms of creative resistance that find their source from
beyond the specific conditions of modernity and global capitalism: this is another key
point. They are instantiations of the improvisational approach—attitude, or style—of
bricolage, which itself expresses a creative impulse that animates us as individuals while
drawing upon and returning to a pre-reflexive corporeal awareness that binds us to our
shared environments. The arts of the street formulate themselves within and in reaction to
the conditions of late-stage capitalism—the spatial-sensorial order that lends cohesion to
the flow of perceptual experience in the contemporary world—while also suggesting
something deeper, transhistorical: a pre-subjective perceptual presence in the world that
provides a foundation for subsequent conscious reflection and action. The arts of the
street thus act as a sort of bridge between Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and the role
of reflection, interrogation, and the perceptual faith in lived experience, and Lefebvre’s
critical treatment of space, everyday life, and the sense of possibility that inheres in the
everyday. The arts of the street are pragmatic responses to the conditions of late-capitalist
urban life: they claim a spaces of inhabitance for themselves, without formalizing
property relations. I also detailed how Jacques Rancière’s theorization of critical art is
helpful in further exploring the arts of the street and understanding them as forms of
everyday resistance. We saw how these various minor arts express a politics that revolves
around other possibilities in how we sense and share space, in how we parcel out—
distribute—the sensible in our everyday interactions: a politics of the sensible that offers
an open-ended space of encounter not designed by the professional, the planner, and the
instrumental logic of rational management. We are in the realm of the everyday amateur.
In the final chapter, we saw in more concrete detail how the fluid, unstable nature of the
arts of the street means that they always retain some unruly productivity: a negative
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excess that reminds us of the pre-subjective—excessive—common ground that precedes
our conscious reflection and that expresses itself in the common spaces of everyday
speech, curiosity, and improvised experimentation. This is the virtuosic in the mundane,
in the ordinary, the common: a propulsion to muddle one’s way through, to improvise onthe-wing according to a particular orientation—or disposition—but without resorting to a
totalizing plan. Again: virtuosity in this context does not refer to an elite ability or display
of talent that distinguishes the few from the many. Rather, following Virno, the amateur
virtuosity of everyday creativity is an expression of the many: it is the common
inheritance of the species. As such, it reminds us of the common ground of perceptual
awareness, of our pre-reflexive corporeal presence in the world. Thus, while the arts of
the street gather together a range of skills and refined abilities, of interests and attitudes
that practitioners develop in relation to specific features of the urban environment, they
also suggest that the ability to make evident the latent—to materialize mere possibility—
extends beyond these particular sets of practices: it is an ability that helps us orient
ourselves as we take up our diverse projects in the world.
Of course, the objection might be raised that all of this is fine and interesting but if, as has
been suggested, we are indeed transitioning into some new form of social order—or at
least one in which the very nature of productive activity and of the social and economic
relations that this engenders have been radically altered—then do the points that have
been made concerning the arts of the street have any import at all in the contemporary
context? Put differently: could it be said that the arts of the street, as I have described
them, belong to an order that is giving way to some other—perhaps even more
constrictive—arrangement of socio-political forces and material-economic relations of
production? In yet simpler terms: do the arts of the street, as such, have any relevance
today? My answer to this last question (perhaps unsurprisingly, given that I am only
addressing it now) is an unequivocal yes. Beyond their significance in understanding
certain aspects of everyday modern experience, the arts of the street continue to be
relevant to considerations of how we might bring about different ways of engaging with
our environments and with each other. They are thus political, as I have argued, while
also—or: precisely by—deliberately eschewing the formal realm of political discourse.
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I would note that I am as yet unconvinced by the claim that we have experienced an
unbroachable break with the past. Postmodernist declamations aside, we do not appear to
have irrevocably left the past behind any more than the past determines an inevitable
future for us. Certainly, we have witnessed significant changes in the social order as local
economies are more firmly integrated into a global economic system that subsumes local
concerns, knowledges, and practices, rendering them into seemingly dematerialized
commodities (i.e. alienated from the means and moment of their production and made
available for free circulation within an ever-expanding market). But, while many of the
concerns associated with the socio-cultural and material-economic homogenizing effects
of globalization are well-founded, the arts of the street are not subject to these
pressures—or, at least not in the same ways. They are not threatened with extinction
precisely because they have evolved with, or alongside of, modern capitalist society; but,
they also touch on something that is transhistorical, that is fundamental to human
experience, modern or otherwise. As do all of our activities, they formulate themselves
within existing conditions and can be largely reproductive of those same conditions, but
at the same time—and this has been central to my overarching argument—they draw
upon, and draw our attention to, the excess of the world (in the broadest sense of the
word), an excess that is also that of pre-reflexive perception, of the objective (i.e. presubjective) possible body that finds expression in the everyday débrouillardise of
amateur virtuosity (i.e. an endless propensity to experiment, to improvise).
The arts of the street are by their nature always incomplete, always suggest some other
possibility. They come into being in their enactment as creative activities, but never
assume formal properties such that they may be fully identified and thereby fully
recuperated by the forces of productivity and value creation. It might be countered that
the foregoing claims seems to support the idea of an ever-expanding realm to be
colonized and reappropriated by the forces of capital. However, while it may be true that
the creative forms and practices encompassed within the arts of the street may offer new
terrains to be commodified, what is more important is the fact that they represent both
something intrinsic to the species (bricolage, common creativity) but also always posit
something the supersedes them—and that surpasses us—that both gives them ever new
possibilities and undoes them, as distinctive sets of practices. Like Rancière’s critical art,
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these minor arts have a habit of collapsing back in on themselves, of dissolving
themselves into the common techniques that support the everyday world. I have already
discussed the idea of failure as possibility, and it returns here. By ‘not succeeding’
(exemplified by the anti-professionalism of punk), the arts of the street always remain
open to future possibilities: they refuse the terms of ‘success’ dictated by the state, by
capital, by formal property and private profit. Indeed, we might say that, just as the very
existence of the capitalist depends on that of the worker while the obverse is patently not
true, so too we can say that late-stage capitalist expansion depends on the very kind of
endless productivity expressed by the arts of the street while these practices themselves
escape capitalist logic, finding their origins in a transhistorical creative instinct that is
intrinsic to the species—a force that can never become property, that never assumes a
formal identity. It is in this way, finally, that the arts of the street continue to be
relevant—are, as I have suggested, perhaps more relevant than ever: precisely because of
their status as amateur arts, because the amateur does what they do for the love of it only.
This is crucial: the work of the amateur operates outside of, or beyond, the profit motive.
While such works may have some use that can be recouped and converted into value,
there also always remains some playful uselessness in the tinkerings of the amateur
bricoleur. I do it just because. Because: I can. And, because I can always do it again.
The arts of the street are amateur arts, minor modes of operating in the world that draw
upon and return to the common spaces of creativity and curiosity. And, as I have
indicated, this common sense of curiosity and experimentation also provides a basis for
reflection and interrogation, for critique and for creative action. If the amateur is the one
who operates outside or on the margins of a proper(tied) space, then the amateur is also
the one who can act as critic, because not constrained by the formalism of the
professional. What is needed in the face of the crisis of late-capitalism is not so much
anti-professionalism but non-professionalism—everyday creativity—as Andy Merrifield
argues.432 And it is this, finally, that I contend make the arts of the street relevant at a
broader theoretical level. Beyond being forms of practical creative action, they suggest an
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approach—an orientation, or style—that operates as a form of amateur critique, of
amateur theory. Indeed, we might remember that Kant himself argues that one of the
roles of philosophy is to critique the other disciplines—or faculties—by eliminating
errors of reasoning: to keep them honest, as it were. For Kant, philosophical critique is, in
this sense, a minor faculty, as opposed to the professionalized disciplines such as
medicine and law.433 Similarly, Edward Said puts forward the argument that the
intellectual-as-amateur is precisely the one who is best able to critique dominant norms
and ideas.434 The amateur does not answer to the legitimization of the professional, and is
thus freer, in a sense, to offer honest criticism.
Although I do not make quite such extensive claims for the arts of the street as might be
made for developed critical theory, I do suggest that they are critical in that they offer
themselves as examples of how we might engage with the world and each other, and—
more importantly—how we already do these things, and how we continue to do so on a
quotidian basis. And though it may seem strange that I end by citing Immanuel Kant—
that most rational and systematic of thinkers—my entire argument is, after all, positioned
within a tradition of critical thought whose history has afforded me certain possibilities—
and I would be at odds with my founding assumptions, were I not to acknowledge these
influences. But, it is with this supposition that I both summarize the foregoing pages and
suggests further possibilities: aside from their practical productivity, the arts of the street
remind us of the common source of creativity and of our capacity to act and to act anew.
They show that whatever ability we may have to make a different world, we depend upon
capacities that are already afforded to us. The arts of the street demonstrate the creative
and critical potential of bricolage—not simply as an approach to making but as a way of
thinking and of being, and of being together.
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